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LEIGH RAYMOND & SALLY K. FAIRFAX"

Fragmentation of Public Domain Law
and Policy: An Alternative to the
"Shift-to-Retention" Thesis"
ABSTRACT
Conventional wisdom asserts that after a century of disposition,
Congress changed course and began retaining land in federal
ownership during the Progressive Era. This "shift narrative"
shapes our understandingof conservationhistory and federal land
holdings in the Western United States. Unfortunately,it is largely
incorrect. We propose an alternative narrative that emphasizes
insteada fragmentationof policy. Fragmentationgrew in part out
of changes in the nation'spolitical economy after the Civil War.
Expanding centralgovernment power in some cases underwrote
federal ownership of natural resources. However, the diverse
priorities of increasingly effective corporate interests and scientific/professional groups assured a fragmentation of policy.
Fragmentationalso blossomed when Progressive Era theories of
property began to gain support. These more social and utilitarian
views of ownershipdid not replace their Lockean antecedents, but
simply supplemented and confused American ideas of ownership.
The result to this day is a conflicted vision ofproperty that suggests
to us a needfor a more dialecticalanalysis of property rights along
the lines of G.W. Hegel. The final part of the article details a
revisionist history of public domain policy based on the politicaleconomic changes just described. Rather than a sudden or incremental shift to retention, we describe a wide variety of policy
decisions.Among these are choices to strongly retainsome selected
lands, retain and later dispose of others, weakly retain some lands,
split the estates of still others, and only nominally retain a good
portion of the remainder. We conclude that the idea of a shift to
federal ownership conceals the diverse public domain tenure
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arrangements and makes meaningful conversationabout historic
policies and future paths more difficult. Better understandingof
both the political-economicsetting and the ideas of property of the
period, we argue, will help us to better understand the resulting
policies as they affect the present day.
I. INTRODUCTION

A. Goals and Structure of Paper
The received wisdom tells us that near the close of the nineteenth
century, after more than one hundred years of granting and selling land to
raise money and to encourage orderly settlement of the western territories,
the federal government reconsidered. It decided to retain at first selected
lands, and then, essentially, all public domain lands in federal ownership.
This reorientation of policy is typically portrayed as a "shift" from land
"disposition" 1 to land "retention." It is generally described as a decision by
the wise men of government to stop the pillage of our common heritage
and to scientifically manage those lands remaining in federal ownership for
conservation purposes.2 The standard "shift-to-retention" story, as we will

1. In this article, we are not going to concern ourselves much with the problems in the
construction of "disposition" or the "disposition era." However, an argument could be made
that the glossing of the cash and credit sales, preemption, grants to states and corporations,
and free land elements of the disposition era is not reasonable. Much of the land passed to the
states was not, for example, entirely disposed of-it remains under state management. See JON
A. SoUDER & SALLYK. FAIRFAX, STATE TRUST LAND: HISTORY, MANAGEMENT, AND SUsrAINABLE

USE 6,18-24 (1996). For build up on the homestead act see, e.g., HELENE SARA ZAHLER, EASTERN
WORKING MEN AND NATIONAL LAND POLICY, 1829-1862 (1941). For detail on the disposition
era policies, see PAUL W. GATEs, HISTORY OF PUIc LAND LAW DEVELOPMENT (1968).
2. The classic "aha" story is Gifford Pinchot's formulation of his now-famous horseback
ride through Rock Creek Park "The forest and its relation to streams and inland navigation,
to water power and flood control; to the soil and its erosion; to coal and oil and other
minerals; to fish and game; and many another possible use or waste of natural
resources....Here were not isolated and separate problems....Here were no longer a lot of
different, independent, and often antagonistic questions, each on its own separate little island,
as we had been in the habit of thinking. In place of them, here was one single question with
many parts. Seen in this new light, all these separate questions fitted into and made up the
one great central problem of the use of the earth for the good of man." GIFFORD PINCHOT,
BREAKING NEw GROUND 322 (1947) [hereinafter BNG]. Pinchot credits himself with having
discovered consermation, a whole new way of thinking about the world. See id. But he also
clearly expressed the driving image of his confreres in the Roosevelt administration: "the crux
of the gospel...lay in a rational and scientific method of making basic technological decisions
through a single, central authority." SAMUE P. HAYS, CONSERVATION AND THE GOSPEL OF
FpRqCMJcY: THE PROGRESSIVE CONSERVATION MOVEMENr, 1890-1920,271 (1959).
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refer to it, thus depicts a clear change in policy direction, generally
presented with strong moral implications.
The purpose of this article is to reconsider this standard narrative
regarding changes in public land law and policy at the turn of the century.
Much of the narrative is misleading in ways that are of great importance to
current debate. The monolithic nature of the term "retention" masks a wide
variety of policies and tenure arrangements that presently operate on the
public lands. The moral power of the asserted "shift" obscures multiple
and conflicting motivations behind the diverse policies enacted in a way
that prevents clear discussion and understanding of many public land
conflicts to the present day.
We believe it is important to understand the "shift-to-retention"
story because we are among those who believe that narratives have power
in law,3 in policy definition and analysis,' and in decision making.' Policy
stories tell us what the problem is, who caused it, whether things are
improving or disintegrating, and what to do about it.' They are especially
useful when the conditions for policy making are uncertain, complex, or
difficult to explain. We argue that the "shift-to-retention" story is a useful
summary of one side-the Progressives'--in a complex and protracted
debate. But, like any tale told by a passionate advocate, it is a poor guide
to what actually happened and why. Without doubt, the narrative has had
a powerful grip on public domain policy and the conservation movement,
more generally, throughout the twentieth century. We do not cavil at the
simplifications of the "shift-to-retention" narrative per se, for it is a model
and perforce must simplify the reality it represents. Our objections to the
"shift-to-retention" tale arise from the core ideas and events that are
omitted, concealed, and distorted therein. Those inaccuracies confound our
understanding of both historic and current choices. Therefore, we believe
an improved story is needed.
We propose to weave a different tale in which policy does not shift
in unity but rather fragments. In our account, public domain policy does
not manifest a single coherent vision, but splits onto a number of frequently incompatible paths, reflecting different combinations of ideas
about the nature of government, the nature of ownership, and the
economic and environmental priorities for developing specific resources.
There was no single moral direction or guiding light to these multiple
3. See, e.g., CAROL M. ROSE, PROPERTY AND PERSUASION: ESAY ON THE HISTORY, THEORY,
AND RHETORIC OF OWNERSHIP ch. 2, at 25-45 (1994).
4. See, e.g., EMERY ROE, NARRATIVE POLICY ANALYSIS: THEORY AND PRACTICE (1994).

5. See generallyDeborah A. Stone, CausalStories and the Formationof Policy Agendas, 104
POL ScL Q. 281 (1989); William Cronon, A Placefor Stories:Nature, Historyand Narrative,78 J.
AM. HIST. 1347 (1992).

6. See Stone, supra note 5, at 282.
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policies. Instead, multiple visions of ownership and equity engendered
multiple and conflicting policy solutions.
We present our revised narrative in five sections. Part I will dearly
identify our target-the "shift-to-retention" story as it has appeared in the
literature over the years. We will observe the standard narrative in its
original telling and as it continues to shape our understanding of public
resource management and institutions. The bulk of the article will consider
the details of Progressive Era public domain policy with an increasing
specificity. Two subsequent sections will put the standard story into the
wide-angle context of social, political, and intellectual forces of the same
era. Because our narrative focuses on two basic elements, government and
land ownership, we will first focus our attention on late nineteenth century
elaboration and diversification of ideas about (1) the role of government,
and (2) the role of property in American society. This recitation of ideas in
conflict and transition attacks the "shift-to-retention" thesis indirectly. We
simply wonder why-in a period in which basic assumptions about the
role of government in society and the economy, the appropriate form of
democratic decision making, the nature of property, and the meaning of
land ownership were all undergoing fundamental reorientation-would
anyone suppose that public land policy, at a key intersection of those ideas
and forces, would emerge expressing a single clear theme? More specifically, both sections identify some lines of fracture along which we argue
that public land policy fragmented.
Part II is broad, discussing major changes in the economic and
social context of government action that set the stage for public domain
policy fragmentation. Although some of the discussion is familiar, we retell
the story for two reasons. First, public land law and policy is frequently
overlooked or underplayed in general histories. When the public domain
story is told, it therefore tends to be experienced in relatively pure bites, as
environmental or conservation history, as if public land law were separate
from, or could be understood apart from, the rest of the nation and the
world in the nineteenth century. Context is needed. Second, the Progressive
narrative about government, especially regarding the central role of the
federal government, has emerged in recent times as either inevitable or,
more recently, the way things always were. We need to understand the
contingent nature of what was self-evident to Progressive advocates
because many of those contested assumptions are coming under intense
reconsideration in our own time.7 Our effort to make those points will

7. Our favorite example is the treatment of the early acquisition of the public domain
in GEORGE CAMERON COGGINS Er AL, FEDERAL PuBLIc LAND AND RssouRcEs LAw, 4546 (3d

ed. 1993). The authors, determined advocates of federal authority over federal land, ignore
the state cessions and the agreements made with the states during the 1780s regarding the
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focus on four very much related elements: (1)the emergence of the federal
or central level as "the" government, and a growing sense of a continental
nation;' (2) the rise of administrative science and scientific management as
the core element of democratic decision making; (3) the rise of a national
economy; and (4) the conflicted relationship between government and the
modem business enterprise. Our discussion emphasizes the importance of
late nineteenth century German ideas in underwriting many of these
changing attitudes about government.
Part I focuses closer attention on one aspect of the diversification
of ideas and programs that is especially relevant to the public domain:
changes in thinking about property. We describe a complex amalgam of
ideas about ownership that evolved both prior to and during the Progressive Era. New property theories specifically did not displace the Lockean
notions of property expressed in early American nation building. Rather,
in the altered social and political climate of the nineteenth century,
American ideas of property fragmented. While we continued to embrace
Locke, most transparently in the intensifying deference to homesteaders
and "actual settlers," we also began adding new and quite different ideas
more appropriate to the rise of the corporation and the nation. Our
discussion emphasizes a broadening of what can be owned and who can
own it; a broadening of what the idea of ownership entails, including a
growing separation of title from control, which is central in public domain
policy; and an expansion in the ends that a property system serves. These
newer notions of property underwrite much of the fragmentation in public
domain policy. We also suggest the relevance of a Hegelian theory of
property to our fragmentation thesis. We underscore that we are not
talking about an incremental broadening of ideas about property, or some
old ideas and some new that dilute each other into a sloppy middle ground
between Locke and Progressive Era thinkers such as Morris Cohen. We are
talking about a fragmentation of ideas and policies, a simultaneous pursuit
of incompatible notions. Hegel's framework for understanding property
tries to encompass the contradictions that we see expressed in American

public domain and begin the acquisition process with the Louisiana Purchase. See id.

8. See Joseph L.Sax, Do CommunitiesHave Rights? The National Parksas a Laboratoryof
L REv. 499,502 (1984) (discussing the federal government as privileged
New Ideas, 45 U. PUTr.
in the public lands context).
9. We use the term "actual settler" frequently and should point out that we mean by it
a person, not necessarily a male or a citizen, who enters the public domain with the intent of
working the land her or himself. Dispositions to actual settlers can be distinguished from sales
to land speculators (although "actual settlers" also speculated in land), and grants to states
and corporations, such as railroads. The basic distinction we make reflects the Lockean notion
that an actual settler intends to possess the land by mixing his or her sweat with it. See infra
text accompanying notes 312-22.
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ideas about property and in the core fissures of public domain policy. We
suggest that his ideas provide a useful way to view the current situation on
much of the public lands.
Part IV turns specifically to the issue of public land law and
describes in detail the three forms of fragmentation that constitute our
thesis. Our narrative starts shortly after the Civil War, focuses on the
period between 1890 and 1916, and concludes with the Taylor Grazing Act
of 19340 In our retelling, we supplement the standard "shift-to-retention"
story with enough caveats, complications, and counter-narratives to
establish the plausibility of our fragmentation hypothesis as described
above. While some lands were effectively retained by government during
this period, many more were not, including vast areas of minerals and
grazing land that are typically described as retained. Government control
over these resources also splintered into numerous distinct agencies and
bureaucracies, with internal feuding and antagonistic policy agendas often
being the result. And finally, we show that the resources themselves were
increasingly carved apart by policy and institutional fragmentation. All of
this fragmentation was heavily influenced by the social/political changes
described in Parts II and III.
Part V draws some theoretical and practical implications from our
rejection of the "shift-to-retention" model in favor of the fragmentation
story. It summarizes the forms of policy fragmentation we describe and
uses them to build an alternative framework for discussing public domain
policy and law. We conclude that our present public land policies are not
the residue of a retention program, but rather a complex bundle of
mutually incompatible programs, each reflecting different ideas about
government, property, and the exacting priorities of professional groups
and their constituents. We suggest that focusing on eras in which a
particular policy dominates discussion, and which are often inscribed as
good and evil, creates enormous barriers to understanding both where we
are in public lands law and policy and how we got here. Our ability to
understand policy history and engage in policy debate would be enhanced
by an explicit focus on entitlements. By this we mean an appreciation of the
familiar Lockean and Progressive elements of our inheritance, and also an
understanding of their continuing incompatibility. The nation's centurylong unwillingness to fully embrace or eschew either is characteristic of
programs which operate on the vast majority of public lands and is well
expressed in the approach to property and government described by Hegel.

10.

See generally E. LOUISE PEPPER, THE CLOSING OF THE PuBuc DOMAIN: DISPOSAL AND

RESERVATION PouaLES, 1900-1950 (1951). Peffer is the best source on the Taylor Grazing Act
as the end of the relevant period.
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B. The Standard Story Recounted
It is important to have some dear targets before we start shooting.
What is a "shift-to-retention," and how is this theme encountered in the
literature? What were the problems that retention advocates perceived,
what did they advocate, and how has the "shift-to-retention" been
presented, at the time it ostensibly occurred, and to subsequent generations?
1. The Problem
In the standard story," the "shift-to-retention" policy addressed
two basic problems, namely waste and greed. Although greed continues
to generate most of the soaring rhetoric about the nineteenth century, waste
was a major focus of attention. Benjamin Hibbard's 1924 classic A History
of the PublicLands Policies described the situation:
[A] great number of men prominent in politics, educators,
editors, and others of public spirited character became
suddenly awakened to the patent fact that the natural
resources of the country could not be lavishly used, and
wantonly wasted indefinitely without great danger of
2
ultimate disaster."
Noting, for example, that the American public viewed coal and
energy resources as "inexhaustible," Gifford Pinchot, that ubiquitous
Progressive Era icon, complained that even in the face of dwindling
reserves, only five percent of the coal actually mined was used. Similarly,
even after many oil and gas fields had already failed, "vast amounts of gas
[were] poured into the air and great quantities of oil into the streams." 3
More characteristically, Pinchot was appalled by the waste caused by forest

11. The literature is, of course, endless. Our discussion below features Gifford Pinchot,
a prolific writer and reasonable exemplar of the era, with a supporting pastiche of
commentaries, including PEPPER, GATES, HAYS, CLAWSON, DANA AND FAIRFAX, HIBBARD, ISE,
LooMis, ROBBINS, AND UDALL See, e.g., MARION CLAWSON, UNCLE SAM'S ACRES (1951) (written

while Clawson was Director of the BLM) [hereinafter UNCLE SAM'S ACRESL MARION CLAWSON
& BURNELL HELD, THE FEDERAL LANDS: THEIR USE AND MANAGEMENT (1957); Marion Clawson,
Reassessing Public Lands Management, in PRIVATE RIGHTS AND PUBLIC LANDS 17 (Phillip N.
Truluck ed., 1983) (hereinafter Reassessing];SAMUEL TRASK DANA & SALLY K. FAIRFAX, FORESr
AND RANGE POuCY: ITS DEVELOPMENT IN THE UNITED STATES (2d ed. 1980); BENJAMIN HORACE
HIRBARD, PH.D., A IH-ORY OF THE Pu ic LAND POUCIES (1924); JOHN ISE, THE UNITED STATES
FOREST POLICY (1920); JOHN B. LOOMIS, INTEGRATED PUBLIC LANDS MANAGEMENT PRINCIPLES
AND APPuCATIoNS To NATIONAL FORE -s, PARKS, WILDLIFE REFUGES, AND BLM LANDS (1993);

RoY M. ROBBINS, OUR LANDED HERITAGE: THE PuBIuc DOMAIN 1776-1936 (1942) and STEWART
L.UDALL, THE QUIET CRISIS (1963).
12. HIBBARD, supranote 11, at 472.
13. GIFFORD PiNCHOT, THE FIGHT FOR CONSERVATION 7 (1910) [hereinafter THE FIGHT].
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fires; failure to replant after harvest; and failure to protect soil, water, and
waterways on which our prosperity depended. Waste was rampant.
The greed was of two varieties, general and corporate. Pinchot
noted that "[flew passions of the human mind are stronger than land
hunger," 14 and the "superb practical optimism" of the American people led
them to a short-sighted inability to plan for future resource needs.15 The
common man required uncommon leadership. However, the progressive
conservationists focused their ire on corporate greed and monopolies. Roy
Robbin's classic Our Landed Heritage: The Public Domain 1776-1936
concluded that at the turn of the nineteenth century,
a few thinking men beg[aln to realize that the nation's
natural resources were being exploited in such an alarming
fashion that the time was near when these vast sources of
wealth would be completely under the control of a few
individuals who had no regard for their proper utilization.... The agency most responsible for this exploitation was
not the individual farmer who typified the earlier period of
American history, but the corporation which with abundant
capital at its disposal was able to appropriate large areas of
valuable land and often to exact an exorbitant tribute from
the people who were attempting to build up the civilization
of the country.. .[The abuses which accompanied the
corporate exploitative processes were such that many
persons began to wonder if the very foundations of democratic America were not in danger.'
2. The Solution-PublicLand Retention and Scientific Management
The Progressive Era solution to the problems of waste and greed
was twofold: government land retention and scientific management. The
basic notion of land retention contained two elements: an end to disposition of land and resources, hence permanent government ownership of the
land; and thereafter, increasingly aggressive federal acquisition of title,
jurisdiction, and management control' Government retention and
management of land was widely described as the necessary first step in
addressing waste and greed.
Arthur Newton Pack, for example, wrote in 1923 that central
government ownership of forested lands was the "sole remedy" for a
number of reasons: "first, because the government, being a continuing

14.
15.
16.
17.

Id. at 13.
Id. at 4-5.
ROBBINS, supranote 11, at 301.
See Reasesing, supranote 11, at 20-21.
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entity, can alone afford to hold land long enough to await the second
growth timber crop; and secondly, because lands thus held may be
protected from fire without encountering the much mooted question of
conflicting authority.""' Jonathan Ise discusses the "necessity" of government ownership in terms of obviating the fears of artificial price controls,
stability in the lumber market, reduced waste, and provision for proper
reforestation.19 Luther Gulick, himself a major figure in the emergence of
scientific management theory, described the retention program as a "road
to salvation." Writing in 1951, Gulick viewed the program as defined by
"an unconscious 'export of technology,"' from Western Europe advocating
"positive governmental action including the retention of a large part of the
public domain forever as a forest preserve.""0
Land retention was first and foremost intended to provide support
for actual settlers on the public domain. This fact is almost always obscured,
both by end of the twentieth century environmental advocates who want
to present the "shift-to-retention" story as a move toward preservation, and
by the progressive land managers themselves, whose reach for land to
manage far exceeded their grasp. Nevertheless, Gifford Pinchot reminds us
forcefully that "[tihe single object of the public land system of the United
States.. .is the making and maintenance of prosperous homes."2 1 The future
of the nation was, in this view as in Jefferson's, tied to the special characteristics of the small holder and avoidance of foreign systems of tenantry.'
The most valuable citizen of this or any other country is the
man who owns the land from which he makes his living. No
other man has such a stake in the country. No other man
lends such steadiness and stability to our national life.
Therefore no other question concerns us more intimately
than the question of homes. Permanent homes for ourselves,
our children, and our Nation.'
Herein we observe a fundamental rift within the Progressive
vision. Although Pinchot vowed to stand for the actual settlers as long as
he "had the strength to stand for anything," "' he nevertheless generally
opposed proposals that opened land within forest reserves to agricultural

18. ARTHUR NEwroN PACK, OUR VANISHING FORESTS 110 (1923).
19. See ISE, supra note 11, at 366-68.
20. LUTHER HALSEY Guuc, AMERICAN FORESTRY, A STUDY OF GOVERNMENT
ADMINISrRATION AND EcONOMIc CONmOL 11-12 (1951).
21. THE FIGHT, supra note 13, at 11.
22. See id. at 13-14. Compare Thomas Jefferson on the Agrarian Ideal, 1787, in MAJOR
PROBLEMS IN AMERICAN ENVIRON ENrAL HISTORY: DOCUMENTS AND ESSAYS 141, 141-42
(Carolyn Merchant ed., 1993).

23.

THE FIGHT, supra note 13, at 21.

24.

Id. at 30.
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homesteading. This straddle was justified by the Progressive's view of
science as essential. The theory seemed to be that wise management of the
water, timber, and other natural resources on the reserved lands would
support home building on the unreserved public domain.'
Science was the key element of this wise management. Again, from
Pinchot: "The first duty of the human race is to control the earth it lives
upon."' According to the Progressives, the essential element of this control
was comprehensive, integrated, government-led resource development and
management. This embrace of science was first and foremost a reflection
of a growing belief in scientists' ability to control the natural world and
bend it to human will.' Some naysayers, Pinchot noted, had once believed
that fires were acts of God, which came in the natural order of things. In
1910, scientific foresters knew better. "To-day we understand that forest
fires are wholly within the control of men."'
But the embrace of science also reflected Progressive Era beliefs
about legitimate and efficient decision making. Progressives were generally
suspicious of the disruptive and potentially dangerous political process.
Deeply impressed by the social upheavals and economic struggles of the
late nineteenth century, they believed that social and economic problems
should be addressed by "experts who would undertake scientific investigations and devise workable solutions."' Many early commentators on
Progressive Era conservation evinced a generic dismay at Congress'
complicity in what they viewed as the evils of the nineteenth century
disposition programs. The inability of Congress to deal intelligently with
the nation's public resources was caused in part, according to Jonathan Ise,
by "the inability of Congress to pursue an intelligent policy regarding
anything..3o

25. Compare Peffer's discussion of Pinchot dragging his feet on opening national forest
land to homesteading until he realizes that failure to make some concessions threatens the

reservations more generally, PsE;ER, supra note 10, at 325, with Pinchot's description of his
own activities: behind his back the US. Geological Survey had approved some national forest
land for homestead entry which was neither suitable nor intended for agriculture and "passed
promptly and fraudulently into the hands of lumbermen." BNG, supranote 2, at 321.
26. THE FIGHT, supra note 13, at 45.
27.

See generally GEORGE PERKINS MARSH, MAN AND NATURE (1864) (frequently and

inaccurately discussed as a paean to preservation, when in fact, it is a celebration of the ability
of science to define effective control over the natural world).
28. THE FIGHT, supra note 13, at 45.
29. HAYS, supra note 2, at 267. See also id. at 264-71. See generallyLouise P. Fortman & Sally
K. Fairfax, American ForestryProfessionalismin the Third World: Some PreliminaryObservations,
EcON. & POL WKLY., Aug. 12, 1989, at 1839 (explaining that science privileged college

education as against on-the-ground experience, and proceeded on the assumption that locals
were simply Self-serving exploiters rather than knowledgeable managers of a resource).
30. ISE, supranote 11, at 371.
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Yet, the same commentators had to deal with legislation that was
central to their narrative. Incredibly, what usually happened was the story
line blurred and the narrator simply asserted that there was no meaningful
process or history behind the congressional action. The 1891 forest
reservation authority was, according to Stewart Udall, "apparently
innocuous, and its potential did not penetrate the minds of the adjourning
members. Committees had not considered it; its adoption contravened the
rules of both Houses; it was not debated;.. .[A]s a piece of legislation, it was
a fluke: one of the most far-reaching conservation decisions ever made was
ironically consummated in half-hidden haste."31 Whatever "good"
happened in Congress was either an accident or a miracle.3'
The scientific orientation of the Progressives was not, however,
exclusively oriented toward government decision making. Samuel P.Hays
described the scientific element in terms of greater efficiency-foresight
and planning that would direct human affairs, both public and private.
Hays noted that the Progressive Era government officials maintained close
contact with the burgeoning engineering and other professional societies,
and were advocates of more efficient mining methods and use of byproducts from iron and steel manufacture.'
In spite of the technological transformation that was taking place
throughout society, the conservationists argued that the only way to
achieve rational, comprehensive, scientific decision making was on
government owned land. Many were convinced that conservative, scientific
management would never be embraced by corporations whose only goal
was short-term profit. Indeed, one of the ironies of the Progressive Era was
that government ownership, which is generally and appropriately
characterized as a manifestation of growing federal regulatory authority,
appeared necessary because of inadequate constitutional authorities to
control private land use.' Hence, the straddle on actual settlers-land was

31.

32.

UDALL, supra note 11, at 113.
See, e.g., ISE, supra note 11, at 116-18 for the accident thesis. See also Sally K. Fairfax &

A.Dan Tarlock, No Waterfor the Woods: A CriticalAnalysis of U.S.v. New Mexico, 15 IDAHO L
REv. 509,534 n.106 (1979); Harold K. Steen, The Originsand Significance of the NationalForest
System, in ORIGNS OF THE NATIONAL FOIRWi A CENTENNIAL SYmPOSIUM 3, 6 (Harold K. Steen
ed., 1992) (confessing that "historians--myself included-have managed to maintain a fiction
that Congress didn't know what it was voting on when it ratified the process to create forest
reserves by presidential proclamation").
33. See HAYS, supra note 2, at ch. VII, 122-46 (exploring this notion of efficiency as the core
of conservation). See also RICHARD T. ELY UT AL, THE FOUNDATIONS OF NATIONAL PROSPERITY
(1917), discussed in HAYS, supra note 2, at 123.
34. In spite of the growth of the federal bureaucracy and the expanding sense of
nationhood that we shall describe in Part II, it was nevertheless not at all clear at the start of
the twentieth century that the federal government had authority to direct the management
of private forests or private lands abutting important watersheds and waterways.
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for them, but federal authority existed on public, not private, lands. Pinchot
bragged that the Forest Service not only took the position that "the small
man had the first right to the natural resources of the West," but was also
the first to "make it stick. 'Better help a poor man make a living for his
family than help a rich man get richer stilL' That was our battle cry and our
rule of life.'r However, on the same page, Pinchot came closer to the truth.
"While we could still say nothing but 'Please' to private forest owners, on
the national Forest Reserves we could say, and we did say, 'Do this,' and
'Don't do that.' We had the power..."m
3. The Shift
The "shift-to-retention" policy was necessary to give the government the power it needed to address waste and greed. The literature
portrays it in a number of ways. As suggested above, early commentaries
described wise men identifying a crisis and selecting retention as the cure.
"Men Must Act..." is the name of a key chapter in the Udall retelling.Y
Even today, it is not uncommon to read about a simple policy shift or to
encounter the assertion that the "federal government" made an "explicit
decision" s to retain lands. One recent text characterizes the National Park
and National Forest "lands remaining in federal ownership today" as the
result of "an explicit federal action" to withdraw them from entry under
disposal programs.3 A residual category of lands remained in federal
ownership, according to this analyst, because they were "literally 'lands
nobody wanted." That assertion, though common, is an extremely costly
error." In these narratives, the simple notion of a "shift-to-retention"

35. BNG supra note 2, at 259.
36. Id. The "public forests," Pinchot noted, "held this enormous attraction for a
forester-they were under one and only one ownership and control. In contrast with the slow
process of inching along from private owner to private owner, which I knew so well,
Congress by a single act could open the way for the practice of Forestry upon these enormous
stretches of public forest lands. No wonder they caught and held my keen interest and
attention." Id. at 79.
37. See UDALL, supra note 11, at ch. X, 138-58.
38. See Loomis, supra note 11, at 24.
39. See id. at 24-25. In today's commentaries, the origins of these "explicit decisions" vary
slightly. For example, economist Loomis sees them as a response to three factors: concern over
abuse and fraud; desire to preserve unique scenic and geologic wonders; potential for
shortages of critical natural resources. See id.
40. Id. at 24.
41. It is well known that a great deal of the ostensibly "unreserved, unentered" public
domain remained in public ownership not because it was unwanted, but rather because the
structure of disposition laws made taking title legally almost impossible. See, e.g., HAYS, supra
note 2, at 51-52. Until the 1870s, disposition policy focused either on revenue generation or
agricultural settlement and made it very difficult to obtain land legally for uses that did not
fit into the row cropping model familiar in the east. See id. at 53. Those uses included timber
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implies a sharp change of direction from one priority to another brought
about by wise men who saw clearly and took appropriate action.
At the close of the twentieth century, the "shift-to-retention" story
appears most frequently in discussion of eras in public land management:
a period of land acquisition was followed or accompanied by a period of
land disposition and capped by a period of land retention." The story
typically runs, we acquired land until the Alaska purchase, disposed of it
throughout the nineteenth century, and beginning in either 1872 (Yellow-

stone) or 1891 (forest reservations), shifted to a policy of government
retention of public domain land. This "eras notion" allows for a little
fudging on exactly when acquisition ended, and disposition and then
retention began. I Of course, this fudging is necessary as even today the
federal government still acquires and disposes of land. One consequence

harvest, mining, and ranching. See id. Land for those uses was therefore generally obtained
illegally through extensive graft and manipulation of loopholes, carefully constructed or
otherwise, in the disposition statutes. See id.; Joseph Arthur Miller, Congress and the Origins
of Conservation: Natural Resource Policies, 1865-1900, 113 (1973) (unpublished Ph.D.
dissertation, Univ. of Minn.) (on file with the University of Michigan); Leigh Raymond,
Viewpoint: Are Grazing Rights on Public Lands a Form of PrivateProperty?,50 J.RANGE MGMT.
431 (1997) (discussing this familiar point). Entrymen had, of course, found a way around
government efforts to prevent fraud in land disposition, so it is not clear how real were the
barriers these provisions ostensibly created. Nevertheless, occupants of the public rangelands
settled for control over vast acreage of the public domain, occupying them effectively (albeit
initially as trespassers), but leaving little more than bare title with the federal government for
most of the twentieth century. See discussion infra Parts IV & V.
42. See UNCLE SAM'S ACRES, supra note 11, at 16-17; Reassessing,supra note 11, at 18-20.
Clawson's periods have expanded from the most familiar acquisition-disposition-retention
framework to include periods of custodial management, intensive management, and
consultation and confrontation. See Reassessing, supra note 11, at 18-21. Clawson describes the
use of the periods as the "usual" approach to the subject See UNCLE SAM'S ACRES, supra note
11, at 16. It appears to have begun in the analysis for the first Public Land review in 1884 by
THOMAS DONALDSON, THE PuBUC DOMAIN, ITS HiSTORy, wrrH STATSTCS (1880). Because of
when he wrote, Donaldson does not say much about reservations or retention, but he does
discuss acquisition and disposition. See generally id. Louise Peffer, however, attributes the
three phases story to F.H. DENNErT, THE PUBuC LANDS OF THE UNITED STATES (1910). See
PEFFER, supra note 10, at 4. See also GATES, supra note 1, at ch. XX, 563-606 (using the basic
concepts, but not the terminology). It is also important to note that while this "shift- toretention" framework is ubiquitous, it is not monolithic. Some scholars have tried, with
limited success, to pose alternatives. See SALLY K. FAIRFAX & CAROLYN E. YALE, FEDERAL
LANDS: A GUIDE TO PLANNING, MANAGEMENT, AND STATE REVENUs 5-13 (1987) (discussing
an ebb and flow in different resource arenas between a reliance on private entrepreneurs and
market-based decisions as opposed to government regulation and planning). See also ROBINS,
supra note 11, at 423 (taking a slightly different configuration that preserves the emphasis on
the "shift-to-retention" and the pending omniscience suggested therein).
43. Occasionally a scholar will note that the eras "overlap and the precise dates of
beginning and ending may be debated." Reassessing, supranote 11, at 18; UNCLE SAM'S ACRES,
supra note 11, at 16-17. However, the notion of a shift is unmistakable.

NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL

[Vol. 39

of this triptych is the positioning of government ownership of land as the
dawn of enlightenment, the sine qua non from which public-spirited
conservation inevitably followed." In their standard undergraduate policy
text, Dana and Fairfax, for example, characterize the shift as an "awakening.'" Robbins juxtaposes disposition, "The Corporation Triumphs," with
a "shift-to-retention" policy, "The Government Forces Conservation." Ise
simply identifies the period of the shift as the "golden era."47
II.

CHANGING CONCEPTS OF GOVERNMENT

This section begins the retelling of the "shift-to-retention" story
presented in Part I by exploring the development in ideas about government that led to the fragmentation of public domain policy. It recounts the
emergence of a strong national government replacing local governments
as the political center of the nation. This emergence augers well for the
traditional narrative about national management of national lands. The
equally familiar tale of science emerging as a key element of legitimacy in
public decision making also fits nicely with the traditional "shift-toretention" notion.
We show, however, that the increasing importance, scope, and
professionalism of the national government, and all that it entailed,
represented the addition of new ideas and institutions of government to
national policy and politics, not the erasure of earlier ones. Moreover, both
the general public and the government evinced mixed feelings about new
powers of regulation, often remaining supportive of large corporations
despite their growing size and strength. In like fashion, corporations
frequently supported, rather than opposed, government regulation on the
public lands, and government retention of title when it suited their
priorities. While the observations we make regarding American government in this section may be familiar to some readers, the conclusions we
draw for public land policy are quite different from the traditional view.
Clearly, the rise of a stronger, more united nation and federal bureaucracy
was crucial to making possible any policy of retaining and managing some
portion of public lands. But in general, ideas about government became
more complex during this period, and this complexity contributed to the
fragmentation of public land policy that occurred at roughly the same time.

44. Note that this notion of acquisition-disposition-retention implicitly shapes several
standard texts. See, e.g., COGGIMS Er AL, supra note 7, at xi; DANA & FAIRFAX, supranote 11, at
ix.
45. DANA & FAIFAX, supra note 11, at 33.
46. ROBBINS, supranote 11, at ix-x.
47. ISE, supra note 11, at 143.
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A. New Ideas about Government-Roots of the Retention Option
In the late nineteenth century, a set of German ideas took hold in
the United States and weakened what had been to that point a fairly
unalloyed embrace of the ideas of English writers following in the liberal
tradition of John Locke. These new ideas affected disciplines as diverse as
economics, education, public administration, political science, and forestry
as they were practiced in the United States. In many cases, German ideas
provided alternatives to the classic liberal emphasis on the paramount
rights of the individual against the state within a "laissez faire" system of
governance. For the purposes of this analysis, the Lockean view in defining
early U.S. land policy is central. The alternatives offered by German
thinkers were equally important in underwriting other policy options on
public lands as the self-evidence of Locke became less dear.
1. The Lockean Status Quo Ante
The first one hundred years of political history in the United States
were dominated by the thoughts and ideas of English political economy in
general and particularly the writings of John Locke.' Louis Hartz perhaps
overstated the case when he called the United States a society that "begins
with Locke and.. .stays with Locke, by virtue of an absolute and irrational
attachment it develops for him...." His basic point was accurate nonetheless. In public domain policy, Locke's views were almost perfectly reflected
in Jefferson's vision of a nation of small and independent freeholders. The
preemption acts of the early nineteenth century were distinctly Lockean
in nature, rewarding those who worked previously "unclaimed" land with

48. See WILuAM B. Scorr, IN PURSUrr OF HAPPINESS: AMERICAN CONcEPnONS OF
PROPERTY FROM THE SEVENTEETH TO THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 35 (1977); PROPERTY:
MAINSTREAM AND CRITICAL POSrIONS 15 (C.B. Macpherson ed., 1978) [hereinafter CRITICAL
PosmoNs]; Louis HARTZ, THE LIBERAL TRADITION INAmEaRcA ch. I, at 3-22 (1955). For the
influence of English political economy in general in the nineteenth century see SIDNEY FINE,
LAISSEZ-FAIRE AND THE GENERAL WELFARE STATE: A STUDY OF CONFLICT IN AMERICAN

THOUGHT 1865-1901,6-8 (1969); JOHN G. SPROAT, "THE BEST MEN," LIBERAL REORMERS IN THE

GILDED AGE 7-10 (1968). Other crucial English thinkers to early American political economy
include Adam Smith, John Stuart Mill, David Ricardo, and Herbert Spencer. See FINE at 8-10.
This argument is not to say that thinkers of other backgrounds were insignificant to the
American polity until 1880-French writers, for example, had an important influence as well.
See id. Nevertheless, the pre-eminent source of political and economic ideology at the time
was clearly the British Isles.
49. HARTZ, supra note 48, at 6.
50. See JOHN OPIE, THE LAW OTHELAND-TWO HUNDRED YEARS OF AMERICAN FARMLAND
POuCY, ch. 4, at 43-56 (1987). See also GATES, supranote 1, at ch. XIV, 341-86.

NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL

[Vol. 39

a chance to acquire fee-simple title to it s' setting the stage for a limited
government of independent tillers of the soil.
Locke was far from the only English thinker to have a strong
impact in nineteenth century America. Adam Smith, David Ricardo, and
John Stuart Mill were important in supporting a liberal tradition of
individual freedoms from state interference in American policy. More
influential after the Civil War was Herbert Spencer, whose vision of "Social
Darwinism" had great influence and popularity among Americans.52
Spencer's ideas regarding the application of natural selection principles to
human society were read in America as a tract in favor of classic liberal
principles. Spencer expounded a limited role for government, extensive use
of free markets, and maximum individual freedom and self-reliance.s'
These American interpretations of Spencer followed broadly on Locke's
own liberal tradition of limited government, individual freedom, and the
sanctity of private property 5 ' In terms of the public lands, Spencer's views
dearly supported the Lockean policy of extensive disposition of land into
private hands. While the views of Locke and Spencer differed significantly
on many other points, together they anchored a long tradition of English
liberalism in the United States that came under attack in the Progressive
Era.
2.

The German Influence

By the end of reconstruction, the grip of Locke's ideas was no
longer unalloyed. Critics such as Henry George noted that the actual
distribution of land in the United States was a far cry from the LockeanJeffersonian ideal. The alleged "dosing of the frontier" in the 1890s, as
proclaimed by Frederick Jackson Turner, also brought the potential end of
the era of Jefferson's hardy yeomen into the public view. By 1890, the

51. Of course, many such settlers still could not afford to buy the land they had settled,
leading to claims associations and other extra-legal efforts to maintain ownership without
paying full price. See Ong, supra note 50, at ch. 4, 43-56.

52. See DAVIDWILTSH,

THESOCIALANDPOLrICALTHOU GTOFH WERRSPUNC92-93

(1978); FINE, supranote 48, at 41-43.
53. See RiCHARD HOPSTADTE SOCIAL DARwIism IN AMERCAN THOUGHT 36 (1944).

54. In another similarity, Spencer followed Locke (rather than other English liberals such
as Bentham or Mill) in basing his theories of the relationship between individuals and the
state on a notion of natural rights. For more discussion of the natural rights outlook and the
crucial role it plays in changing notions of property see discussion infta Part III.
55. See FrederickJ. Turner, The Significanceof the Frontierin American History, in Annual
Report of the AMIRICAN HrORICAL ASSOCIATION FOR THE YEAR 1893,199,199-200 (1894). It
is important to note, however, that although Turner made his famous observation in the
1890s, congressional policy continued to be based on what was increasingly described as the
myth of the homesteader until the Depression. See supra text accompanying notes 21-25.
Patricia Limerick observed that with the "closing" of the frontier, land and its availability lost
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influence of Locke's ideas on the nation had diminished significantly from
100 years previously. Important challenges to the hegemony of Locke and
his English brethren came from the ideas of a recently united German
nation. Many turn-of-the-century American intellectuals and reformers
were educated in Germany before making their careers in the United
States.' The strength and power of the new German state (created in 1871)
and its bureaucratic powers of regulation made a significant impression on
American political reformers who were faced with a weak and ineffective
federal government at the time. Hence, the influence of German culture
and ideas in the late nineteenth century became "so pervasive as to be
virtually dominant" in American society."
The Germanic influence on public lands management was
unmistakable and frequently commented upon. German-born forester
Bernhard Femow, third chief of the Division of Forestry, laid much of the
groundwork for the forest reservation legislation of the 1890s. Femow,
along with Carl Schurz, brought the German idea of scientific management
of forests to the United States and educated the first generation of
American foresters in schools they founded at Cornell in New York and
Biltmore in North Carolina. ' Gifford Pinchot was trained in German
forestry prior to his rise to power in American politics at the turn of the
century.s The German tradition in forestry was, not at all coincidentally,
a military-style control over the harvest and regeneration of what were
considered in Europe to be scarce, essential timber resources.' As in
education, labor relations, economics, political science, and so many other
areas, the ideas of German educators had a profound effect on the path of
61
American resource management.

its centrality in individual and national notions of "progress" and upward mobility. Patricia

Nelson Limerick, A History of the Public Lands Debate 7-8 (Oct. 11-13,1995) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with the University of Colorado Natural Resources Law Center).

56. See discussions of reformers in economics, education, and conservation, for example,
presented below.
57. THE AMERicA HEGEuANS--AN INTELLECTUAL EPISODE IN THE HISTORY OF WESTERN
AMERICA 10 (William H. Goetzmann ed., 1973).

58. See Char Miller, Wooden Politics: BernhardFernow and the Questfor a National Forest
Policy, 1876-1898, in THE ORIGS OFTHE NATIONAL FORESTs 287,291-92,297 (Harold K. Steen
ed., 1992).
59. See BNG, supra note 2, at 8-9. His training actually occurred in France, but was
conducted under the direction of Prussian forester Dietrich Brandis. See id.
60. See R.W. Behan, Forestryand the End ofInnocence, AM.FORESTs, May 1975, at 16,18-19
(1975) (a classic article discussed briefly in DANA & FAIRAx, supra note 11, at 65-67). For a
brief review of the feud between Pinchot and Femow, and the serious negative consequences
of Pinchot's ascendance, see id. at 19, 38-41.
61. See also DANA & FAIRFAX, supra note 11, at 52-53.
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Less frequently discussed in the conservation context, the writings
of German thinkers also became an increasingly important factor in the
development of American government. In a period of extreme economic
change and labor unrest, for example, German critics of laissez faire
enjoyed increasing authority in the United States. The growth of the
nineteenth century American labor movement and the strong union actions
of the period, dramatized by such events as the Haymarket Riot of 1886
and the Pullman Strike of 1877, were shaped in part by socialist thinking
and activism drawing on the ideas of Marx and Engels.'2 Socialism
remained a powerful force in American union activities through World
War 1. Significant, although declining, public support of the socialist
agenda continued through the Depression.' Less radical than their socialist
brethren, economists of the "new school" of political economy, led by
Richard Ely and Henry Carter Adams, were trained extensively in
Germany before returning to the United States." Their critique of laissez
faire ideology asserted the inductive and relative notion of economic truth
rather than the deductive and "immutable" laws of economics that were
popular at the time.' This belief in an alternative, empirical form of
economics was firmly rooted in German thinking. In general, these
German-based dissents from a market-oriented set of government policies
were also a force pushing away from an unmitigated policy of public land
disposition.
Less radical and more appealing to most American intellectuals,
the ideas of G.W. Hegel spread widely in the late nineteenth century.
America Hegelianism took root in the St. Louis movement and its Journal
of Speculative Philosophy after the Civil War. It spread to the highest reaches

62. See MELvYN DuBoFKy, INDUWRIALISM AND THE AMERICAN WORKER, 1865-1920 ch. 2
(2d ed. 1985). Socialist and Marxist radicals found room under the inclusive umbrella of the
Knights of Labor until its demise in favor of the more moderate American Federation of Labor
in the 1890s. See generlly JOHN H.M. LAsLEr, LABOR AND THE LEFf A STUDY OF SocIALsr AND
RADICAL INFLUENCES INTHE AMERICAN LABOR MOVEMENT, 1881-1924 (1970) (describing the
close relations between the socialist and trade union movements at the turn of the century).
63.

See IRVING HOWE, SOCIALism AND AMERICA ch. 1, at 3-48 (1985). Howe and others

point out that Socialists and members of the Socialist party included both moderate and hardline reformers with a more orthodox Marxist perspective. See id. Their support for collectivism
and worker control of the means of production were all dearly rooted in the writings of Marx
to a greater or lesser degree. See also PHLIS. FONER, HORY OF THE LABOR MOVEMENT IN THE
UNITED STATES, VOLUME III: THE POLICIES AND PRACICES OF THE AmERICAN FEDERATION OF

LABOR, 1900-1909,370 (1964). It is interesting also to observe that even as early as the Civil
War, no fewer than four generals in the Union Army were avowed Marxists. See THE AMERICA

HEGELIANS, supra note 57, at 6.
64.

See FINE, supranote 48, at 199.

65. See id. at 198.
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of the federal government by the 1890s." The Journal was itself the most
prestigious philosophical periodical in America during its publication from
1867 to 1893.67 Prominent in the American version of Hegelianism was a
strong sense of nationalism and a teleological view of American history
moving towards a utopian future. Hegel's ideas had a widespread impact
at American universities throughout the late nineteenth century. 8 A broad
range of American scholars, including Ralph Waldo Emerson, Joseph
Pulitzer, and John Dewey, all espoused some degree of a Hegelian
perspective in their work.' Consequently, public policy ideas as diverse as
kindergarten for young children and a notion of national destiny for
America can be attributed in part to the ideas of this movement.
More striking for our purposes were the aspects of Hegelian
thought that overlap with the Progressive Movement's agenda. This is not
to argue that the Progressive Movement explicitly or exclusively drew
inspiration from the German thinker. Indeed, the Progressives owed a large
and more obvious intellectual debt to earlier French positivists such as
Auguste Comte and Henri Saint-Simon. 0 In particular, the Progressive
embrace of science and scientific management as the best method of social
progress was distinctly in tune with Comte's work. But while their debt to
positivism is clear, Progressives also partook of several ideas that are quite
Hegelian in nature-particularly in their view of the proper role of the state
in modem life.
Embracing academic, non-partisan expertise and the power of the
middle class in reforming government, the Progressives echoed Hegel's
views on how the state should develop.'1 Like both the French Positivists
and the Progressive reformers, Hegel's philosophy emphasized the
importance of an educated elite, and in particular the tight connection
between academic experts and government officials.' Furthermore, Hegel's
work accentuated the power of the middle class as the bedrock of a stable

66. See THE AMERICA HEGEIIANS, supra note 57, at 7-10. The relative influence of Hegel,
through his American interpreters, is contested. McClay, for example, argues that "[the social
thought of the St. Louis group was never likely to take Gilded Age America by storm."
WILFRED M. McCLAY, THE MASTERLESS: SELF AND SOCIETY IN MODERN AMERICA 136 (1994).

Nevertheless, Hegel's dominating influence over Germanic thinking in politics and
philosophy in the late nineteenth century as a whole is undisputed, as Goetzmann claims.
67. See PAUL EDWARD GOrFRiED, THE SEARCH FOR HurORIcAL MEANING: HEGEL AND THE
POSTWAR AMERICAN RIGHT 16 (1986).
68.

See EDWARDA. PURCELL,THECRISISOFDEBM4

TCAcTHEORY-SIN

= NAuRAUMo

AND THE PROBLEM OF VALUE 7 (1973); THE AMERICA HEGELIANS, supra note 57, at 9.

69. See GoTrFRiED, supra note 67, at 16-20.
70. See ROBERT H. NELSON, REACHING FOR HEAVEN ON EARTH: THE THEOLOGICAL
MEANING OF ECONOMICS, ch. 5, at 85-122 (1991) [hereinafter HEAvEN ON EARTH].

71.

See G.A. Kelly, Hegel's America, 2 PHIL & PUB. APP. 3,19,26, 29-31 (1972).

72.

See id. at 29.
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and utopian society.' The Progressive Movement was similarly reliant in
particular on the new American middle class for its primary support7 4 The
Progressives sought a "new nationalism," with the state serving as a check
on the selfish individualism of unregulated civil society. In this respect,
their agenda resembled Hegel's own vision of the ideal state75
Government and its policies rapidly came to reflect the new ideas
that were shaping American political culture, as the intellectual influences
on public policy makers in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century
gradually became more diverse. Importantly, the ideas behind the
changing political arena were frequently in opposition. The newer ideas of
German thinkers such as Marx and Hegel did not simply replace the ideas
of English political economists in the American consciousness. Instead,
such German ideas took a place beside those of Locke and Jefferson,
Spencer, and Mill. Not surprisingly, public policies diversified along with
these differing ideas about the nature and role of government. Thus, in the
public lands field, we find it useful to simplify in the following way: If

73. See id. at 26.
74. See ROBERT H. WIEBE, THE SEARCH FOR ORDER: 1877-1920 ch. 5, at 111-32 (1967). See
also HEAVEN ON EARTH, supra note 70, at ch. 5, 85-122 (discussing the Progressive Era along
similar lines). However, neither Weibe nor Nelson make the connections to Hegel that we are
asserting.
75. See R. JEFFREY LUSTIG, CORPORATE LIBERALISM: THE ORIGINS OF MODERN AMERICAN
POLICAL THEORY 1890-1920, 215 (1982). The connection between Hegel and Progressive
public policies will return in our discussion of property in Part TV. This argument is contested
in part by writers such as McClay and Kelly, who argue that little of the Hegelian notion of
the ideal state "resonates within the American historical experience," Kelly, supranote 71, at
27. We contest this claim vigorously. Hegel himself saw the United States of his age (1820s
and earlier) as not a true state at all, but merely a form of "civil society," a collection of
individuals seeking self-interest with no collective conscience or national identity. See, e.g.,
id. at 3. Hegel felt that America would fail to be a true nation under his theory until it
developed stronger competition over goods, more class structure, and had a populace that
began to feel "physically, economically, and psychologically cramped." Id. at 7. There is a
strong argument that this description was exactly the America of the late 1800s. The frontier
was ostensibly closed and the borders of the nation were set; economic competition was
becoming stronger than ever before, corporate control was limiting a former sense of personal
freedom among individuals; and a dominant wage labor system had created a much stronger
class system. The historical birth of the Progressive Movement thus came at the exact time
when America finally became a true nation under the Hegelian framework. While the
Progressive reform movement in government was not true to Hegel's ideas in every sense (it
was not, for example, a monarchy as was apparently the ideal form of government for Hegel;
see id. at 8), it dearly added many of the necessary elements of an ideal Hegelian state to the
American system. See id. at 24. Kelly argues that there is a desire for more Hegelian ideas in
government in the United States of the 1960s, but his arguments are even more appropriate
in describing the "third path" between pure individualism and radical socialism taken by
Progressives at the turn of the century. In this manner, we find his analysis of a "Hegelian"
influence on governing the United States to be remarkably accurate in describing the
Progressive Era of government from 1880-1920. See, e.g., id.
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Locke and his English brethren can be seen as the spiritual guides of the
policy of disposition to private land holders, Hegel and the newly
ascendant German state can be viewed as a force that helped splinter and
fracture the old model.
3. The Rise of a Strong National Identity
The growing importance of a national identity and a federal level
of government was critical to the emergence of a policy of large-scale
permanent land holdings. Any major departure from the long-standing
commitment to full disposition of the public domain was unlikely until the
country shifted from "a nation of island communities" into a country in
which the federal level of government and a corresponding sense of
national identity were paramount.'
Confidence in the national government was at a nadir during the
1870s. The emphasis remained on small-town life where local communities
remained the natural setting for solving social problems. The unity of the
nation, which peaked briefly in the aftermath of the Civil War and climactic
events such as the Grand Review of the victorious Union Army,7 dissolved
as rapidly as the size of the same armed forces.' By 1877, the reconstruction of the former confederacy was largely a failure in terms of creating a
new, national consciousness, and the nation was mired in a deep economic
depression." National cohesion and pride were low, and popular
confidence in government as an agent of change was lacking. 8
From 1880 to 1920 these factors began to change.'1 Instead of the
states' rights issues of reconstruction, the country became increasingly
concerned with industrial growth.2 Collectivism emerged as an alternative
social movement to localism, best symbolized by the public response to the
1888 publication of Looking Backwardby Edward Bellamy. Looking Backward
was a utopian vision of collective government ownership of the means of
production with an egalitarian distribution of resources. The book was
immensely popular at the time, and gave rise to hundreds of Bellamite

76. WIEBE, supra note 74, at 4 (the "island communities" image is famously located here).
77. See MCCLAY, supra note 66, at 9-40.
78. See STEPHEN SKOWRONEK, BUiLDING A NEW AMERICAN STATE: THE EXPANSION OF
NATiONAL ADMINisRATrvE CAPAcrrms, 1877-1920,86-87 (1982). By the mid 1870s, the federal

military had shrunk from a wartime peak of one million soldiers to only 25,000 men in
uniform. See id.
79. See WIEBE, supranote 74, at 1-2.
80.

See MORION KELLER, AFFAIRS OF STATE-PUBLIC LIFE IN LATE NINETEETrH CENTURY

AMERICA 85 (1977); MARK WAHLGREN SUMMERS, THE GILDED AGE, OR THE HAZARD OF NEW

FUNCnONS 23-24 (1997); -LWayne Morgan, Towrd National Unity, in THE GILDED AGE 1, 3 (H.
Wayne Morgan ed., 1970).

81.
82.

See KELLER, supra note 80, at 285.
See id. at 286.
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Societies nationwide intent on adopting his vision of the future. s Such an
outbreak of collectivism stood in marked contrast to the individualism and
localism of the previous decade. Public domain policy followed suit.
Symbolically, in the same year that Looking Backward was published,
Congress enacted legislation authorizing federal agencies to exercise
eminent domain." In general, government at the federal level began to
assume a larger role in many aspects of American life.'e
It would be a clear mistake to argue that localism was left dead in
Bellamy's wake. The populist emphasis on small-town power and local
autonomy probably reached its zenith in 1896 with the presidential
campaign of William Jennings Bryan. But while localism never disappeared from the American landscape, after Bryan's defeat it lost vigor as
the organizing principle of public policy.' Other forces continued to drive
the nation together, especially in the economic realm. New national
markets in the 1890s for goods from companies like Sears, Singer, and Ford
combined with a rising consumer economy served as a unifying force in
the country.' By 1912, according to one major historian, the three major
parties agreed on the "responsibility of the national government for
guidance" of society, and were in conflict only over who would get the
honor of completing the Progressive agenda of reform spurred by
government intervention.' The elevation in priority of the nation as an
important political unit for public policy was essentially complete.
The rise of a national identity was essential to a policy of national
lands. Without this change in the American political climate, a growing
inability to dispose of certain parcels of land might have led to a push for
disposition to the states or other local governments.e The growing power
and identity of the nation provided an important force in the overall

83.
84.

See SCorr, supra note 48, at 160-65.
See generally NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN § 1.1-1.41 (rev. 3d ed., Sackman Van Brunt

ed., 1979) (for the nature and origins of the eminent domain power). See United States v.
Gettysburg Elec. RR. Co., 160 US. 668 (1896) (upholding federal eminent domain authority).
See infra text accompanying notes 281-93.

85. See infra text accompanying notes 281-306.
86. See KELLER, supranote 80, at 579-80.
87. See Sax, supra note 8, at 501 (observing that "the chips are strongly stacked against

localism in American law"). For a different, but thoughtful, perspective on the demise of
localism in American political life see DANIEL KEMMIS, COMMUNITY AND THE POLrnCS OF

PLACE (1990).
88. See MAURY KLEIN, THE FLOWERING OF THE THIRD AMERICA: THE MAKING OF AN
ORGANIZATIONAL SOCIETY, 1850-1920,181 (1993).

89. WIEBE, supra note 74, at 217.
90. See DANA & FAIRFAX, supra note 11, at 138-39. President Herbert Hoover and his
Secretary of the Interior, Ray Lyman Wilber, proposed disposition of the surface estate to the
states in the late 1920s, but absent the mineral value, the offer was rejected. See id. at 139.
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fragmentation of public lands policy. It was a force that encouraged broad
acts of retention that would be unimaginable in the United States of the
1790s or even in the 1870s.
B. Sources of Fragmentation within the Growing Federal Government
We have pointed to a number of new, but not exclusively German,
ideas about government that conflicted with our Lockean heritage. The
strong national government and identity bode well for a shift to a policy of
national lands retained and managed by an increasingly effective federal
government. In this section, we discuss three elements that fragmented that
apparently coherent picture. First, the varied landscape of the United States
steadily required more diverse federal policies. Second, government
bureaucrats rapidly found allies in the private sector who advocated for
increased authority, resources, and legitimacy for their burgeoning
professions. Third, the growing national economy provoked a very
ambivalent and conflicted reaction from the government. Thus, we find
fragmentation of public domain policy clearly demonstrable in the
ambivalent, constantly shifting love-hate relationship between government
and corporations at the turn of the nineteenth century.
1. Edaphic Facts-TheLandscapeas a Source of Fragmentation
For most of the nineteenth century, it was the policy of the
government to divide land into interchangeable 160-acre postage stamps.
Until the 1870s, federal land laws effectively treated all public land as
identical, highly abstracted squares noted on official survey maps and often
sold to buyers at great distances from the soil itself."' The cadastral survey
took no notice of variances in terrain or topography as it prepared the land
for disposition.' By and large, the survey system worked fairly well for the
relatively consistent and mesic lands of the mid-western grain belt. By the
time settlers reached the famed one hundredth meridian, however, the
inadequacies of the standardized system of disposition became unavoidable.
John Wesley Powell is known as the first person to bring these
problems with public land policy in the arid west to the attention of
Congress in a formal manner. His famous 1878 Report on the Lands of the
Arid Region suggested vast changes to the disposition laws, to bring them

91.
92.

See Opia, supra note 50, at xvi-xxi, 1-3; GATES, supra note 1, at 69.
See OpiE, supra note 50, at xvi-xxi.
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more in tune with the less hospitable environs of the inter-mountain west."
While policy-makers largely disregarded his report, its lessons loomed ever
larger as the years went by and "traditional" policies for public land
disposition began to fail miserably. In numerous cases during the late
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, natural features of climate and
topography conspired to force Congress to explore a variety of policy
directions. Reclamation efforts were an explicit acknowledgment of the
need to supplement disposition policy with irrigation in order to continue
homesteading." A move to reacquire land in eastern forests for renewed
federal ownership succeeded in part due to serious fires and flooding in the
Appalachian region in the years before 1911.1 Similarly, the dust storms of
the 1930s were a key factor in passage of an act to regulate public domain
grazing after decades of debate." Just as important were the economic
interests attached to different resources. These interests advocated in
Congress for different policies to meet the diverse requirements of
developing and marketing timber as opposed to minerals, coal as opposed
to gold, and scenic wonders as distinguished from water sheds.
Expressing a continuing embrace of the homesteader, Congress
frequently ignored these edaphic and climatic facts of the lands. It simply
presumed that row cropping, such as succeeded in the eastern and old
northwest states, would continue in the intermountain west.' Nevertheless, the diversity in climate, aridity, and other natural factors influenced
policy makers on several occasions to make significant policy shifts away
from the status quo. An increased awareness of the diversity of the
landscape led to a consequent diversity in policies for that landscape.
2. GrowingFederalBureaucracyand Growing Interest Group Politics
Samuel Hays has argued persuasively that the central factor behind
the Progressive Movement was the drive to base public policy decisions on
scientific principles of management rather than the pull and haul of selfinterested local politics." According to Hays, conservation was fundamentally concerned with "efficiency" in the management of natural resources.
Despite their populist and anti-corporate rhetoricr conservationists were

93. See GATES, supra note 1, at 419-20. See also WALLAcE STEGNER, BEYOND THE
HUNDRE>m MEDiAN: JOHN WESLEY POWELL AND ThE SECOND OPENING OF THE WEST ch. M

(1954).
94. See infra text accompanying notes 375-83.
95. See WILLIAM B. GREELEY, FORwss AND MEN 15-19 (1951).
96. See PEFPER supra note 10, at 220; DANA & FAIRFAX, supranote 11, at 160.
97. See GATES, supra note 1, at 770. See also JONATHAN RABAN, BAD LAND. AN AMERICAN
ROMANCE passim (1996).

98. See HAYS, supra note 2, passim.
99. See supra note 1 and accompanying text (discussing this position in more detail).
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scientists, first and foremost, and were committed to using their expertise
to manage public resources in the least wasteful manner possible."
Accordingly, the locus of power for the progressive scientific expert was
the burgeoning federal bureaucracy. 1
Prior to the 1870s, the federal government grew quite slowly in
scope and number of employees. ' Most growth reflected increases in the
Postal Service as the nation's territory extended."e At the end of Reconstruction, however, the executive branch began to increase rapidly as a
public sense of national pride and identity matured.'" Starting with a
gigantic administrative agency designed to serve Civil War pensioners, the
government increasingly created federal bureaucracies intended to serve
and regulate specific interest groups."oo Numerous new agencies were
created around the turn of the century, including such familiar names as
the Interstate Commerce Commission and the National Labor Relations
Board, not to mention the U.S. Forest Service. Furthermore, Progressive
reformers filled more positions in the federal bureaucracy on the basis of
tests and skill, rather than political patronage, thanks to the widening
impact of the Pendleton Act, passed in 1883.11 In the early twentieth
century, Teddy Roosevelt relentlessly expanded the power of both the
presidency and the federal government during his tenure in the White
House."E By the end of World War I, the federal government had been
transformed into a large, professional bureaucracy serving numerous
regulatory and promotional functions. In particular, the increase in federal
administrative regulation of economic life became a dominant theme
throughout the early twentieth century and into the present era.'4
100. See HAYS, supranote 2, at 2.

101. The trend towards bureaucratization in American government is also well
documented and debated in its finer points. For several good places to start see generally James
Q. Wilson, The Rise of the BureaucraticState, 41 PUB. ITERESt 77; SKOWRONEK, supra note 78;
WILLIAM E. NELSON, THE RoOrs OF AMERICAN BUREAUCRAcY, 1830-1900 (1982); PERWoLL,
AMERICAN BUREAUcRAcY ch. 2, at 35-75 (2d ed., 1977).
102. Except for a temporary government expansion during the Civil War.
103. See WOLL, supranote 101, at 36-37.
104. See SKOWRONEK supra note 78, at 49; Wilson, supra note 101, at 82-88.
105. See Wilson, supra note 101, at 88.
106. See, e.g., SKOWRONEI, supra note 78, at 59-84.
107. See JOHN MORTON BLud, THE PROGRESSIVE PRES!DEWI3: ROOSEVELT, WILSON,
ROOSEVELT, JOHNSON 17-18,28 (1980).
108. See THE IssuE OF FEDERAL RBGULATION INTHE PROcRmsIVE ERA 2 (Richard IM.Abrams
ed., 1963). Note that in some cases states engaged in extensive regulation of business and
economic interests even before the Civil War. See The Government Business Relationship in
Historical Perspective, in THE SHAPING OF TWENTIM-CTrURY AMERICA 1, 2-3 (Richard M.
Abrams & Lawrence W. Levine eds., 1965); Robert A. Lively, The American System: A Review
Article, in THE SHAPING OF TWElIErlTH-CEmNWRY AMERICA 4,4-23 (Richard M. Abrams &
Lawrence W. Levine eds., 1965); Harry Scheiber, The Road to Munn: Eminent Domain and the
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An emphasis on expertise was not exclusively the preoccupation
of federal bureaucrats. Many historians have noted the progressive
emphasis on science as a general method of reform."° The research and
writings of efficiency experts such as Frederick Taylor led to a growing
belief among progressive activists in general that "scientific management"
was the answer to many public and private problems. Science and higher
education in general were bursting forth throughout the nation at the turn
of the century.110 New schools of higher education, and professional
programs of study in topics such as forestry, hydrology, and political
science provided the education and expertise required for this scientific
approach to government 1 In this model, political concerns, as well as the
concerns of individual or corporate resource users, were secondary to
using science to create efficient resource use. The conservation agenda was
but a part of a more general system of putting the expert in charge.
The growth of science and efficiency as a touchstone among both
government and private decision makers went hand-in-hand with a
growing emphasis on "client-serving" bureaucracies. Reflecting the
attitudes of the age, many such agencies officially had a regulatory
relationship with their constituency (such as the Interstate Commerce
Commission or the National Labor Relations Board), while others were
established explicitly or in part to promote the interests of their "client"
group (such as the Federal Communications Commission and the Civil
Aeronautics Board)." 2 In either case, agencies developed dose relationships
to those they regulated over time, while inexorably seeking to expand their
own budgets and powers." Natural resource agencies were no exception.
The growing influence of such varied constituencies led to a variety of
policies-individually tailored to the needs of a given interest group.

Concept of PublicPurposein the State Courts, in PERSPECrIVES IN AMERCAN HISORY 329, 329-402
(1971) [hereinafter Scheiber-Munn].
109. See, e.g., WILLIAM E. NELSON, THE ROOTS OF AMERCAN BUREAUCRACY, 1830-1900,82

(1982).
110.
111.

See PURCELL, supranote 68, at 7.
See KELLER, supra note 80, at 477; MCCLAY, supranote 66, at 136.

112. See Wilson, supranote 101, at 95.
113. See generallyPAULJ. CULHANE, PUBLC LAND POLMCR INEREST GROUP INFUENCE ON
THE FOREST SERWCE AND THE BUREAU OF LAND MANAGEMENT (1981) (discussing the agency
capture principle in the public lands context); PHILUP 0. Foss, POLrTCS AND GRASS: THE
ADMINISTRATION OF GRAZING ON THE PuBuc DoMAIN (1960); ROGER G. NOLL, REFORMING
REGULATION: AN EVALUATON OF THE ASH COUNCIL PROPOSALS (1971) (representing two
standard theories of agency "capture); PHILLP SLZNIK TVA AND THE GRASS ROrS A STUDY
INTHE SOCIOLOGY OF FORMAL OIZATION (1966). See also JUDITH E. GRUDER, CONTROLuNG
IN DEMOCRATIc GoVERNANCF 80-83 (1987) (admirably
BUREAUCRACIES: DMm
summarizing this phenomenon).
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Perhaps the best way to understand the importance of the
combined impact of scientific bureaucracies and constituent claims is to
contrast Progressive Era reclamation policy to the earlier creation of the
railroads. The construction of the railroads was by far the largest economic
venture of its time-and it was funded primarily by private enterprise.
Grants of public land helped finance the projects to some degree, but much
of the necessary capital actually came from overseas. 1 So great was the
need for private capital that the construction of the roads led to the creation
of the modem financial markets of New York City during the same
period. 5 The role of the government in creating this rail system was
minimal, despite the fact that in Europe nearly all such transportation
projects were government built.u At the time, such significant involvement
by the U.S. government was out of the question. However, one can see a
new set of circumstances underwriting the Newlands Act in 1902.17 In the
Progressive Era, powerful economic interest groups advocated large
western construction projects implemented entirely with public funds.
Hence, by the passage of the Reclamation Act, the federal government and
scientific bureaucrats were in a position to undertake such projects, and
reclamation supporters were strong enough to insist upon it.
3. Government Ambivalence toward the Growing CorporateEconomy
The rise of client-serving bureaucrats and agency-supporting
clients gives lie to the standard Progressive story about controlling
corporate greed. There is no question that corporations grew to a dominant
position in the national economy in the last quarter of the nineteenth
century. 18 However, that growth was not accompanied by consistent
114. See GATES, supra note 1, at 356; DANA &FAIRFAX, supra note 11, at 19-20. For a slightly
different view see Wallace D. Farnham, The Weakened Spring of Government: A Study of
Nineteenth Century American History, 63 AM. HIST. REV. 662,671 (1963) (arguing that the land
grants to the railroads were largely irrelevant to the actual financing of the construction of the
rails). See alsoJAMES WILLARD HURST, THE LEGmrMAcY OF THE BUSINESS CORPORATION INTHE
LAW OF THE UNrED STATES: 1780-1970,79 (1970) (echoing Farnham's assertion in part).
115. See ALFRED D. CHANDLER, JR., THE VISIBLE HAND: THE MANAGERIAL REVOLUTION IN
AMERICAN BUSINESS 93 (1977).
116. See id. at 205.
117. Newlands Act, Pub. L No. 161, 32 Stat. 390 (codified inscattered sections of 43
U.S.C.) (1902). It is worth noting that whereas entrepreneurs anticipated huge profits from
construction of railroads, reclamation projects were not uniformly viewed in that light.
118. See generally CHANDLER, supra note 115. The trend is almost universally noted in

Gilded Age histories. Other works emphasizing this change include NAOMI R.LAMOREAUX,
THE GREAT MERGER MovEMENTIN AMERrCAN BUSvm 1895-1904 (1985); DAVID 0. WHITEN,
THE EMERGENCE OF GIANT ENTERFRIE, 1860-1914: AMERICAN COMMRciAL ENTERPRISE AND
EXTRACTiVE INDUrRIE (1983); OLIVIER ZUNz, MAMING AMERICA CORPORATE 1870-1920 (1990).

For a more concise overview of the growth of big business, two good sources are John Tipple,
Big Businessmen and a New Economy, in THE GILDED AGE 13 (H. Wayne Morgan ed., 1970);
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public or government positions. On the contrary, the relationship between
the government, including the Progressives, and the corporations blew hot
and cold throughout the period.
Corporations grew phenomenally. In the first third of the
nineteenth century, the lack of a cheap energy supply limited American
business development"1 Most businesses were small, local, and privately
held by a few individuals or family members. The discovery and development of the first significant American coalfields in the 1830s spurred the
creation of the first American "modem business enterprises"--the railroads
and the telegraph companies.'n The development of the railroads and the
telegraph wires across the country provided the reliable transportation and
communication infrastructure that was the prerequisite of nearly all other
large-scale businesses. By the 1890s, large businesses, with thousands of
employees and annual sales of six figures or more, were commonplace. 1
Many such companies had nation-wide markets. The consolidation of
firms, both vertically and horizontally, into even larger enterprises was an
increasingly common phenomenon." Large corporations controlled the
vast majority of economic operations in manufacturing, railroads, mining,
and many other industries." By World War I, according to business
historian Alfred Chandler, the modem business enterprise was the
"dominant1 business institution in many sectors of the American
economy." u
The rise of the modem business was closely related to the changing
role of the corporation in American political economy. Prior to around
1840, corporations played a relatively limited role in American economic
life. Early corporations were tightly controlled by the government and
special acts of the legislature that created them, and existed at the

Glenn Porter, Industrializationand the Rise of Big Business, in THE GLDED AGE, ESSAYS ON THE
ORIGINS OF MODERN AMERICA 1 (Charles W. Calhoun ed., 1996).
119. See CHANDLER, supra note 115, at 76.
120. See id. at 79.
121. Many such enterprises remain household names today. Sears, Roebuck ($338,000 of
sales in 1893); Bell Telephone (142,527 employees in 1914); and Singer Sewing Machines
(60,000 sales employees alone by 1900) are but three examples. See WHTrEN, supranote 118,
at 55, 70, 83.
122. See CHANDLER, supranote 115, at 288.
123. See SCOTr, supranote 48, at 133.
124. CHANDLER, supra note 115, at 3. This is not to say that every industry or enterprise in
America was a large corporation. Small producers of custom products not easily massproduced continued to play a significant, if lower-profle, role in the nation's economy during
the Gilded Age. See Porter, supranote 118, at 6-7.
125. See LAWRENcE N. FRIEDMAN, A HISrORY oF AMERICAN LAW 188 (2d ed. 1973).
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continued sufferance of the legislature.1 ' Most corporations were formed
to provide public or quasi-public services, such as turnpikes, canals, or
other large public works projects."' Private manufacturing and business
concerns were largely partnerships created by contract between a handful
of owners until mid-century." A sharp distinction between public and
private corporations did not exist in this era. In fact, some states even
encouraged a "mixed" form of corporation, creating private enterprises
with public officials seated on the board of directors."
By the 1870s, however, strictly private corporations became the
dominant form of business organization. In the forty years from 1830 to
1870, and with a great deal of public debate, government slowly weakened
and eliminated restrictions on incorporationYt Incorporation became an
administrative, rather than legislative task-essentially a right, rather than
a privilege." Corporate charters were no longer special contracts between
a legislature and an enterprise, subject to ongoing monitoring and
significant threat of revocation. They became a bureaucratic detail, subject
only to the filing of a few forms. Furthermore, American jurisprudence
strengthened the legal protection for these economic creations, giving
corporations the legal status of "persons" in 1886.1 Soon after, the courts
declared corporate charters to be a form of private property requiring
compensation if revoked or withdrawn without due process of law.'
Thus, the typical industrial business enterprise at the turn of the century
enjoyed expanded legal powers as a corporate entity as well as larger size,
bigger markets, and improved administrative efficiency.
The Progressive Era rhetoric challenged and responded to this
unprecedented growth of large corporate businesses and their power over
126.

See Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 US. (4 Wheat) 518 (1819)

(declaring corporate charters irrevocable contracts between the government and the charter
recipients). However, in a concurring opinion, Justice Story suggested that governments
simply qualify the powers granted to corporations in the charters, so that the resulting
contracts would then be declared "revocable" or otherwise subject to revision or cancellation.
See id. at 700 (Story, J.concurring). State legislatures rushed to follow his suggestion, making
the case more of a victory than a defeat for public control over corporate power at the time.
See FRIEDMAN, supra note 125, at 197; Donald J. Pisani, Promotion and Regulation:
Constitutionalismand the American Economy, 74 J.AM. HIST. 740,751-55 (1987); HURST, supra.
note 114, ch. 1, at 13-57.
127. See HURST, supra note 114, at 17,22-23; Pisani, supra note 126, at 751.

128. See FRIEDMAN, supranote 125, at 190; HURST, supranote 114, at 14.
129. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 125, at 192; Pisani, supra note 126, at 752.
130. See Pisani, supra note 126, at 753.
131. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 125, at 512.

132. See County of Santa Clara v. Southern Pac. Ry. Co., 118 U.S. 394 (1886).
133. See Monongahela Navigation Co. v. United States, 148 U.S. 312 (1893); Reagan v.
Farmer's Loan & Trust Co., 154 U.S. 362 (1894), as discussed in LUSTIG, supra note 75, at 91-93.
See also HURST, supranote 114, at 65.
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public policy. Traditionally, the period of the late nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries was an era of "laissez faire" government in which
regulation or control of big business was a very uncommon occurrence.''
It was this allegedly weakened state of government regulatory power that
fueled the narratives used by Progressives justifying their policy reforms.'
Progressives like Pinchot clearly declared that the inability of the federal
government to direct private land use required federal ownership of land
to assure protection of watersheds, fire control, and replanting of timber.'
Many researchers have described, however, a more complex
relationship between government and big business in the late nineteenth
and early twentieth centuries.' The actual relationship between government and business was much more ambivalent than Progressive narratives
would indicate. American government, like many of its citizens, both
encouraged and feared the rapid growth of big business. In the first place,
the very notion of a "laissez faire" era implies a lack of both negative and
positive interference by government in economic life. In fact, as several
historians have pointed out, nineteenth century governments often
subsidized and promoted business development rather than simply
following the laissez faire ideal to leave private enterprise alone.'
Examples of such subsidies included extensive tariffs protecting various
American industries, grants of public land to private railroads 0, and the
delegation of powers of eminent domain to private turnpike and other
companies." Moreover, in certain western states, the development of

134. The defining court case of this period for the laissez faire argument is, of course,
Lodmer v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) overruled in part by Day-Brite Lighting, Inc. v. Missouri,
342 US. 421 (1952) & Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 US. 726 (1963) (in which the right of a bakery
to force twelve hour days on its workers is upheld by the Supreme Court).
135. See supra text accompanying notes 55-75.
136. See supra text accompanying note 36.
137. In addition to the cites in note 36, see generally FINE, supranote 48; KLEIN, supra note
88, at 171-91; LUSTIG, supra note 75 (academics who have paid particular attention to the role
of government in controlling or promoting business interests at the turn of the century). See
also JAMES WEINSTEIN, THE CORPORATE IDEAL IN THE LIERAL STATE: 1900-1918 (1968).
138. See FINE, supranote 48, at 19; JAMES WILLARD HURsr, LAW AND THE CONDmONS OF
FREEDOM IN THE NINETEEMH CENTURY UNITED STATES 7-10 (1956) [hereinafter LAW &
CONDITIONS OF FREEDOMb MOLLY SELvN, THIS TENDER AND DEUCATE BUSNESS: THE PUBLIC
TRUST DOCTRINE IN AMERICAN LAW, 1789-1920,5,12 (1987); Harry Scheiber, PropertyLaw,

Expropriation,and ResourceAllocation by Government: the United States, 1789-1910, 33 J.ECON.
HIST. 232 (1973) [hereinafter Scheiber-Expropration).
139. See KELLER, supranote 80, at 376-80; Lewis L. Gould, PartyConflict: Republican versus
Democrats, 1877-1901, in THE GILDED AGE: ESSAYS ON THE ORIGINS OF MODERN AMERICA 215,
216 (Charles C. Calhoun ed., 1996).
140. See infra text accompanying notes 282-84. See also HIRBARD, supra note 11 (for a
preliminary discussion).
141. See Scheiber-Expropriation,supranote 138, at 237; HURST, supranote 114, at 63.
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various private industries such as mining and livestock was declared
explicitly a part of the "public interest" in the state constitution for
purposes of facilitating the growth of local economies."4
In other respects, however, government became increasingly
apprehensive about the unrestrained growth of modem corporations.
Where earlier the primary goal of the government had been economic
development and promotion, now the idea of regulation gained strength.'"
The power of laissez faire as a popular ideology began to decline. 1' An
early state law to regulate the rates (and thus the profits) of the grain
elevator industry, for example, was upheld by the Supreme Court in
1873.' States in general became more active on the regulatory front during
the post-reconstruction period.' New state actions included regulations
in pursuit of public health and public morals, as well as economic relief
from monopoly and other alleged business excesses.' At the federal level,
early Progressive reformers succeeded in creating the Interstate Commerce
Commission in 1887 to control railroad business activities.' Congress also
passed the Sherman Anti-Trust Act in 1892 in order to slow the pace of
business consolidation.'" Other controls over big business similar to these
proliferated throughout the Progressive Era.
The increased propensity of the legislative branch to restrain and
control business activity met resistance from the judiciary. During the socalled "Lochner era," from the 1880s until at least World War I, the federal
courts frequently frustrated or limited attempts by the legislative branch to
regulate business."W State and federal courts struck down a variety of

142. See Scheiber-Expropriation,supranote 138, at 243.
143. See FINE, supra note 48, at 355; KELLER, supra note 80, at 409-38; Pisani, supra note 126,
at 756-67.
144. See FINE, supra note 48, at 169-96, 198-247, 347-53 (describing a diversity of social
forces that were allied against the laissez faire ideology, including religious members of the
"social gospel" movement, and "new school" economists in the 1880s, who were heavily
influenced by German thought of the period).
145. See Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113 (1876) (finding Illinois' interest in grain elevator and
storehouse operations as justification for regulation). See also Scheiber-Munn, supra note 108,
at 329.
146. See KELLER, supra note 80, at 418.
147. See FINE, supra note 48, at 355-58; KELLER, supra note 80, at 409-22.
148. See SKOWRONEK, supra note 78, at 121-23, 248-49; Pisani, supra note 126, at 759-61
(both stating the agency lacked significant regulatory power until after 1900).
149. See Pisani, supra note 126, at 760 (although enforcement of the act was minimal until
the early twentieth century).
150. See FINE, supra note 48, at ch. V, 126-64. See generallyBJAMIN R Twiss, LAWYERs AND
THE CONSTrrUTION: How LAwEZ FAME CAME TO THE SUPREME COURT (1942) (describing the
key role of attorneys in shaping the laissez faire doctrine of the Supreme Court in the late
nineteenth century); Charles W. McCurdy, Justice Fieldand the Jurisprudenceof GovernmentBusiness Relations:Some Parametersof Laissez-FaireConstitutionalism,61 J.AM. HIST. 970 (1975)
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business regulations, including laws controlling railroad fares,1 51 preventing monopoly power in industries of "production," 2 setting maximum
hour laws for certain types of employees,ls and impeding the right to
commercially manufacture noxious products in private residences, M
among many others. By restraining the power of government to regulate,
the courts reflected a certain degree of isolation from the desires of a
majority of the nation to place at least some controls on economic

growth.us
But the efforts of the courts to limit business regulation were not
entirely consistent; even in this relative stronghold of laissez faire doctrine,
there were conflicting attitudes and decisions. In the areas of public morals
and public health, for example, the Supreme Court frequently ruled in
favor of government control. Prominent examples include decisions in
favor of laws that closed a brewery without compensation due to a state
prohibition law, and prevented the sale of oleomargarine ostensibly on
public health grounds." The court also permitted regulation of working
hours for mining employees, and permitted some degree of rate regulation
for railroads, albeit by the courts themselves rather than state commissions
or the Interstate Commerce Commission. 7 On the public lands, the court
upheld the fledgling regulatory powers of the newly created Forest Service
against private entrepreneurs in two crucial decisions.m Even Justice Field,

(describing the key role of Justice Field in setting the boundaries of government regulation of
private enterprise in the late nineteenth century); LB. Boudin, Government by Judiciary,26 POL
Sci. Q. 238 (1911) (arguing against the judicial tendency to annul legislative action in the early
twentieth century).
151. See Wabash, St. Louis & Pac. Ry. Co. v. Illinois, 118 U.S. 557 (1886) (declaring the need
for federal rather than state-by-state regulation of railroad rates and commerce); Chicago,
Milwaukee, & St. Paul Ry. Co. v. Minnesota, 134 U.S. 418 (1890) (declaring the rate-setting
policies of a state commission to be unconstitutional).
152. See United States v. E. C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1 (1895) (declaring Sherman Anti-Trust
Act inapplicable to industries of "production" [e.g., in this case, of refined sugar] rather than
.commerce" or trade).
153. See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) overruled in part by Day-Brite Lighting,
Inc. v. Missouri, 342 U.S. 421 (1952) & Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726 (1963) (declaring
unconstitutional restraint of contract a New York law limiting working hours for bakers to
10 hours per day and 60 hours per week).
154. See In re Jacobs, 98 N.Y. 98 (1885) (declaring unconstitutional a law preventing the
manufacture of cigars on any floor of a tenement used for living space).
155. See Boudin, supranote 150, at 270; TWMss, supra note 150, at 4.
156. See, e.g., Powell v. Pennsylvania, 27 U.S. 678 (1887); Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623
(1887).
157. See Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366 (1898); Smith v. Ames, 169 U.S. 466 (1898).
158. See, e.g., United States v. Grimaud, 220 U.S. 506 (1911) (holding that authority to make
administrative rules not an unconstitutionally delegated legislative power); Light v. United
States 220 US. 523 (1911) (holding constitutional Congress' authority to withdraw lands from
settlement without consent of state).
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no friend of regulating private property, utilized the public trust doctrine
and the notion of public rights to void the sale of the Chicago waterfront
to a private railroad company in 1892 ."s As legal historian Harry Scheiber

points out, although the courts in general sought to grant new corporate

enterprises a great deal of freedom and assistance during the gilded age,
public rights and regulatory control never vanished from view."
To make matters more complicated, in many cases large private
interests failed in their efforts to obtain regulation by the government. Two
cases serve as good examples. First, the railroad industry attempted to
obtain "pooling" legislation in the 1880s. It would have allowed them to
form cartels to end the ruinous rate wars and speculative pressures taking
a toll on their profitability.' 1 No such legislation was ever enacted, and the
railroads finally turned to mergers as an alternative strategy for reducing
competitive pressures. The second case comes from the public lands. For
decades prior to the Taylor Grazing Act, large grazers strove without
success to create a government leasing system to end the "range wars" over
access to forage on the public domain."6 Ironically, in both cases the private
industry groups failed to gain the regulation they desired during an era of
government economic policy that was supposedly of great support to the
private sector. The role of government in facilitating and restraining large
economic development remained torn throughout the period.
C. Summary
The growth of a continental nation, a more confident and assertive
national identity, and a powerful national economy, made it possible for
the federal government to develop an increasingly aggressive array of
programs and policies. Many of these changes were supported by changing
assumptions about government associated with the influx of German ideas
about politics and economics. The growth of the federal bureaucracy did
not, however, displace the earlier Lockean notions of limited government

159. See Illinois Central R.R. v. State of Illinois, 146 U.S. 387 (1892) (see infra notes 302-04
and accompanying text). See also McCurdy, supra note 150, at 993-95.
160. See Harry M. Scheiber, Public Rights and the Rule of Law in American Legal History, 72
CAL L. REv. 217,251 (1984).
161. See SKOWRONEJ, supra note 78, at 124-31 (noting the failure of any particular interest
group--big business, agrarian populists, or others--to obtain business regulation legislation

to its own satisfaction prior to 1900).
162. See infra note 439 and accompanying text. The stodcren's quest for regularized access
was delayed from the late 1890s, when it was first proffered as a possibility, until 1934, largely
by the aforementioned spat between the Departments of Agriculture and the Interior, and
continuing conflict between sheep and cattle interests. See DANA & FAIRFAX, supra note 11, at
158-65.
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and agrarian democracy. The rise of science did not dictate a unified policy
for public land management. Nor did the rise of corporations lead to a
government policy devoted exclusively or even primarily to controlling
private enterprise or subduing capitalist greed. The government also
encouraged corporate growth even as the corporations sought regulatory
programs supportive of their interests. Ideas about government and the
nature of government decision making in a democracy were fragmenting.
These changes were closely related to a similar revolution in thinking about
property and the nature of ownership to which we now turn.
II.

CHANGING CONCEPTS OF PROPERTY

Ideas about government were not the only ones fragmenting
during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The definition and
understanding of property was also highly contested and divided during
this period. We focus on property for three reasons. First, it is central to
public lands policies to a degree evinced by few other legal or social ideas.
Second, we believe that much of the current public debate, which continues
to be arrayed around the arid structure of the "shift-to-retention" dogma,
can be better understood as a dispute about the meaning of ownership.
Finally, the resulting disarray of public lands rules and decisions that we
describe begs for an improved organizing theory to amend or replace the
simple "shift-to-retention" narrative. For these reasons, the rather abstract
work of this section is central to the revised approach to public land policy
we present in this article.
A.

A Continuum of Property Ideas: From Locke to Cohen and Hegel

To describe the fragmentation of the concept of property in the late
nineteenth century, it is helpful to introduce a continuum of property views
and place a few political philosophers of property on it. The continuum
locates an "intrinsic" view of property at one end and an "instrumentalist"
view at the other. A closely related spectrum is one that places property as
an individual right at one end and property as a social benefit at the other.
1. The Intrinsic View
The defender of the intrinsic view sees property as an individual's
right against society and government.' a It is a right, in the sense made

163. Leading proponents include John Locke and Robert Nozick. See JOHN LOCKE, Two
TREXATSEOFGOVEDMEI, 2D TRFATb, ch. 5 (Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1960)
(1690) (Locke's work is divided into sections and will subsequently be referred to hereinafter
as LOCKE, 2D TREATISE, §); ROBERT Nozmc, ANARCHY STATE AND UToPIA (1974). A modern
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popular by Ronald Dworkin, that is a "trump" that must be respected by
all other actions in defense of the individual's autonomy.'" Thus, the
intrinsic view is of property as an absolute, Blackstonian 1 " right to do with

one's property as one wishes, even to the point of destroying it. It is also a
pre-political right-one that exists outside of the government framework
and which must be respected by the political process in order for the
government to be legitimate. It therefore includes the idea that property is
a natural right, derived from some personal action or actions that no just
law can undo. Defenders of the intrinsic position argue for either a general

right of property for all, or a special right of property for some and not
others.' Who gets what and how much is not the core issue. What matters

is simply that whatever the agreed upon mechanism for taking ownership,
property rights include near-absolute power over the object in question
that must be respected by government to the benefit of the individual
owner at nearly all costs.
2. The InstrumentalistView
For the instrumentalist, property is nothing but a human institution created to further the ends of society.1 " It is therefore subject to change
to meet evolving social goals. The view flatly rejects the idea that property
is somehow a natural or pre-political right. Property is instead a construct
of government-something created to further the common good that exists
exclusively at the continued pleasure of the political system. Property
rights may serve in part as a bulwark against the tyranny of the majority,
but they are not inviolate. Government created private property to better
the common lot of society, and therefore must be able to change the nature
of the right over time where common interests require changes. Another
way of characterizing the instrumentalist view is to think of a property

revision of this view sees property rights as political, but still focused on the needs of the
individual.This view might include the ideas of Jeremy Bentham as well as law and

economics scholar Richard Posner.
164. See generally RONALD DWORCIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1977) (in particular, a
common threat to such individual rights supported by Dworkin is the demand of greater
social needs and such utilitarian demands must give way before individual rights in many
cases).
165. See, e.g., JOHN P. DWYER & PETER S. MENELL, PROPERTY LAW AND POLICY-A
CoMPARATivE INSrrunoNAL PmwPcTI 273 (1998). Traditionally, the writings of eighteenth
century English legal scholar Sir William Blackstone are taken as the definitive statement of
"absolute" or unmitigated rights of ownership, including full powers of use, exclusion,
bequest, and alienation.
166. See JEREMY WALDRON, THE RIGHT TO PRIVATE PROPEIrY ch. 4 (1988)(explaining the
distinction between special and general rights, citing introduction of the idea to H.L.A. Hart).
167. See infra notes 180-90 and accompanying text on Cohen. Leading proponents of this
view include Morris Cohen and, more recently, Joseph Sax.
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relationship creating a duty in others, rather than a right for the propertyholder. The Progressive legal scholar Wesley Hohfeld"s noted that rights
and duties can be viewed as "legal correlatives" of one another-the notion
of a right for one person necessarily implies a concurrent duty in others to
the right-holder to forbear or take certain action.'" Hence, within the
instrumentalist approach, property is better seen as a privilege than a
right-something that must meet the ends of society as a whole in order to
be acceptable.'
Few argue for either a purely intrinsic or instrumentalist approach
to property. Nevertheless, these archetypes allow us to describe different
approaches to property as tending more to the instrumentalist or intrinsic
position. In particular, a juxtaposition of John Locke and Morris Cohen,
who fall near the opposite ends of the spectrum, helps frame our discussion
of property fragmentation in the late nineteenth century political and legal
realms of the United States.
3. Locke's Account
The Lockean account is firmly located in the intrinsic approach to
property. In Locke's seventeenth century political writing, private property
served an important role as safeguard of the free-holding citizen against
the potentially despotic state.' For Locke, property was a right that
individuals derive from the ownership of their bodies and their labor. That
people own their bodies and their labor was taken by Locke as selfevident.' Everything not owned in nature was free to be appropriated by
human actors. By mixing labor or sweat with the object desired, either
directly or through the "owned" labor of servants or slaves, a person
became the owner of that item.1 "3Hence, the familiar phrase, "That is mine
with which I have mixed my sweat." No government action was required

168. See generully Walter Wheeler Cook, Hohfrld's Contntions to the Sciene ofLaw, 28 Yale
L.J. 721,736-38 (1919) (Hohfeld uses the opposite notion of "duty" to more clearly define the
widely used legal idea of "right," concluding that if I have a right to exclude you, you have
a duty to remain off of my property).
169: See WALDRON, supra note 166, at 68-73. The notion of rights and duties as legal
correlatives raises a host of possible objections and complications--including the notion of
rights without corresponding duties and others.
170. See MORTON J.HoRwlrz, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 1870-1960: The
Crisis of Legal Orthodoxy 155 (1992); WALDRON, supra note 166, at 69-73 (making similar
arguments by asking how private property can be justified if it leaves some people without
access to even the most basic means of survival).
171. See LOCKE, 2D TREATISE, supra note 163, at § 87.
172. See LOCKE, 2D TREATISE, supr note 163, at § 27. Why this is so obvious to Locke is
unclear to some later commentators. See, e.g., LAWRENCE C. BECKER, PROPERTY RIGms:
MUOSOPHIc FOUNDATIONS 36-41 (1977).

173. See LOCKE, 21) TREATISE, supra note 163, at § 27.
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to create this ownership claim.Indeed, it was the obligation of government
to respect such property rights as natural and in some sense prior to
legitimate government action.
Initially, Locke's system of individual appropriation was restricted
in two ways. The first was the "Lockean proviso" that "enough and as
good" must remain for others after an appropriation has taken place. Thus,
taking ownership of common resources in conditions of scarcity was not
simply a matter of mixing one's labor-other considerations were
required." 4 The second restriction was to ownership of subsistence needs
only. The natural processes of spoilage and waste prevented accumulation
of property beyond what one can immediately use.17 With these two
restrictions, the Lockean account was quite limited in its power to justify
individual appropriation. Locke evaded the first limitation by emphasizing
the availability of unused land in areas like America, where an abundance
of resources remain available for private taking. He dispensed with the
second limitation by noting the creation of money. Money serves, by "tacit
and voluntary consent" among men, as a permanent repository of value,
thus permitting unlimited accumulation of wealth without threat of
spoilage.176 With these maneuvers, Locke argued that the labor theory of
ownership extends to unlimited accumulation of goods.
Both the Lockean proviso and the "implicit agreement" to permit
unlimited accumulation have been the subject of extensive subsequent
commentary and critique." Nevertheless, despite its more controversial
aspects, the basic Lockean system of property as a license for unlimited
individual accumulation has held a powerful place in the American
pantheon of political thought since the revolution. Even today, the notion
of ownership based on "moral desert," particularly through personal labor,
is a powerful influence on property law and social custom.' An "intrinsic"
right to ownership pervades the rhetoric and policies of groups as diverse

174. See LOCKE, 2d Treatise, supra note 163, at § 35. Locke contrasts in this section the
impossibility of taking ownership of land by unilateral action in England, where land is
scarce, with other places such as America in which land is plentiful enough to permit
appropriation without harm to others. See id. Whatever the merits of this argument on his
part, it reveals his understanding of the limits on unilateral appropriation caused by the
proviso "enough and as good" left for others.
175. Id.at §36.
176. Id.at §§ 48-51.
177. See NOZICK supra note 163, at 149-231; STEPHEN P- MUNZER, A THEORY Op PROPERTY
ch. 10 (1990) (for those generally sympathetic to Locke's agenda, or at least portions thereo.
See aLso BECKER, supm note 172, at 32-56; WAWDON, supm note 166, at ch. 6; C.B. MACPHERSON,
POuIICAL THEORY OF POSSESSIVE INDIVIDUALISM ch. 5 (1962).
178. See MUNZu, supra note 177, at 260 (noting one example of this desert-based

for ownership).

argument
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as the "wise use" and the "pro-choice" movements."' As an explanation
and defense of private property, the Lockean model remains central more
than 300 years after the publication of Locke's work.
4. Morris Cohen and The ProgressiveView
The Progressive Movement in American politics was accompanied
by a significant outpouring of legal and political philosophy sympathetic
to its reformist goals. Foremost among the Progressive thinkers was Morris
Cohen. Drawing on the ideas of contemporaries such as Hohfeld and
British socialist RH. Tawney, Cohen produced a large number of works
espousing a progressive, reformist approach to law and politics." In
particular, he expressed a social view of ownership while downplaying the
Lockean emphasis on the rights of the individual. His was a strongly
instrumentalist perspective on property, viewing the institution as a
political means to common societal ends.
Cohen's approach to property was influenced heavily by the views
of socialists such as R.H. Tawney, who stressed the "function" of property
in society as its justification for being."' Cohen, in particular, emphasized
the existence or absence of substantial public benefit in evaluating a system
of property. In his landmark essay "Property and Sovereignty," Cohen
noted the tight connection between the traditionally distinct realms of

179. See, e.g., Jeffrey D. Goldberg, Involuntary Servitudes: A Property-Based Notion of
Abortion-Choice, 38 UCLA L.REV. 1597 (1991) (discussing an abortion case).
180. See Morris R. Cohen, Property and Sovereignty, in LAW AND THE SOCIAL ORDER 41
(1967) [hereinafter Cohen-Sovereignty].See also MORRIS RAPHAEL COHEN, REASON AND LAW:
STUDIES INJURISIC PHUOSOPHY (1950); MORRISR COHEN, STUDES INPHIIOSOPHY ANDSCIENCE
(1949); MORRIS COHEN, THE FAITH OF ALIERAL (1946).
181. See R.H. TAWNEY, THE SICaNESS OF AN ACQUiSmrrVE SOCIT, ch. V (1920), reprintedin
PROPT: MAINSTREAM AND CRMCAL POSmONS 133 (C.B. Macpherson ed., 1978). Tawney's
thesis was that property systems should be judged according to the "function" they serve in
society. See id.Property rules that play a useful role are to be supported as legitimate. Property
rules that cease to be useful are to be rejected. See id. Tawney neglects to declare by whose
criteria the term "useful" is to be defined, but he nevertheless gives some examples in which
property has ceased to serve its original, worthwhile function. For example, property once
served to guarantee "security" for each man to keep what he had made or sown. See id. at 138.
"Such property," wrote Tawney, "was not a burden upon society, but a condition of its health
and efficiency." Id. In the beginning of the twentieth century, however, property no longer
protected the security of the laborer to the fruits of his efforts. See id. at 146. Indeed, the
security of the average worker to attain and keep the necessities of life was threatened
severely by the property rights of the corporate owners who employed him. See id. In this
respect, property had ceased to provide the security itwas designed for, and therefore needed
to change. "Property is the instrument," concluded Tawney, "[but) security is the object..." Id.
A right to property that ceased to play the correct function in society is, on this account, the
"greatest enemy of legitimate property itself." Id. at 150.
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private and public power.' Control over things leads inexorably to control
over other people as well, for property is a fundamentally social institution
involving restrictions on the actions of others. In the industrial capitalist
world of the early twentieth century, Cohen noted that property owners
exert such tremendous control over those who lack property as to effect a
kind of sovereignty over their lives.' a This objection was not, in and of
itself, an argument against private property as it then existed. Cohen
sought only to consider whether the sovereignty created by property as it
was structured in early twentieth century America was more or less
justified than any other form of governance.'
Cohen's answer was that property has a useful function, but must
be limited in its power to the continued service of the common good. The
question for Cohen, of course, was what degree and type of limitations on
property were desirable for society."3 His answer promoted typically
Progressive restrictions on private property, including a weakened power
of bequest for individuals." It also included a stronger power for
government to mandate higher wages and better working conditions
without compensating
business owners for their alleged loss of
"property." " More important, however, was the basic assumption of the
intellectual exercise undertaken by Cohen in the first place. Simply by
asking what ends property must serve, Cohen embraced the instrumentalist approach and downplayed the intrinsic value of property rights. In so
doing, he rejected core elements of Locke's ideas.
Despite these dear differences, however, Cohen's position was not
an outright rejection of the Lockean approach. In fact, Cohen defended the
idea of natural rights and natural law in general.' Nor was Cohen entirely
hostile to the labor theory of ownership propounded by Locke and his
followers. "[Tihe labour theory contains too much substantial truth," he
wrote, "to be brushed aside." 1' The key difference was that Cohen put
much less weight on the importance of labor as a justification for ownership. On his account, private property was a very poor candidate for a
182. See CohenrSovereignty,supra note 180.
183. See id. at 47.
184. See id. at 49.

185. See id. at 57.
186. See Cohen-Sovereignty,supra note 180, at 27-31. See alsoJohn Stuart Mill, Of Property,

in PROPERTY: MAINSTREAM AND CRITICAL POSITIONs 87-91 (C.B. Macpherson ed., 1978) (Mill
was hardly the first to question the unlimited right of bequest; however, he was one of the
stronger critics of such a right.).
187. The expansion of property to include intangibles such as a regulatory environment
is discussed at length infra text accompanying notes 252-61.
188. See MORRISR.COHEN, REASON AND NATURE: ANESSAYONTHEMEANINGOFSCIETIWIc
METHOD 401-26 (1931).
189. Cohen-Sovereignty,supranote 180, at 52.
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natural right. For Cohen, as for Tawney and other instrumentalists, the
labor theory of ownership was justified only insofar as it serves greater
ends such as efficiency or industry on the part of individuals. Scrutinizing
the function of property as a tool to other ends remained the key method
of analysis. In this manner, the role of property as an individual right that
must be respected by others was seriously weakened. A property right was
no longer a "trump" against the greater needs of society-it was simply an
instrument of public will, subject to manipulation by government to serve
the greater good.19" Ownership was fundamentally political, rather than
pre-political, in nature.
5. Hegel-A Third View
The theories of Hegel provide a thirdway of viewing property that
reflects the opposition between rights and duties as framed by Cohen and
Locke. 19 'His view takes a dialectical approach, recognizing property as a
system that must simultaneously embrace the individual's rights of
ownership and temper them with socially oriented controls. Because the
tension between Cohen and Locke remains unresolved to this day in
American politics and law, we find the Hegelian view useful for studying
property in the Progressive Era and the twentieth century in general. For
it was Hegel, and the Hegelian notion of property, that spoke both early
and with power on the conflict within a system of ownership between the
individual and society, between individual rights and social concerns-themes that underwrite and best explain Progressive Era policies
for public lands.
Ownership is critical to Hegel's conception of human development
in a way that is unlike many, if not all, of the political philosophers who
preceded him.'n Hegelian property is simultaneously individual and social

190. Many modem legal scholars continue to embrace this view of property with
enthusiasm. See, e.g., Joseph L Sax, Some Thoughts on the Declineof PrivateProperty,58 WASH.
L. REV. 481 (1983).
191. Hegel's political thoughts, and his ideas about property in particular, have inspired
much recent legal commentary and analysis. See, e.g., WALDRON, supra note 166, at 343
(dedicating a chapter of his work to a discussion and critique of Hegel's account of
ownership); Margaret Jane Radin, Property and Personhood,34 STAN. L.RnV. 957, 1,014-15
(1982) (taking the Hegelian idea of property and applying it to modem legal disputes,
drawing a distinction between "personal," such as wedding rings, and "fungible," such as
stock certificates, forms of property); ALAN BRuDNER, THE UNITY OF THE COMMON LAW:
STunms IN HEEUAN JURISPRUDENCE 7 (1995) (explaining fragmented public policy and

common law through a Hegelian approach).
192. See generally HEGEL'STHE PHiLOSOPH OF RIGr (T.M. Knox trans., 1952) [hereinafter
PHLOSOPHY OF RiGHT with § or §A). Although Hegel discusses the concept of property in a
number of his works, the most extensive and complete consideration is found in this later
publication. This work is divided into "sections," (§)with longer glosses, or "additions," (§A)

Fall 1999]

FRAGMENTATION OF PUBLIC DOMAIN LAW & POLICY

689

in orientation and purpose. For Hegel the relationship of individuals to the
world and other persons around them begins with the notion of ownership.
This initial relationship is the first social aspect of his theory. His vision of
property is also fundamentally connected to the human development of
personality, however, as a concurrent emphasis on the individual.
Hegel begins his analysis of political philosophy in the Philosophy
of Right by viewing humanity as beings with free will. But while people are
free in his analysis, they initially lack any means of connecting their free
will to the external world that surrounds them.9 It is property that makes
this initial connection. Hegel contrasts the freedom of human will with the
world of "things." Objects external to humans are un-free and therefore, in
Hegel's view, without rights." Ownership consists of the free will being
placed in the external object of nature with the purpose of taking ownership. 9 ' This placement of the will can occur through physical possession
with intent to own or by simply "marking" the object in a manner
recognizable by others.'96 In this manner, humans possess an intrinsic right
to ownership of property by virtue of their freedom of will.
Hegel contrasts property with mere possession-the latter being
control of an object without the exercise of free will critical to ownership.fl
This distinction separates humans from mere animals; the latter may have
possession of various items to meet their bodily needs, but they lack the
freedom inherent in human decision making to take ownership." Property
therefore is not simply a means to create wealth more efficiently or to
distribute goods (as it might be in the instrumentalist account), nor is it a
right that simply protects the individual from the state (as in the intrinsic
account). It is instead a fundamental expression of our freedom and our
humanity-the first expression of our free will that gives us a personality
and set of rights distinct from the rest of the natural world. The primacy of
property makes Hegel's account quite different from those of his predecessors such as Locke,'" despite the fact that both his account and Locke's
stressed the intrinsic nature of the property right.
While recognizing property's intrinsic value, Hegel's account of
private ownership also includes significant social benefits and components.

on many such sections found in the back of the book.
193. See id. at § 41.
194. See id. at §42.
195. See id. at § 44.

196. See id. at §54. All property is "alienable" in Hegel's account by virtue of an individual
choosing to remove his or her will. See id. at § 65.
197. See id. at § 45.
198.

See id. at § 42A, 45, 47A. This particular point of Hegel's is obviously debatable.

199. Or contemporaries such as Bentham. See HARRY BROD, HEGEL'S PHILOSOPHY OF
POLmcs: IDEAuSM, IDENTrTY, AND MODmNITY 67-68 (1992).
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This inclusion puts him in contrast again with Locke, who emphasized the
gains to the individual under a private property regime. For Hegel,
property is the very basis of interpersonal relations-the initial means by
which two free individuals learn to recognize and interact with one another
in the external world. Only occupation of an object by another's will
prevents a claim of ownership.1 Because of this, my property claim must
be recognizable by you and others before it becomes legitimate, "my
inward idea and will that something is to be mine is not enough."'2 1
We do not argue that property is exclusively or even primarily a
social institution in Hegel's thought. Property plays a crucial role in an
individual's development of personality and a relationship to the external
world.m The very individual rights to life and liberty are grounded in the
notion of "self-ownership." The active occupation of one's own body by
one's free will prevents control or ownership by others?' Property not only
is itself a right, it creates other individual rights as well. However, property
also bears a strong social role within Hegel's system. The importance of
"social consensus," as Shlomo Avineri observes, to maintaining a healthy
system of property makes Hegel's view complex.'
Hegel is quite aware of the potential for conflict between these
individual and social aspects of ownership. This becomes evident in his
discussion of the historical moment of civil society in particular.a Here, the
individual aspects of property are dominant, as people come together
primarily to further their own individual ends. In civil society, rampant
self-interest and pursuit of individual ends threaten general social goals.
Private property is an important part of this threat. As Stillman observes,
Hegel is aware of the "tendencies toward atom-ism and individual
acquisitiveness" that are "latent in property ownership," and must be

200.
201.

See PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT, supra 192, at § 50.
Id. at § 51. Compare Ross, supra note 3, at 297. The parallels between this observation

by Hegel and those of modem legal thinker Carol Rose are quite thought provoking. Rose
concludes by arguing that in many important ways the key to understanding a property claim
is to think of it as an act of persuasion to the outside world. See id. The connections to the
ideas of Hegel are clear.
202. See, e.g., Peter Stillman, Property, Freedom, and Individuality in Hegel's and Marx's

Political Thought, in NOMOSXXU PROPEmrY 130-67 (J.Roland Pennock et aL eds., 1980) (noting
the importance of property to individual development within Hegel's work).
203. See id. at 133.
204. See SHLOMO AViNM, HEGEL'S THEORY OF THE MODER STATE 89 (1972).
205. See generally PH=ILSOPHY OF RIGHT, supra note 192, 1-13. Hegel's philosophy is
strongly "historicist," seeing the past as a steady progression of human society through
various stages or moments of development. See id. The moment of civil society is one such
stage, improving on those that preceded it but still itself to be improved in future moments
of social development to come. See id.
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corrected.' To this end, Hegel seeks other institutions such as the family
and the state to serve as a balance to the power of individual ownership.
Hegelian property rights are not to be respected at all costs by society. They
are subject to modification and constraint by competing social needs.'
Indeed, Avineri notes that the Hegelian state is a constant threat to
individual rights of private property, even as it insists on the continued
legitimacy of such rights.' ° Thus, the tension remains unresolved.'
To summarize, for Hegel private property ownership remains
crucial to human development in a manner that is fundamentally different
from a mere mechanism of individual wealth maximization. Property
develops and relies on important individual and social qualities as an
institution. It recognizes the tendency toward atomistic and selfish
behavior by individuals within civil society that must be checked by state
and family intervention. Yet, it is not simply a mechanism of politics or
society for furthering social goals. It is crucial to the individual's most
fundamental relationships to the world around her. Within the Hegelian
account, the idea of property should honor and include both the individual
roots of ownership and the need for social constraints upon it. Therefore,
Hegel's theory of property is uniquely suited to the fragmented notions of
property and public land policy developed during the Progressive Era.
B. The Fragmentation of Property in America-Three Fissures
How did the fragmentation of property along the Locke-Cohen
spectrum play out in the American legal-political realm of the late
nineteenth century? What had been a strong allegiance to the intrinsic
rights of ownership was weakened by challenges from increasingly social

206. Stillman, supra note 202, at 145.
207. See ALAN RYAN, PROPERTY AND POLITICAL THEORY 133 (1984).
208. See AVINERI, supra note 204, at 85.
209. A provocative, although tangential, difficulty for Hegel's account of ownership is the
problem of the property-less. The Hegelian view puts such importance on ownership for
human development, that it appears to imply some sort of right or entitlement to "property
See WALORON, supra note 166, at ch. 1. See also Stillman, supranote 202, at 134. This
for all."
does not mean an equal share of property for everyone, as radical egalitarian critics like P.J.
Proudhon might argue, but merely the chance to own some meaningful amount in order to
develop one's individuality. See PrLsoPHY oFRIGTrr, supra192, at § 49. Thus, the importance
of property for personal development makes the existence of the "rabble"-the masses within
society lacking any property at all-a quandary. It is, for Hegel, an unavoidable downside to
the accumulations of property within civil society. And yet, he has only the weak suggestions
of "colonization" and public relief or charity as potential cures. See Stillman, supranote 202,
at 148. The importance of property for human development on his account leaves him
vulnerable to criticism that his argument must explain how to provide some measure of
"property for all" or why such universal ownership is not required.
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and instrumentalist views. The result was a more conflicted conception of
property, both in terms of justifications for ownership and of what
property ownership actually entailed. We elaborate here on three major rift
lines: a broadening in what can be owned and who or what can own it; a
broadening in understanding of what ownership entails, including a
separation of ownership and control; and a broadening of the individualist
ends which property serves, to include a more social definition of property's role. The first two encompass changes in what the power of
ownership included legally and politically in the United States. The third
is a more specific example of changes in the American legal system to
justify ownership along the Locke-Cohen spectrum just presented.
In general, the powers of property right holders broadened during
the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Increasingly abstract
entities served as both owner and subject of ownership. Meanwhile, the
traditional connection between ownership and control over items
weakened as the unified right of property began to fragment into more and
more divisible "sticks" within the "bundle of rights" that came to define
ownership in the late nineteenth century.21
1. Abstractionsas Owner and Owned
In the early years of the nation, public policy largely recognized
individuals as the owners of property. In general, these individuals owned
physical things: animals, tools, other people (in the case of slavery), and
especially, land. These individualist and "physicalist" views of property
broadened significantly, however, after the Civil War." No longer did the
hardy farmer with his 160 acres of land provide the dominant image of
ownership. Instead, abstract legal constructs in the form of corporations
became the holders of extensive property rights. What they owned also
expanded to include numerous non-physical "things" such as the right to
a reasonable profit or freedom from undue regulation.' By the end of the
period covered by this study, it was clear that almost anything could

210. See, e.g., Eric T. Freyfogle, The Owningand Taking of Sensitive Lands, 43 UCLA L. Rsv.
77(1995).
211. See HoRwnTZ, supra note 170, at 145; Scowr, supra note 48, at 6, 15. However, the
ownership of intangible property was not uncommon in the eighteenth and early nineteenth
centuries. See William Michael Treanor, The Original Understanding of the Takings Clause and
the PoliticalProcess, 95 CouM. L REv. 782, 827 (1995). Nevertheless, the dominance of tangible
forms of ownership prior to the Civil War is generally acknowledged. See infra text
accompanying notes 271-73.
212. The term "physicalist" is from HoRwrrz, supra note 170, at 145.
213. See HORWrrZ, supra note 170, at 146; Freyfogle, supra note 210, at 97-99.
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legally own almost anything else except other human beings. The rise of
these abstractions reflected the general move on our continuum from the
intrinsic view of property towards an instrumentalist one.
a. The Old View-Concrete Ownership
Consider the approach to property in the early years of colonial
America and the United States. The dominant image and form of ownership was an individual white male with property in an agrarian plot of
land. At the time of the revolution, nearly 70 percent of the white male
citizens were landowners. 1 Sole proprietors owned and directed nearly
every business enterprise in the United States. Few corporations existed,
and those that did were primarily for quasi-public purposes such as road
building and banking. 17 As late as 1840, few alternatives to a farm or
business owned by an individual or small group of persons existed on the
American economic landscape.2' This Lockean-inspired approach to
property ownership of objects by persons extended into the 1870s and
beyond, supported by Populists and others who opposed the growing
power of the modem corporation."1 9
Non-physical forms of property were not unknown at the time.
Indeed, there was a growing reliance within the eighteenth-century
American economy on imaginary assets such as promissory notes and°
other forms of credit based on only "promises, hopes, and expectations."
The rise of credit, and other transferable forms of intangible property as
private assets, put fear in the minds of civic republicans such as Jefferson
and Adams, who explicitly sought a more stable and less transferable form
of ownership in agrarian land."1
214. Of course, Cohen and others would argue that the effective ownership of laborers did
not expire with the emancipation proclamation. For more on this point see infra text
accompanying notes 271-73.
215. See HoRwrrZ, supra note 170, at 145-67 (noting this trend).
216. See SCOTT, supranote 48, at ch. 2.
217. See STUART BRUCHEY, CORpORATION, HSTORiCAL DsVEIormENT IN THE CHANGING
EcONOMIc ORDER: READINGS IN AmERICAN BusINEss AND EcoNoMic HTurORY 143 (Alfred D.
Chandler et al. eds., 1968).
218. See CHANDLER, supra note 115, at3.
219.

See LUSTIG, supra note 75, at 52-53.

220. Gregory S.Alexander, Time and Propertyin the American Republican Legal Culture, 66
N.Y.U. L. REv. 273, 333-35 (1991). See also David Schultz, PoliticalTheory and Legal History:
Conflicting Depictions of Property in the American PoliticalFounding, 37 AM. J.LEGAL HIST. 464
(1993).
221. See Alexander, supranote 220, at 292. See a/so Stanley N. Katz, Thomas Jefferson and the
Right to Propertyin Revolutionary America, 19 J.L & ECON. 467,470 (1976). These republican

views of Jefferson, Adams, and others were strongly influenced by the works of James
Harrington, a seventeenth century political philosopher who sought stability and equity in
government through stable, widely dispersed, and relatively non-transferable rights of
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Nevertheless, these intangible forms of ownership lacked the
widespread recognition and certain legal preferences accorded to physical
property. Physical objects, especially land, were the pre-eminent and most
common form of property during this period.' Although many other
feudal aspects of property law disappeared from American law soon after
the revolution," land remained a central form of property well into the
nineteenth century. Presidents from Jefferson to Jackson privileged the
ownership of land, and continually encouraged a stream of early nineteenth century public land acts favoring preemption, squatters rights, and
small free-holding farmers' Emphasis on the physical nature of property
extended into "takings jurisprudence" as well. As late as the Civil War, any
violation of the Fifth Amendment still required an actual physical intrusion
upon or removal of property from the aggrieved owner.' The Homesteading act of 1862 was a crowning piece of legislation for the traditional
view of property, one passed even as the form of ownership it encouraged
was beginning its decline.'
In summary, the antebellum view of property focused on the
intrinsic, Lockean value of physical property such as land for individuals
and small groups of owners. While cracks in this approach appeared well
before the Civil WarW they did not become part of a more dominant
pattern in American society until the last third of the nineteenth century.

property to land. See generally JAMES HARRINGTON, OCEANA in 33 IDEAL COMMONWEALTHS
(1901). See, e.g., GATES, supra note 1, at 257 (the widespread existence of government
certificates redeemable for public land-issued to Revolutionary War soldiers in lieu of a
salary--bedeviled the new nation as it tried to raise money from the sale of the public
domain, because much of the land was purchased with these highly discounted forms of
public debt.).
222. See SCOTT, supra note 48, at ch. 4; FRIEDMAN, supra note 125, at 230; HORWITZ, supra
note 170, at 145.
223. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 125, at 234-45.
224. See, e.g., OPIE, supn note 50, at 22. See also LusG, supra note 75, at 67 (even arguments
of later nineteenth century critics of government land policy such as Henry George were
rooted in a Lockean view of ownership with land having a privileged status).

225. See Treanor, supra note 211, at 796; HORWITz, supm note 170, at 147.
226. See DANA & FAIRFAX, supra note 11, at 22; ScOTT, supra note 48, at 70.
227.

See SCOTT, supra note 48, at 88 (observing that a minority of more radical American

thinkers such as Theodore Sedgwick began to use property and monetary wealth
interchangeably, rather than privileging land ownership, as early as 1836). See also FRIEDMAN,
supra note 125, at 235 (noting the rapid ascent of land as a tradable commodity rather than a
permanent source of family support within American society as exemplified in many cases
by the family farmer acting as a land speculator, eagerly selling his plot at a profit when prices
were high and moving on to another homestead further west).
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b. The New Vision-Abstract Propertyand Abstract Owners
The major changes in the United States discussed in Part II,
including the rise of corporations and the "modem business enterprise,"'
and the relative decline in importance of small family farming, put the
traditional "physicalist" form of property under great pressure to adapt. As
increasingly complicated forms of ownership became the rule, the
American legal system moved to recognize and embrace that reality by
expanding the notion of property. This action reflected a more instrumentalist view of property as something to be manipulated and altered by
public officials as required by public needs. Both who could be an owner
and what could be owned expanded slowly but steadily, as the idea of
property became increasingly abstract.'
Starting with the new railroad and telegraph companies, large
corporations began to take the place of smaller entrepreneurs as the owners
of property in the United States.' Railroads were the first private
businesses to acquire and utilize large amounts of capital from sources
outside their local region." The power of the roads as the dominant
corporate force in America can be easily underestimated-as late as 1900,
three-quarters of the corporations traded on the New York Stock Exchange
were railroad companies.3 As the railroads and other corporations gained
economic power, they also gained legal recognition. Contrary to the
populist, Lockean view, corporate advocates sought full rights of private
property for their legal constructs. In 1886, that goal was realized as the
Supreme Court declared corporations to be "persons" entitled to due
process and compensation for losses of property under the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments. 3 Ironically, a constitutional amendment passed
to protect freed slaves from abusive laws served extensively as a protection
of large corporate interests in the 1890s.1 Also ironic were the instrumentalist property views later associated with Cohen that appeared in the
courts' ratification of corporate ownership.' The reliance on a labor theory

228.

The term is Alfred Chandler's. See supra text accompanying notes 115-24.

229. See HoRwrrz, supranote 170, at ch. 5,145-67 (making this general observation).
230. See supra text accompanying notes 119-29. See also ScOr, supranote 48, at 133-35.
231. See Alfred D. Chandler, Jr., The Coming of Big Business, in THE CHANGING EcONOMIC
ORDER: READINGS IN AMERIcAN BusiNEss AND EcoNoMc HwISRY 268, 270-71 (Alfred D.
Chandler et al. eds., 1968).

232. See LUSTIG, supra note 75, at 43.
at 92. See also County of Santa Clara v. Southern Pac. Ry. Co., 118 U.S.394
233. See id.

(1886).
234. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 125, at 521.

235. This notion is ironic given the ostensible Progressive reform agenda against the
interests of big business.
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of ownership for property was clearly missing. ' In other words, corporate
owners do not sweat in the Lockean sense of ownership.
The expansion of property's legal reach was even more dramatic
in terms of what was subject to ownership. Moving rapidly away from the
emphasis on land and physical property, courts began in the 1880s and
1890s to adopt a more flexible, market-based mentality. Property was no
longer the thing one possessed; it was the "market value" of the item.' 7
Property grew to include abstractions such as a company's earning power
or the right to a fixed rate of return. Even the corporate charter, itself
granted by government, was considered property.' Through copyright,
trademark, and patent law innovations, other intangible forms of property
became the increasingly common subjects of legal ownership claims.'

Unfettering property from its physical limitations created a problem for the
courts, however. Nearly every government regulation could be seen as
having an impact on the market value of private investments, and therefore

as an interference with private property rights. In the antebellum period,
a fairly strict adherence to the physical definition of property kept this
problem under control.'a With the rise of a market value notion of

property, boundaries were difficult to establish. "During the period," notes
historian Morton Horwitz, "American courts came as dose as they had
ever had to saying that one had a property right to an unchanging
world."' This expansive property right remained a mainstay of Lochner"
era court decisions almost until World War II.
The increased abstraction of ownership played out in other ways
on the legal-political landscape as well. Although Henry George and
Frederick Jackson Turner did not make their arguments about the declining
availability of land until the 1880s and 1890s, the social and political
importance of land ownership diminished as early as the Civil War. Even
before passage of the Homestead Act in 1862, most states moved away

236. Although economists argue that the stockholders' provision of capital is the sine qua
non of the corporation, they take no physical role in the production of value of their

companies.
237. See HoRwrIz, supra note 170, at 149; LuSTIG, supra note 75, at 96; Freyfogle, supra note
210, at 97-98.
238. See LUSTIG, supra note 75, at 92-93. See also supra note 133 and accompanying text

(discussing corporate charters).
239. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 125, at 255-57,435-38. Patents, copyrights, and trademarks
all existed in American law by early in the nineteenth century. The number of patents
increased rapidly into and after the Civil War, however, and the range of intangible ideas
protected by trademark and copyright also expanded significantly in the post-bellum period.
240. See HoRWrIz, supra note 170, at 150.
241. Id. at 151.
242. Lochner v. New York, 198 US. 45 (1905), overruled in part by Day-Brite Lighting, Inc.
v. Missouri, 342 US. 421 (1952) & Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 US.
726 (1963).
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from a requirement of land ownership for holding public office.2 ' Land
ownership as a requirement for voting also gave way, replaced in some
states by only a requirement for freedom from debt and pauperism." The

increasing numbers of professional managers and other wage-workers in
the United States starting in the 1840s drove these political changes.'" By
the 1880s, wage laborers and others lacking land ownership became a
dominant part of the American industrial economy.3 The relevant form of
property was no longer land, but simply wealth. Hence, the distinction
between freemen and free-holders was already disappearing as the number
of non-land owners grew steadily.'
The preceding discussion of new ownership forms reflects an
intriguing mix of the instrumental and intrinsic approaches discussed
above. On the one hand, the pre-political, natural rights approach to
property failed to envision ownership of non-physical things, such as a
specific regulatory environment. In this respect, property during the late
nineteenth century took on a much more instrumentalist cast. On the other
hand, the kind of protection afforded to these intangible new forms of
property was often strongly rooted in the old intrinsic-right position.
Indeed, Morris Cohen and other Progressives railed against the injustices
of the Lochnr era court with its nearly unfettered protection of expanded
property rights.' The growing abstraction of ownership was thus a
combination of the instrumentalist and intrinsic positions, evocative of
Hegel in its attempts to respect both traditions of ownership.=

243. See SCOTT, supra note 48, at 202.

244. See Robert J.Steinfeld, Property and Suffrage in the EarlyAmerican Republic, 41 STAN.
L REV. 335 (1989).
245. See CHANDLER, supranote 115, at 167,245.
RYOFTHELABORMOVNWIENTIEUNTED STATES,VOULM
246. See PHJPS. FONERH
I ch. 4 (1947) (observing the shift of the majority of the workforce into wage labor rather than
subsistence farming or other forms of self-employment).
247. See SCOTT,supra note 48, at 171.
248. See Lochner v. New York, 198 US. 45 (1905), overruled in part by Day-Brite Lighting,
Inc. v. Missouri, 342 US. 421 (1952) & Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726 (1963). See supra text
accompanying note 150.
249. See Cohen-Sovereignty,supra note 180, at 172 ("there is no unjustifiable taking away

of property when railroads are prohibited from posting notices that they will discharge their
employees if the latter join trade unions, and that there is no property taken away without
due or just process of law when an industry is compelled to pay its laborers a minimum of
subsistence instead of having subsistence provided for them by private or public charity or
else systematically starving its workers").
250. See SCOTT, supra note 48, at 146. In this respect, we agree with Scott's assessment of
the role played by Justice Field in effecting this shift "Stephen Field's genius was to take an
older natural right conception of property and tie it to new, emerging forms of ownership.
Even though Field considered himself a conservative, he was an instrument of change." Id.
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The abstraction of property contributed to the fragmentation of
public land policy in several ways. The growing importance and legal
embrace of corporate ownership made the simple policy of disposition,
intended in spirit at least for actual settlers, less appropriate or relevant in
certain cases. Furthermore, the power of "ownership" over certain types of
regulatory environments was sure to make private interests ambivalent or
even supportive of a "shift-to-retention" of some public lands. Ownership
of the physical plot of earth was increasingly irrelevant as policies offering
access and government non-interference with private development of those
"public" resources expanded. Thirdly, the de-emphasis on land ownership
as a qualification for political life in terms of voting or holding office also
made the blanket policy of disposal to small holders less urgent as a course
of action. The abstraction of property thus encouraged the alternatives to
disposition created during the Progressive Era.
2. Fragmentingthe Powers of Ownership-SeparatingTitlefrom Control
Another important fracture within the concept of property
regarded the powers of ownership. During the late eighteenth and early
nineteenth centuries, owning property was tightly connected to fully
controlling its use. After the Civil War, this connection became increasingly
tenuous as modes of regulating and controlling valuable resources
diversified. The rise of the corporation and the decline of agrarian
populism both contributed significantly to this division. The division also
related to the emergence of the "bundle of sticks" metaphor for property,
which came into use around the same time.21 The metaphor complemented
the view of property as exchange value, rather than just a physical object.
Corporate owners retained the revenue "stick" of an enterprise while
passing on the "stick" controlling day-to-day operations. The rise of the
bundle metaphor coupled with the separation of title and control were
additional blows to the intrinsic idea of ownership in favor of rival views.
a. The Old View--Onership Is Control
The dominant view of property in post-revolutionary America was
of a right to absolute control over that which was owned. Following the
doctrine of Blackstone and other legal scholars, the property owner claimed
a "despotic dominion" over his land and goods, including the rights of
exclusion, alienation, use, and even destruction.' Casting off any

251. See HoRwrrz, supra note 170, at 149. See also Freyfogle, supra note 210, at 97; supra note
74 and accompanying text.
252.

See MORTON J. HoRwrrz, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 1780-1860, 31

(1977). See also OPIE,supm note 50, at 19; CRITICAL POsmoNS, supra note 48, at 7-8 (observing
the rise of a virtually unlimited set of powers of ownership during the eighteenth century over
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remaining feudal restrictions on ownership, American law made the owner
the nearly exclusive decision-maker regarding the fate of his property.'
Although business regulations existed even in colonial times, few besides
the right of eminent domain substantially interfered with the individual's
basic control over his land and his goods.' Fear of interfering with the
vested property rights of others, for example, helped impede attempts to
abolish or limit slavery for decades prior to the Civil War. Property
ownership was fundamentally a means of control over objects and
individuals, the extreme case being the power to legally own other
persons.21
The union of ownership and control was deeply rooted in the labor
theory of value espoused by Locke. "For 'tis Labour," wrote Locke, "indeed
that puts the diffrence of value on every thing..."' The labor theory of value
served as a strong justification for ownership to reward hard work. Early
American society was, as already noted, a nation of freeholders and small
proprietors.' Thus, it was well suited to this close relationship between
personal control and ownership. In this manner, the intrinsic view of
property was more supportive of this tight connection between ownership
and power over material thingss'
The power of ownership was always contested, however, even in
the antebellum and colonial periods. William Treanor notes that colonial
governments regularly interfered with private property rights, often
without compensating landowners.' Other writers have noted that
eighteenth and early nineteenth century governments regularly interfered

formerly feudal systems, which restricted ownership rights significantly more). Compare
Freyfogle, supra note 210, at 99.
253. See Alexander, supra note 220, at 298; Katz, supranote 221, at 471. In particular, the
feudal practices of primogeniture and entail received extensive criticism and opprobrium
prior to their elimination by American reformers.
254. See JAMESW. ELY, THE GUARDIAN OF EVERY OTHER RIGHT A CoNIn0ONALHSfIoRY
OF PROPERTY RitHs 22-25,75 (1992) (noting the federal government did not extensively use
the right of eminent domain until after the Civil War). See supra notes 281-93 and
accompanying text.
255. See supra notes 268-73 and accompanying text.
256. LOCKE, 2D TREATISE, supra note 163, at § 40.
257. See discussion supra text accompanying note 216 (Scott and Chandler make these
points, among others). But see Schultz, supranote 220 (for an alternative view that regulation
was more common in the revolutionary period than is commonly argued).
258. See PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT, supranote 192, at § 44. This power is preserved in the
Hegelian view of property, but is seriously weakened as one moves further towards the
instrumentalist position. Hegel views property as a right of total control over that which is
owned. Such power is what helps differentiate humans from the non-human world.
259. See Treanor, supra note 211, at 785-91. See generally HILDEGARD BINDER JOHNSON,
ORDER UPON THE LAND: THE U.S. RECTANGULAR LAND SURVEY AND THE UPPER MIsISSIPPI

COUNTRY (1976) (noting an absence of the allowance for roads in the cadastral survey).
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with private property rights even while their rhetoric espoused the
continued sanctity of the private owner.' Nevertheless, several tight
connections between ownership and control during this period remain
clear. Individuals who owned land or businesses made all or nearly all the
decisions about how to manage them. Corporations and other forms of
private ownership without control over property were relatively uncommon. Public restrictions on private land use were limited, at least by
twentieth century standards,. 1 although significant exceptions did exist.
More importantly, forms of control without ownership, besides basic
government regulation, were much less common in revolutionary America
than they became in the late nineteenth century.
b. The New View-Ownership and ControlDiverge
One of the fundamental new qualities of the modem corporation
was the de-coupling of ownership from management. With the development of the railroads and their huge requirements for capital, business
sought private investment from far and wide.' Railroads represented an
example of a large group of corporate shareholders owning the company,
but remaining distant and uninvolved with the day-to-day operations
within it. By the 1880s an entire "class" of professional railroad managers
had arisen.' Few of them were owners of their enterprises, but all
exercised enormous power over the day-to-day operations of the company.
These managers, working on salary rather than profit sharing, built the
large railroad "systems" of the 1880s--not the shareholders who nominally
owned the companies.' In this manner, a rift developed along with the
rise of the corporate entity between the formerly united ideas of ownership
and control.
The rise and fall of national concern over foreign ownership of land
provides another helpful example of the title-control separation at work.
Foreign capital began to acquire large portions of land in the western
United States after the Civil War. By 1874, western populist interests began

260.

See JENN ER NEDEKY, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE LIMITS OF AMERICAN

CoNSTTLmONAI.SM 224-29 (1990). See also Scheiber-Exprpriation,supra note 138, at 232. See
generally Alexander, supra note 220.
261. Widespread zoning, for example, was unheard of until late in the nineteenth century
and was not ratified as a legal practice by the Supreme Court until Village of Euclid, Ohio v.
Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S 365 (1926). Environmental regulations and restrictions on land use

were far less common (although not unheard of) in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries
than they are today.

262. See CHANDLER, supra note 115, at 87.
263. See id. at 130.
264. See id. at 167.
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to protest growing foreign land ownership.' By the late 1880s, these
concerns reached a fevered pitch culminating in federal and state acts
restricting alien ownership of land.' The alien land law movement was
short-lived, however, ending in 1897 when the federal government
essentially repealed its own restrictions on foreign land ownership.' The
death of alien land laws marked a realization of two things: (1) that the
country felt an acute need for foreign capital, especially in the wake of the
depression of 1897, and (2) that foreign ownership of land was not
necessarily an alarming loss of national sovereignty or control. In this
manner, the decline of the alien land law movement was a loss for those
who supported the intrinsic importance of property ownership.
An even more provocative example of the separation of ownership
from control occurred after the abolition of slavery during the Civil War.
In colonial times, ownership of other persons was an established practice
even before the slave trade started in earnest. "Indentured servants"
literally sold themselves to owners in the New World for a limited period
of time in order to secure passage to America.2m The respect for private
property required under the Constitution was in significant part due to a
fear of abolition of slavery without compensation to the existing slave
owners. Such authority over ownership bf other persons as a means of
controlling their labor was legally affirmed as late as 1857, when the
Supreme Court declared that "the right of property in a slave is distinctly
and expressly affirmed in the Constitution."'
With the abolition of slavery, and the decline of subsistence
agriculture, wage labor became the dominant mode of employment.
Employment for wages appeared to be the opposite of slavery or indentured servitude by virtue of the arrangement being a free contract between

265. See Douglas W. Nelson, The Alien Land Law Movement of the Late Nineteenth Century,
Ix J.Wwsr 46, 47 (1970).
266. See id. at 51-52 (this backlash is illustrative of the more standard view of "ownership
of property as control" striking out in fear against foreign ownership and therefore control
of domestic land).
267. See id. at 55.
268. See FONER, supra note 246, at 19 (estimating that in certain states as many as 75% of
the residents had been or were indentured servants at the time of the American Revolution).
See also Steinfeld, supranote 244, at 342-43, 347 (noting that unlike their modem successors,
early Americans "frankly acknowledged" the power of property rights over other persons and
were not embarrassed by this fact; the control that property gave was legitimately exercised
in the eighteenth century over other physical objects and beings, including other persons).
269. See Scorr,supra note 48,at 96-99 (noting that nearly all southern state constitutions
had clauses requiring compensation for slave owners if slavery ended). See also Katz, supra
note 221, at 470-71 (observing the respect Jefferson had for existing property rights in general).
270. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (9 How.) 393,401 (1856), superseded by Constitutional
amendment.
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employer and employee.' In practice, however, a vast labor pool made
available through immigration combined with a favorable legal climate to
make wage labor a highly effective form of control for employers over their
work force.' By giving workers a "property right" to their labor, the courts
set up an illusion of freedom when in fact economic and legal conditions
very much limited the options of the wage laborer to negotiate effectively
the terms of her contract.' In this respect, the post-slavery era saw a
continued exercise of control over significant portions of the American
labor force without legal ownership over persons. Hence, the decline of
slavery in favor of wage labor provided a particularly ironic example of the
divergence of ownership from control.
The growing separation of title from control relied on a strongly
instrumentalist concept of property. This instrumentalist trend was an
addition to, rather than a replacement of, the intrinsic ideal of ownership
and control being tightly matched. Owners retained a great deal of control
of their property in many situations-the separation of title from such
control was more like a widening system of cracks in an almost monolithic
facade. 4 Property ideas displayed an increased flexibility in order to
recognize and encourage this economic shift. The resulting tension is again
suggestive of Hegel's property views.
The separation of ownership and control found extensive
expression in the public lands policies considered herein. By distinguishing
title from control, the government and the users of the public lands created
far more flexibility for policies regulating the land's use, disposition, and
retention. Government retention of title, in many cases, no longer meant a
lack of control for private users. In the same manner, disposition of land no
longer meant a total loss of control for the government. Corporations

271. Indeed, numerous laissez faire court decisions turned on this freedom of contract
notion in rejecting pro-labor laws and regulations such as wage and hour laws. See, e.g.,
Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) overruled in part by Day-Brite Lighting, Inc. v.
Missouri, 342 U.S. 421 (1952) &Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726 (1963). For discussion of the
extensive labor unrest of period, see supra text accompanying notes 62-65.
272. See SUMMERS, supra note 80, at 109.
273. See Steinfeld, supra note 244, at 351-57. See also Robert L. Hale, Coercion and
Distribution in a Supposedly Non-Coercive State, 38 POL SCL Q. 470 (1923) (asserting a
particularly powerful Progressive Era statement of this view).
274. The examples of continued control via ownership are obvious and numerous. The
unconditional power to exclude others from private land remains very strong in the American
legal and social worlds to this day. See, e.g. Dolan v. Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994) (blocking
city's regulations requiring dedication of private property to public use in exchange for
permission to enlarge business parking lot, because a reasonable relationship was not shown
in order to satisfy Fifth Amendment requirements). Other forms of control including
alienation and use remain part of the bundle held by many property owners in many
circumstances.
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thereby ushered in a more sophisticated and fragmented idea of
ownership--one that was crucial to both public policy as well as the idea
of property itself, as will be explored more thoroughly in Part IV.
3. Changes in the Justificationsfor Ownership-Froman Individual to a Social
Perspective
The shift to a more socially oriented view of property can be seen
throughout the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Most
historians agree that the judges of the period were conservative advocates
of a laissez faire approach to regulation strongly supporting the sanctity of
individual private property rights against mounting social pressure.' But
in the face of this staunch judicial defense of property rights, the countervailing tendency to consider social goals grew stronger. One can see the
expanding "social" view of property and ownership particularly well in
three areas of the law: changing notions of federal authority to acquire and
retain land; the related development of a federal power of eminent domain;
and the public trust doctrine."'
a. FederalAuthority to Acquire and Retain Land
Both judicial and public thinking about the federal government as
a permanent landholder evolved considerably in response to land
acquisitions associated with the Civil War. The acquisitions found their
way into crucial Supreme Court cases of the 1880s. Innovation in expectations regarding government authority to acquire land for public purposes
was a part of an important expansion of federal authority-both to hold
and manage land, which it already owned, and to acquire private land for
public purposes." The change also reflected a growing emphasis on the
social priorities served by a system of property, rather than the power of
the individual owner.
Until the 1880s, it was presumed that if the federal government
needed to acquire land from an unwilling seller within a state, it needed the

275. See, e.g., FRIEDMAN, supra note 125, at 359-61; SELVIN, supra note 138, at 285; Stephen
A. Siegel, Understandingthe Lochner Era:Lessons from the Controversy Over Railroadand Utility
Rate Regulation,70 VA. L. REV. 187 (1983). But see Freyfogle, supra note 210, at 99 (offering an
opposing view of where the weight of public preference resided).
276. One can also see the expanding social notion of property in the government's
increasingly ambiguous policies towards private corporations. See supra text accompanying
note 137.
277. See generally Sarah Connick & Sally K. Fairfax, Land Acquisition for Conservation in
the United States: A Policy History (Dec. 11, 1997) (unpublished manuscript on file with
authors).
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state's permission.2' The federal government could only acquire land if it
had been ceded by the state legislature. Then, Congress was required to
exercise "exclusive Legislative" power over the area. For much of the
nineteenth century, the state government took the lead on land acquisition
for federal purposes: when the federal government needed land within a
state, the state would undertake condemnation proceedings on behalf of
the federal government and then cede the land to the federal
government.2"
This rather stylized approach to the federal land acquisition
authority began to break down in the aftermath of the Civil War. Most
pivotally, lands where battles occurred and soldiers fell were used for
burial grounds. In the period during and immediately after the war, the
federal government was generally viewed as lacking authority to acquire
such privately held lands. Hence, the graves and battlegrounds were
initially acquired by states and by private charitable groups made up
primarily of Civil War veterans.' However, as the twenty-fifth anniversary of major battles neared, the federal government acquired national war
memorials for itself. The pursuit of national reconciliation and unity fueled
this acquisition activity. This trend expressed the general shift towards a
more "social" conception of ownership in society.
b. The Federal Power of Eminent Domain
Eminent domain played a complicated and conflicted role in
nineteenth-century American property law. The power of condemnation

278. See Connick & Fairfax, supranote 277, at ch. 2,4-6. This was apparently required by
court interpretations of the Constitution, which established a process for acquisition of land
for a national capitol and "other needful buildings" such as lighthouses and forts. See Kohl

v. United States, 91 U.S. 367,373 (1875) (a key case where the Court recognized the power of
the federal government to exercise this right even though it had not been utilized in the past).
The plaintiffs erroneously argued, "For upwards of eighty years, no act of Congress was
passed for the exercise of the right of eminent domain in the States, or for acquiring property
for Federal purposes otherwise than by purchase, or by appropriation under the authority of

State laws in State tribunals." Id. at 369.
279. See Connick &Fairfax, supra note 277 and sources cited therein, for a brief discussion
of this enormously complex topic in the context of public domain issues. This notion of
exclusive jurisdiction made federal enclaves into attractive way stations for fugitives of state
law. See id. at Introduction 15-16, ch. 1, 3-4. Beginning in the 1820s, Congress had passed

"Assimilative Crimes Acts" to give state criminal statutes force in areas of exclusive federal
jurisdiction. See id. at ch. 1, 6-7. Following a dispute with New York State over title to a
lighthouse which the War Department had built and maintained, and over which the federal
government had not exercised exclusive jurisdiction, Congress in 1841 required that all
acquisitions be accompanied by an assertion of exclusive jurisdiction. See id. at Introduction
16, ch. 1, 3-7.

280. See id. at Introduction 16, ch.2,9-20 (detailing a history of these early acquisitions and
their constitutional implications).
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clearly is rooted in a privileging of the social conception of ownership over
the individual viewpoint. As such, it has always been somewhat controversial in American culture. While no state included the power of eminent
domain in its constitution, nearly every state court accepted the idea as
common law by 1820.I The Supreme Court did not sustain the power of
states to exercise the right of eminent domain until 1848. But prior to this
date, in many states the power of eminent domain was already exercised
extensively by private companies ranging from milldams to canal and rail
operators.' While local resistance to the private exercise of eminent
domain could be significant and lead to re-routing of roads on occasion m
the extensive use of the power by private companies continued and peaked
between 1870 to 1910.' Even in the heyday of laissez faire jurisprudence
near the turn of the century, the "social" notion of property as expressed
by use of eminent domain reached full flower.
The exercise of eminent domain powers broadened in the second
half of the nineteenth century. Initially, exercise of eminent domain was
confined to expanding economic opportunity and growth.' The boundary
weakened after the Civil War, however, as cities and public agencies began
to condemn privately held land in order to create parks and other
expansions of open space for recreation for their citizens.z ' The connection
of such actions to the rising social and collectivist consciousness of citizens
celebrated by Edward Bellamy' and others cannot be ignored. Individual
accumulation of wealth through private property no longer served as the
exclusive paradigm. Property ownership could be shaped and even
overridden for public ends other than increased economic gain for
individuals.
The late nineteenth century also marked the ratification of the
power to condemn private property by the federal government. In 1888, the

281. See SCOr, supra note 48, at 126.
282. See Scheiber-Expropriation, supra note 138, at 237-39.
283. See Tony Freyer, Reassessing the Impact of Eminent Domain in Early American Economic
Development, 1981 Wis. L REV. 1263,1275 (1981).
284.

See Scheiber-Expropriation, supra note 138, at 243.

285. See id.; LAW & CONDTONS OF FREEDOM, supra note 138, at 63.
286. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 125, at 420. However, the federal government's authority
to acquire land for parks and recreation purposes continues to this day to be shaky. See Errol
E. Meidinger, The "Public Uses" of Eminent Domain: History and Policy, 11 ENVr. L 1, 19 (1980).
The National Park Service did not receive authority to acquire lands for park purposes until
the late 1950s. Even then, it has usually been seriously constricted. See generally Connick &

Fairfax, supra note 277; Joseph L. Sax, Buying Scenery: Land Acquisitions for the National Park
Service, 1980 DUKE LJ. 709 (1980); Sally K. Fairfax, The Essential Legacy of a Sustaining
Civilization:Professor Joseph Sax on the National Parks, 25 ECOLOGY LQ. 385 (1998) (discussing
the limitations on the National Park Service).

287. See supratext accompanying notes 83-86.
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federal government formally ratified its power of eminent domain into
law.' The Supreme Court upheld this federal power in 1896. United States
v. Gettysburg Electric Rail Co. authorized the federal government's
acquisition of private land at the site of the Gettysburg battlefield for a war
monument.' However, the Court did not rely on the authority of the
"Property Clause" to "make all needful rules and regulations respecting
the territory or other property belonging to the United States,"' but used
the "War Powers" Clause instead.' The Court reasoned that any
government authorized to declare and conduct war had the authority to
take steps to "enhance the respect and love of the citizen for the institutions
of his country, and to quicken and strengthen his motives to defend
them..."'
Not only was eminent domain becoming a more important tool for
achieving a wider variety of public goals, it was becoming a legitimate
imposition on private property rights in the name of national as well as
local or state interests. The agenda of the nation as a whole assumed an
increasingly significant role in the public eye, and the corresponding power
of private property interests diminished. Where opportunities existed to
educate all Americans about the skills and tactics of battle, the private
ownership of lands no longer served as much of an obstacle.
Harry Scheiber has demonstrated that such "public" legal rights
were present and in opposition to vested private property rights throughout the entire nineteenth century.' However, the nature of these public
rights expanded towards the end of the century, taking on causes far less
economic. Instead, they acquired a more collectivist or social cast in
opposition to the ownership rights of individuals. Rather than serving as
a more efficient means to maximize economic growth, eminent domain and
government regulation served a growing array of economic and noneconomic purposes, at both a local and national level. Such changes
indicated a further fragmenting of the idea of property in order to
encompass broader social goals and priorities. The old view of property in
service of individual gaindid not disappear, but new forms of state power
to interfere with and weaken such private rights arose and gained strength
as the century drew to a close. The expanded doctrine of eminent domain
thus evokes the Hegelian notion of property. By using the power to

288. See Act of Aug. 1,1888, ch. 728, § 1,25 Stat. 357 (codified at 40 U.S.C. § 257 (1994)).
See also Meidinger, suqra note 286, at 30 (noting that the federal power to condemn land for
uses such as post offices was ratified by the courts in Kohl v. United States, 91 U.S. 367 (1875)).
289. United States v. Gettysburg Elec. Ry. Co., 160 U.S. 668 (1896).
290. U.S. CONST. art. TV, § 3, d.2.
291. See U.S. CONST. art. I,§ 8, cl. 11.
292. United States v. Gettysburg Elec. Ry. Co., 160 U.S. 668,681 (1896).
293. See Scheiber-Expropriation,supranote 138, at 232.
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condemn land for purposes other than the furthering of individual
economic gain, the nation embraced a stronger social perspective on
property to temper some of the excessive tendencies of civil society.
c.

The Public Trust Doctrine

The emergence of the public trust doctrine provides a final example
of the growing social view of ownership. The public trust doctrine dearly
reflected an anti-Lockean approach to property ownership-one out of step
with the dominant judicial views of the time. Yet, as many scholars have
noted, the late nineteenth century was a period of extensive public trust
jurisprudence.' Even in the judicial branch, this social view of ownership
made significant inroads while the intrinsic view remained strong, thereby
creating another set of fragmented decisions-that can best be described as
Hegelian.
The public trust doctrine is fundamentally a product of state law,
although elements of the doctrine date back to Roman times.' In the
United States, applications of the doctrine vary significantly by state.'
Generally, the public trust doctrine provides for continued public
ownership in common for the benefit of all citizens of most submerged and
tidal lands under navigable waters.'
Although contained in English common law at the time of
American independence, the public trust doctrine had essentially no impact

294. See SELVIN, supra note 138, at 294; Joseph Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural
Resource Iaw: Effective JudicialIntervention, 68 MICH. L. REV. 471 (1970) [hereinafter The Public
Trust Doctrine; BONNIE J. MCCAY, OYSTR WARS AND THE PUBLIC TRUST-PROPERTY, LAW, AND
EcOLOGY IN NEw JERSEY HORY (1998).

295. See Jan Stevens, The PublicTrust: A Sovereign's Ancient Prerogative Becomes the People's
Environmental Right, 14 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 195,196-97 (1980).

296. See The Public Trust Doctrine, supra note 294, at 476-77. See also Pollard's Lessee v.
Hagan, 44 US. 212 (1845); Shivley v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1 (1893) (establishing title based on
grant from state rather than federal government of submerged lands into private ownership).
But see James M. Kehoe, The Next Wave in Public Beach Access: Removal of States as Trustees of
Public Trust Properties, 63 FORDHAM L. REV. 1913 (1995) (arguing in favor of removing the
states as primary "trustees" of the doctrine).

297. See DAVID C. SLADE, PUrING THE PuBuc TRUST DOCRINE TO WORK xvi-xix (1990).
The doctrine separates ownership of such lands into two forms of title-the jus privatumand
the jus publicum. The jus privatum contains most elements of the fee simple property rights,
while the jus publicum retains the right of the public to access and use these lands and waters

for navigation, recreation, and certain other uses. In most cases, the doctrine prevents the
alienation of the jus publicum in these lands by the government, even as it permits sale of other
property rights to these lands as part of the jus privatum. Thus, the public trust does not
necessarily prevent the sale of any such submerged lands into private hands; indeed, Slade
estimates that nearly one-third of all land in the United States subject to the public trust is in

private ownership.
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in the United States until 1820.m The first important public trust decision
pertained to questions of access to shell-fisheries in the tidal waters of the
eastern seaboard. Both Arnold v. Mundy (1820) and Martin v. Waddell (1842)
were decided in favor of the public right of access to submerged lands in
private ownership." In the Martin decision, the continued and ongoing
customary use of the area in dispute by fishermen was an important factor
for the court. These early public trust cases focused on the issue of "access"
to privately held lands. There was no challenge made to the continued
private "ownership" of the property in question until 1876, when the
Supreme Court utilized the public trust doctrine to prevent full riparian
ownership of submerged lands filled by the state to serve as railroad rightof-way.W By 1890, the public trust began to settle title disputes over filled
lands and lands surrounded by navigable waters.' Conflicts over full title
to the lands in question supplanted those over access as the sanctity of the
individual's property right receded before the social demands of the state.
This trend climaxed in the 1892 case of Illinois CentralRailroad v.
Illinois, a decision referred to by Joseph Sax as the "lodestar" of all public
trust cases.'x In this case, the state of Illinois sold nearly the entire Chicago
waterfront to the privately owned railroad company. When they revoked
the sale four years later, the railroad sued for compensation for their lost
property. The Supreme Court, however, ruled against the plaintiffs,
arguing that the initial sale was invalid under the public trust doctrine.
Therefore, no compensation was due for the subsequent withdrawal of the
property. Written by Justice Stephen Field, a well-known advocate of both
the public trust and vested rights of private property, the decision
recognized that the legislature could alienate portions of the submerged
and coastal lands of a region, but never at the expense of the public's rights
of access and use. The size and scope of this sale made it a violation of the
trust doctrine.'

298.
299.

See SELVIN, supra note 138, at 2-3.
E.g., Arnold v. Mundy, 6 N.J.L. 1 (1821); Martin v. Waddell, 41 US. 367 (1842). See

MCCAY, supra note 294, at ch. 4, 5 (discussing both cases along with their historical and
ecological context).

300. See Barney v. Keokuk, 94 US. 325 (1876).
301. See, e.g., Hoboken v. Pennsylvania R.Co., 124 US. 656 (1888); Packer v. Bird, 137 U.S.

661 (1890).
302.
303.
304.

Illinois Cent. KR. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387 (1892).
See The Public Trust Doctrine,supra note 294, at 489.
See Illinois Cent., 146 US. at 453. The Illinois Central decision was not unanimous. See

id. at 464, 476. Three justices dissented, arguing that the sale of the submerged lands to the
railroad had done nothing to date to impair public rights of access to the lands and waters in
question. See id. at 472-73, Therefore, the legislature may have only alienated the jus privatun,
and not the jus publicura,and the sale would be permissible under the public trust doctrine.
See id. at 474-75. In making their case, the justices cite Hoboken v. Pennsylvania Railroad, 124
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The path taken in these cases illuminates the changing nature of
property rights, even within the conservative world of the federal judiciary.
In 1840, public trust decisions served to establish access of public users to
privately owned submerged lands. By 1876, the doctrine placed the
majority of the property rights in reclaimed lands in the public sector,
leaving the riparian owner with "bare legal title" only.' With the Illinois
Centraldecision in 1892, the Court moved so far as to endorse the removal
of land from private to public hands, putting full title and control in the
service of the public at the expense of asserted private property rights. The
Lockean notion of property, so jealously protected by the laissez faire
courts of the Gilded Age, was increasingly subject to a more social
conception of property rights as championed by the waxing influence of
the public trust doctrine. Nor was the public trust influence limited to
Supreme Court decisions. Selvin, for example, explains the doctrine's role
in the late nineteenth century in appropriating and guaranteeing adequate
water supplies for growing cities in the eastern and western United
States.' Therefore, the peaking of public trust power at the turn of the
century corresponded with the rise of the social idea of property even in
the judicial realm where such ideas met with strong resistance.
C. Changing Concepts of Property-A Summary

We set out in this section a continuum of different views of
property. These views ranged from an intrinsic, pre-political approach that
emphasized the importance of individual rights to an instrumentalist, fully
political approach that emphasized the importance of aggregate social
welfare. Two theorists defined the ends of the spectrum, with John Locke

representing the most intrinsic view contrasted with the strongly instrumentalist approach of Morris Cohen. A third view, provided by German

philosopher G.W. Hegel, gives an alternative perspective on property. It
attempts to embrace the tensions between the intrinsic and instrumental
positions rather than choosing between them. We find this Hegelian

perspective to be most helpful in understanding the twentieth century
concept of property in the United States, particularly as it manifests within
public land policy.

U.S. 656 (1887), in which the New Jersey state legislature's sale of both thejus privatum and
publicum to a private operator of submerged lands abutting the city of Hoboken was upheld
as legitimate. See id. at 465. What, the dissent asks, is the difference between these two cases?
See id. Another important California state court decision in 1914 nullified a different set of
private land claims under similar public trust reasoning See People v. California Fish Co., 138

P. 79 (1914).
305. See Barney v. Keokuk, 94 U.S. 325,339 (1876).
306. See SELViN, supra note 138, at ch. 4.
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A series of examples from turn of the century American law and
policy illustrate changes along this continuum of property ideas. First, we
noted an expansion of the notion of what a property right entails. In
particular, owners and subjects of ownership became more abstract, while
the connection between ownership and control became more tenuous. This
expansion of the practical use of property matched a shift towards a more
social notion of property to compete with the individualist approach of the
antebellum era. In each of our examples, we concluded that the instrumentalist ideas of Cohen gradually augmented, complicated, or "fragmented"
what had been a simpler approach to property that relied heavily on the
ideas of Locke. We do not argue that the movement from intrinsic to
instrumental views of property was in any way a shift from one end of the
continuum to the other.' Indeed, the change was halting and contested.

307. We want to distinguish our discussion of fragmentation from a more general
academic debate over property's potential "disintegration" as a viable legal concept. The
leading article on this topic is Thomas Grey, The Disintegrationof Property, in NOMOS XXII
PROPERTY 69 0. Roland Pennock et al. eds., 1980); see also C.B. Macpherson, Capitalismand the
Changing Concept of Property, in FEVDALSM, CAPrTALISM, AND BEYOND 105 (Eugene Kamenka
et al. eds., 1975). Some writers have attempted to broaden or change the notion of property
over time to include rights not commonly thought of as subject to ownership in lay terms.
Famous examples include Charles Reich's assertions of ownership in government largesse,
as well as C.B. Macpherson's claim of a worker's property right to a livelihood. See, e.g.,
Charles Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE LJ. 733 (1964); CRMCAL POSrnONS, supra note 48,
at 199-207. In some cases, such claims are argued as logical extensions of some traditional
view or justification of private property (as in Reich's case); in others, the writer is quite open
about the need to appropriate the power of the term "Property" in modem society for their
own agenda. See, e.g., C.B. Macpherson, Hwnan Rights as Properly Rights, 24 DSSENT 72 (1977).
All of this expansion and contestation of the notion of property has led scholars such as Grey
to question the continued effectiveness of the institution at all. What, in other words, does
property mean when it starts to mean anything; when its legal definitions are increasingly
alienated from its common usage? See Nedelsky, supra note 260, at 240; BRUCE ACKERMAN,
PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE COlsTrrTmN 1-24 (1977); Rose, supra note 3, at 1-8. It is our hope
that the differences between our argument for fragmentation in this section and a full-blown
disintegration of the notion of property are apparent. Property ideas did not disintegrate
within the period we consider, they simply became more complicated. Thinkers and lawyers
did not invent new ideas of ownership out of whole cloth in order to appropriate the power
of the notion of private ownership. Each competing vision of property drew on an established
intellectual tradition that gave that view credibility and relevance to the term "property"
being contested. The rival views of property were not absurdities-they were considered
alternatives that sought to challenge to varying degrees the formerly dominant Lockean view.
Nor were they unduly removed from common or popular ideas of ownership-based in
popular media and culture regarding property rights. In this way, our discussion clearly
should not be taken as an argument for property's demise as a meaningful legal, political, or
social concept.
308. In locating the peak of property's fragmentation as a legal/political concept around
the turn of the century, we potentially run into disagreement with two other respected views
of legal history. The first is best expressed by legal historian Harry Scheiber, who argues that
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It resulted in a mix of property ideas along the spectrum that we presented.
Neither position dominated to the exclusion of the other. The result was a
fragmented set of public land policies couched in a conflicted notion of
property best categorized as Hegelian.
IV. FRAGMENTATION OF PUBLIC DOMAIN LAW AND POLICY
In this section, we discuss the fragmentation of public domain
policies in the context of the changing notions of government and property
described in Parts II and I. Our goal is to demonstrate that the "shift-toretention" narrative regarding public land law and policy is too simple, and
to suggest the outlines of a more useful one. Our argument has four
elements. First, we show that there is no straight line or discernible trend
that culminates in a policy of retention. Congress enacted major disposition
statutes before and after establishing key retention programs. Second, we
show that the means or instruments of policy are fragmented as well.
Different policies developed for different resources, and resources
themselves were fragmented. Third, we briefly gloss each program-using
the terms and concepts of the previous two sections-to develop a more
complex vocabulary for talking about the diverse public domain policies

both private and public rights have coexisted uneasily in American law since well before the
Civil War, an argument that could be construed to be in conflict with our position. That this
would be incorrect should be evident from our discussion of public rights in eminent domain
in this section, in which we noted the broadening use of eminent domain for more "social"
purposes as well as the rapid expansion of power at the national level of government. We do
not disagree that rival views of ownership have roots in American law dating back to colonial
times. We simply note some important expansions of one type of view, the instrumentalist
position, during the Progressive Era that had a critical impact on public land policies, among
other public actions.
Similarly, some authors have argued that a crucial shift in the idea of property took
place during the New Deal era when West Coast Hotel v. Parrish,300 U.S.379 (1937) explicitly
repudiated the Lochner doctrine. See NEDELSKY, supra note 260, at 229; Cass Sunstein,
Constitutionalismafter the New Deal, 101 HARV. L. REV.421 (1987). This decision is slightly
beyond the period under consideration in this article, and may seem to be in disagreement
with our conclusions. We would argue that such an inference would be mistaken. The year
1937 marked the end of property's reign as the judicial check against government regulation,
and a relative high water-mark of the views of Cohen and other Progressive legal thinkers.
But the alternative views of property that gave rise to that watershed decision were around
for decades prior, as has been shown at length herein. Thus, in one sense this section of the
article could be seen as demarcating early indicators of new ideas of ownership prior to their
peak in the West Coast Hotel decision. Our argument is that the social and instrumental views
of property underwriting the West Coast Hotel outcome grew significantly stronger during the
period we consider, and that these changes are directly related to concurrent shifts in public
land policy.
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which in fact emerged from the period.3 Key elements of this vocabulary
include (1) lands which the government nominally retained, keeping
formal title but disposing of control; (2) lands over which the government
retained actual or potential control, but disposed of the economic value of
the resource; (3) lands which the government briefly retained and then
either relinquished title or devised an improved disposition system; and (4)
lands in which the government made major investment in order to
encourage further land disposition. Finally, our discussion demonstrates
the struggle between two conflicting views of ownership that were equally
influential upon our public land policies during this time.
A. Before Roosevelt and Pinchot-The "Actual Settler" and the Seeds
of Fragmentation
The 1860s saw the emergence of the homesteader or "actual settler"
as the major focus of public domain policy. Programs gradually steered
away from the previous commitment to disposition through special grants
to railroads, states, and cash sales.31 However, by the close of the nineteenth century, needs of actual settlers were occasionally met, not by
disposition, but by federal retention of resources, most notably the forests.
Moreover, collective values, such as national pride in scenic grandeur,
manifested in a small and ill-defined kernel of a reservation policy for
scenic wonders. These changes were the early seed of a fragmented policy
future.

309. See Miller, supm note 41, at 205, for a discussion of the disposition programs that also
continued in some cases until the present day. Miller notes that the reformers did not succeed
in their goal of preventing all dispositions save to settlers. See id. They were unable to halt the
swamp land grants program established in 1850 to encourage states to reclaim swamplands,
and they fought unsuccessfully to revest lands granted to railroads that did not perform on
the terms of the grant. See id. However, they were able to stop further land grants to the
railroads and prevent a program granting millions of acres to civil war veterans. See id. They
were also able to prevent adoption of wholesale disposition of land to support the
development of education programs. See id. But these reforms were not moves toward federal
land retention. Rather they were intended to assure continuing disposition of land to actual
settlers.
310. See Miller, supra note 41, at ch. 3. If our goal were primarily to erode the empirical
underpinnings of the acquisition-disposition-retention model, we would pay more attention
to the construction of the disposition period. Because we are most concerned about the
problems for current debate bequeathed to us by the shift-to-retention element, we focus
there. However, we are convinced that the "disposition" era notion is also too simple. The
"shift" from land sales to free land for actual settlers is also inadequately discussed in
literature aimed at presenting the nineteenth century as a "great barbecue." For a wonderful
antidote, see ZAHLER, supra note 1, for the buildup to the homestead era.

Fall 19991

FRAGMENTATION OF PUBLIC DOMAIN LAW & POLICY

713

1. Homesteading-SweatEquity in Landfor Actual Settlers
The Homesteading Act of 1862 defined the dominant theme of
congressional policy and public discourse until the Depression. The statute
was a near perfect appropriation of Locke's notion of mixing sweat with
11
the land to establish ownership. It invited all those over 21 years of age
to enter up to 160 acres of land and meet certain occupancy and residency
requirements, to "prove up" or take title to the land. 2 Congress amended
and expanded homesteading to sculpt policy for the alleged benefit of
farmers, homebuilders, and settlers well into the next centuryL The
congressional commitment to disposition of land to actual settlers
continued well after the "retention era" was alleged to have begun and was
the justification for many programs that we now regard as retention
oriented.
2. The Mining Acts-Sweat Equityfor Actual Prospectorsand Severing Land
from Water
The Homestead Act preceded three laws 314 responding to the needs
of another major group of westward migrants, actual prospectors. An 1866
statute1 enshrined congressional deference to local custom of the mining
camps, and the ancient idea of the free miner." Reflecting Lockean
enthusiasms, the act proclaimed that "all valuable mineral deposits in lands
belonging to the United States.. .shall be free and open to exploration and
purchase" subject to the local rules and customs of the mining districts

311. See generally NEL IRVIN PAINTER, EXODUSTERS: BLACK MIGRATION TO KANSAS AFTER
REcoNsmucrnoN (1976) (explaining that Congress did not limit the program to either white

males or citizens, but did require that non-citizens file a declaration of their intent to become
citizens).
312.

See GATES, supra note 1, at 393-99 (for data on homesteading in the twentieth century,

when most of the homesteading actually took place). See also GATES, supranote 1, at ch. 18;
PEPPER, supra note 10, at 167.
313. Homesteading on federally owned lands ended first in Hawaii in 1920, in the
continental United States in 1936 (although technically it was still possible to apply for a

"reclassification" for disposition until 1976), and in Alaska in the late 1960s.
314. We now tend to gloss all three together as the Mining Act of 1872, ch 152,17 Stat. 91
(1872) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 30 U.S.C. (1994)). The other two were
passed in 1866 and 1870. Act of July 25,1866, ch. 262, § 1,14 Stat. 251; Act of July 9,1870, ch.
235, § 12, 16 Stat. 217. See JOHN LeSHm, THs MINING LAW: A STUDY IN PERPETUAL MOTION 2

(1987).
315. See 30 U.S.C. § 22 (1994). See Robert W. Swenson, Legal Aspects of Mineral Resources
Exploitation, in GATES, supra note 1, at ch. 13, 719. Passage of the act was accompanied by
"legendary political shenanigans." See id. See also LESHY, supra note 314, at 11 (supporting this

contention).
316. See John C. Lacy, '49ers, Reformers and Esape:Changingwith the FederalMining Law,
1994 A.B.A. SEC. NAT. REsOURCES, ENERGY, & ENVTL L, (Fall Meeting).
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wherein they were located. 17 The 1866 Mining Act was also important for
its disposition of federal interests in water. Congress acquiesced in the
miners' practice of (1)separating the water from the land and (2) asserting
that the rights of the first user of a water source prevailed over rights of
both subsequent users and riparian landowners. Section 9 of the 1866
statute provides that whenever, "by priority of possession, rights to the use
of water.. .have vested and accrued, and the same are recognized and
acknowledged by local customs, laws, and the decisions of courts," the
possessors' rights shall be maintained and protected?' s The fragmentation

here was twofold. The federal government "severed" the land from the
water, thus disconnecting public land law and administration from water
law and administration. It also passed to state control water arising on the
public domain. Congress continued to control land disposition; however,
the fact that allocation of water was a matter for state decision was of
enormous importance in regions where control of the water was tanta-

mount to control over the land.?1
The year 1872 is an interesting one for public land scholars.
Congress enacted the final, and presently the most infamous of the mining
acts, the General Mining Act of 1872. In the same year, Congress reserved
Yellowstone for park and preservation purposes. In the 1872 General
Mining Act, Congress wove the 1866 Mining Act's format into the Lockean
"rules of discovery" that have proven very durable. "Locators" under the
1872 act were required to perform $100 worth of development work
annually in order to maintain their rights as claimants, and rules regarding
the marking and recording of locations were adopted. ° Both the mining
law and the simultaneously developing water regime had in common a
particularly Lockean notion of "use it or lose it." The annual development
work required of locators was similar to the provision in western water law
that appropriators lose their rights if they discontinued use for a

317. 30 U.S.C. § 22 (1994); Swenson, supra note 315, at 720. This American expression of
the ancient customs of free mining is unique in at least one important respect: the United
States government eschewed the standard rent and royalty in connection with minerals
development of the public domain. See Lacy, supra note 316, at 10-15 (observing this federal
policy).
318. Act of July 25,1866, ch. 262, § 9,14 Stat. 251, 253. See also WALTER PRESCOTT WEBB,
THE GREAT PLAINS 439-53 (1931) (detailing how the arid-region doctrine of prior
appropriation arose); COGGINs Er AL, sam note 7, at 365-66 (succinctly summarizing the legal

principles).
319. See Miller, supra note 41, at 166. See also HAYS, supranote 2, at 15-19 (discussing the
consequences of this severance for subsequent conservation efforts).
320. See Swenson, supranote 315, at 723.
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discemable period.32 Although miners did not precisely fulfill Jefferson's
vision of family farmers populating the nation, the 1872 Act nevertheless
reflected clearly Locke's labor-based theory of ownership. The basic
commitment to free access to "lands owned by the United States" for the
purpose of developing minerals has often been modified and challenged,
but never overturned.3'
3. Reservation of Scenic Wonders-EmbryonicAppearance of Social Elements of
Ownership

Congress evinced a "sporadic interest" in preserving areas of
superlative beauty or uniqueness.3' In 1832, Congress set aside four
sections in Arkansas to protect hot springs of arguable medicinal value for
"future disposal." 4 The 1864 cession of Yosemite Valley to the state of
California manifested an evolving congressional interest in scenery and
recreation. Congress distinguished the California cession from the Hot
Springs transaction by requiring that California hold the ceded lands
"inalienable for all time" as a place of "public use, resort, and recreation."'

Eight years later, Congress reserved the Yellowstone area in federal
ownership.' Any clear idea of what constituted a national park was still

321. Not only must one mix one's sweat with natural objects to establish ownership, one
must keep doing so lest the resource return to the common pool for re-appropriation by
another more willing to make the resource productive.
322. Although the 1872 Act continues in effect, its impact has been circumscribed by
subsequent legislative, judicial, and administrative actions. Those actions withdraw some
areas from mineral entry, limit the number of minerals covered by the Mining Law, and,
beginning in the 1970s, put some significant restrictions on what constitutes a "valuable"
mineral deposit See Sally K. Fairfax &Barbara T. Andrews, Debate Within and Debate Without:
NEPA and the Redefinition ofthe "PrudentMan" Rule, 19 NAT. RESOURCES J.505, 514-18 (1979).
It is worth noting, however, that long before the reach of the Mining Law was contracted, it
was expanded. In 1897 Congress extended the provisions of the 1872 Act to cover all oil lands
of the public domain. See PEFFER, supranote 10, at 125-30.
323. See GATES, supra note 1, at 566.
324. See id. As is well known, Hot Springs was never disposed of and became, to the
dismay of many park enthusiasts, a national park.
325. GATES, supra note 1,at 566. It is curious that the Yosemite act attracts attention as the
first of what many consider to be national park reservations, because it was actually a
disposition to the state that was not rescinded for almost half a century.
326. Again, it is commonly observed that Congress established the first national park with
the Yellowstone reservation, but that is still not really true. It is not even clear that Congress
meant to reserve a "national" anything-the likely reason that Yellowstone was reserved in
federal ownership while Yosemite was ceded to California is that there were no states in
Wyoming, Montana, or Utah to take title to a cession. Thus, Congress simply reserved the
land from entry. Nor did the reservation precipitate reliable protection for the resources of the
area. Protracted debates about what to do with the area occupied Congress for the next thirty
years, and probably intensified the destruction of the geysers and the wildlife. For the most
lucid discussion of the motivations behind the Yosemite reservation, most of which are
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several decades away, ' and the National Park Service was not established
for almost 50 years.' However, the reservation reflected a growing public
trust-like notion that some lands or resources were of such overwhelming
importance to a nation that they ought not to be privately owned.' This
idea of natural treasures and curiosities was usually discussed in connection with criticism and despair arising from the commercial exploitation of
Niagara Falls.' It existed side-by-side with the fact that the reservation
itself owed its existence to the advocacy, not of nature lovers, but of
railroad officials anticipating the custom of tourists in the area.sOl
Nevertheless, the idea of land reservations to allow for both
commercial development of tourism opportunities and protection of
natural wonders was gaining familiarity in Congress. 2 Note that some

attributable not to the storied meeting of explorers around a camp-fire, but rather to the
urging of railroad developers, seeking to develop a tourist trade, see RIO4ARD WEST SELLARS,
PRESERVING NATURE IN THE NATIONAL PARKS: A HISTORY ch. 1, at 7-27 (1997).
327. It is not even clear that this reservation was ever intended to be "non-utilitarian" as
against the Forest Service emphasis on commodity development. For a wonderful discussion
of the National Park Service's emphasis on tourist development, and the "pitting of one
utilitarian urge-tourism and public recreation-against another-the consumptive use of
natural resources, such as logging, mining and reservoir development..." See SELLARS, supra
note 326, at ch. 1, 15.
328. As is well known, the situation deteriorated in Yellowstone sufficiently to motivate
the Secretary of the Interior to invite the U. S. Army to protect the area. See generally H. DUANE
HAMPTON, How THE U.S. CAVALRY SAVED OUR NATIONAL PARKS (1971). It is less well known

that Army protection was also seriously contemplated for the forest reservations between the
time they were set aside in 1891 and the time that Congress clarified their purposes and
established a regulatory regime for the areas. See A Plan to Save the Forests:ForestPreservation
by MilitaryControl,LXIX CENTURY ILUSTRATED MONTLY MAG., Feb. 1895, at 626-34. See also
ISE, supranote 11, at 121.
329. The evolution of this idea apart from the public trust, which it closely resembles, is
treated in Joseph Sax, HeritagePreservationas a Public Duty: The Abbe Gregoireand the Origins
ofan Idea, 88 MICH. L REV. 1142 (1990); Joseph L.Sax, Is Anyone Minding Stonehenge?: The
Origins of Cultural Property Protection in England, 78 CAL L REV. 1543, 1549-50 (1990)
(describing Lubbock's theory as having two implications that were radical at the time: first,
that private proprietorship was insufficient to ensure the protection of the artifacts; second,
the duty of protection required a much-enlarged role for the government and allowed the
government to "affirmatively veto" the owner's priorities); Sally K. Fairfax, The Essential
Legacy of a Sustaining Civilization:ProfessorJoseph Sax on the NationalParks, 25 ECOLOGY L.Q.
385 (1998) (summarizing this development).
330. See Connick & Fairfax, supranote 277, at ch. 2,36.
331. This assertion runs counter to much of what the Park Service and its advocates would
have us believe. However, it seems incontrovertible. See SELLARS, supra note 326, at ch. 1,15.
332. See, e.g., Keith & Widder, MackinacNational Park,in RUPORTS IN MACKINAC HISTORY
AND ARCHAEOLOGY, MACKINAC STATE HISTORIC PARIS (1975) (detailing how Congress set
aside a small, former military installation on Mackinac Island in Michigan by calling it a
"national park," and how the managers promptly began laying out sites for summer homes
within the reservation).
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commercial development-such as farming and mining-required private
ownership, whereas the railroads perceived their advantage in the tourist
business as tied to the idea that some things ought not be privately owned
in order to be exploited.3 The growing influence of a social vision of
property as described in Part III was also quite apparent in the formulation
of policy regarding scenic wonders. The fragmentation of public land
policy was beginning.
4. Timber, Timber Culture and Desert Lands-Dispositionfor Actual Settlers
in the Faceof Edaphic Facts

Numerous 1870s statutes also evinced congressional awareness
that most of the easily developable land had been taken up and further
homesteading required investment to make the lands habitable and
productive. Settlers encountering limited rainfall associated it with an
absence of trees. Congress's first efforts to address this aridity relied on
familiar, intrinsic notions of property by attempting to inspire private
investment in addressing the natural variations. The 1873 Timber Culture
Act passed in a burst of national enthusiasm for tree planting.3 The statute
encouraged settlers to plant and maintain trees by extending the
homesteading principle. It allowed homesteaders to receive an extra 40
acres of land if they kept timber growing on one sixteenth of their claim.'
The act reflected an early congressional embrace of scientific dogma as a
basis for policy. It also reflected the presumption that trees would alter the
climate, making the area less arid and more susceptible to homesteading.'
The Desert Land Act of 1877 had a similar structure, but focused
more directly on the emerging aridity problem: Congress promised settlers
up to 640 acres to entry-men who invested the extra effort required to
irrigate them.' The Act was the last major sortie of irrigation advocates
who believed that the private entrepreneur should bear the burdens of

333. See SEIARS, supra note 326, at 89 (discussing this cooperative relationship between
government landowners and private tourist developers).
334. Timber Culture Act, ch. 277,17 Stat. 605 (1873), repealedby Timber Culture Repeal
Act, ch. 561, 26 Stat. 1095 (1891). See also ISE, supra note 11, at 29-30. Arbor Day was first
celebrated in Nebraska in 1872. See DANA &FAIRFAX, supra note 11, at 40-41.
335. See ISE, supranote 11, at 44-45. The act in its first iteration required that the full 40
acres be planted to trees during the first year after entry, which proved to be an impossible
standard. See id. Several subsequent efforts to make the program more amenable to actual
conditions by extending the time allowed for planting and reducing the acreage did not
contribute as anticipated to successful establishment of timber stands in treeless areas of the
west. See id.
336. See GATES, supra note 1, at 399-400.
337. See id. at 63843.

NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL

[Vol. 39

bringing water to arid lands. Very soon thereafter, advocacy turned to
focus on state and, eventually, federally subsidized irrigation.'s
Congress also moved to make timber available to actual settlers.
There was in 1878 no legal way of acquiring public timberlands or the
timber itself.' The Free Timber Act provided free timber for settlers, and
the Timber and Stone Act established a process for selling timberland.' ° A
peculiarly enthusiastic Interior official, Commissioner of the General Land
Office William Sparks, successfully sought congressional authority to
remove large, illegal enclosures of public domain land erected by cattle
interests. This was a major victory for "actual" homesteaders, as distinguishable from ostensible "cattle barons." The removal of illegal fences
following passage of the 1885 act temporarily allowed homesteaders to
enter the area to mix their sweat with the intermountain West. The number
of farms grew rapidly until the turn of the century.341
5. The Irrigation Survey-Early Applied Science and Major Reservations
Rapidly Rescinded
By the end of the 1880s, a consensus emerged in Congress and
throughout the affected areas that the only way to provide a permanent
population in the arid west was through irrigation. Congress reserved
irrigable lands and potential dam sites to avoid alienation while they
developed a better way to irrigate and dispose of them. This quickly
became a policy pattern. Congress frequently adopted a stance of reserving
the resource until it could devise an improved way to dispose of it.
In 1888, while Congress was in the middle of drafting a major land
law reform, the Senate passed legislation directing the Secretary of the
Interior to inventory appropriate streams, reservoir sites, irrigable lands,
and costs of irrigation. The House, fearful that such a study could lead to
monopolization of the inventoried sites, amended the proposal by
providing that all such irrigable lands should be reserved from entry? 2
President Cleveland interpreted the act to preclude all land entries in any

338. See id. at 640-42. The act proved highly susceptible to fraud, especially by those
seeking access to water, and became the target of much attention from land reformers.
However, it was regarded as a god send by those seeking to put together ranch size properties
under statutes designed for row cropping in the humid eastern states.
339. See ISE, supra note 11, at 56. Thus, when Lincoln's Secretary of the Interior, Carl
Schurz, began to enforce anti-theft laws "sufficiently vigorously to discourage timber
stealing," Congress came under pressure from actual settlers to remedy the situation. Id. at
56-57.
340. See id. at 55-58.
341. See GATES, supra note 1, at 466-68. See also RABAN, supranote 97, passim.
342. See Everett W. Sterling, The Powell IrrigationSurvey, 1888-1893,27 MISS. VALLEY HIST.
REV. 421, 422 (1965).
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of the arid regions that might possibly be irrigable. That decision had the
effect of invalidating 134,000 entries and filings made on approximately
nine million acres of land between the passage of the act and its interpretation. The decision also halted further entry in all the land available under
disposition laws in California, Colorado, North and South Dakota, Kansas,
Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, Oregon, Washington, and the territories of
Idaho, Arizona, New Mexico, Utah, and Wyoming.' The response to the
invalidations and closures provided strong indication that the nation was
not ready for a shift-to-retention.
John Wesley Powell, the best exemplar of the early scientific federal
bureaucrats, hurried to the field to prepare assessments and maps of
irrigable lands and reservoir sites as quickly as feasible. However, repeal
of the 1888 reclamation reservations was rapid. In August 1890, Congress
amended away the authority to reserve irrigable lands and cut the funding
for the survey. Soon, all that remained of the Irrigation Survey was a series
of maps that were of considerable value to the young Bureau of Reclamation when it initiated activities under the 1902 Newlands Act." A
significant early expression of growing attention to scientific management
of public resources, the Survey nonetheless demonstrated the continuing
power of disposition. Thus, neither science nor the prospect of federal
largess on irrigation was sufficient to protect the reservations from actual
settlers.
6. Indian Reservations-AnotherMajor Reservation Policy Rescinded
Actual settlers also prevailed in the post-Civil War era over almost
a century of U.S. Indian policy. Between 1830 and the 1890s, Native
Americans ceded vast expanses of the North American continent to the
United States goverment in return for land on reservations and a "pledge
of honorable treatment by Washington."' Following the Civil War,
however, the government waged war on the Indians, abrogated most of the
treaties, and passed title to millions of acres of Indian Reservations to
settlers. Between the Federal Allotment Act of 1887 and the Indian
Reorganization Act of 1934, land in reservations declined by almost one
third, from 138 million acres to approximately 52 million acres. 3 More-

343. See id. at 426.
344. See id. at 434. In 1897 the repeal language was interpreted to apply as well to the
reservoir sites. Because of his maps, Powell is frequently referred to as the "father" of the
Reclamation Service. Small consolation after watching his lifework go in the tank, but not
anything when considering the opprobrium heaped upon his head during the two years in
which entries in the arid region were suspended.
345. Charles Geisler, PropertyPluralism, in PRoPErrY AND VALuEs (Charles Geisler et al.
eds., forthcoming 1999) (manuscript at 10, on file with author).
346. See id. at 10.
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over, the federal government trustee "repeatedly and unilaterally leased
Indian lands at below market value, and mismanaged" funds that they
collected, diverting the amount due the Indians, which has been estimated
at more than $2 billion.' Besides being a national disgrace, the eventual
disposal of many of these reservations was an example of the "reserve and
rescind" policy we discussed with respect to irrigation lands and others in
this section.
7. 1891 ForestReservation Authority--Goal Fragmentationand Park/Forest
Confusion
The destruction of the Irrigation Survey, ironically, coincided with
the Forest Reservation Act, unmistakably the high point of what is
normally described as the "shift-to-retention" period. Section 24 of the 1891
General Land Law Reform Act provided the president general authority to
identify and reserve from homestead entry forested areas of the public
domain. Because the reservation authority in the "Forest Reserve Act" was
general, rather than limited to a specific site like Yellowstone or Yosemite,
the 1891 act is frequently used to date the beginning of the "reservation
era." In the same spirit, the U.S. Forest Service has vociferously claimed the
act as part of its founding myth. As a result, it is difficult to see it not
merely as authority for retention, but also as a key reflection of the
fragmentation of policy that was occurring.
The Forest Service dominance of the story of the act typically has
obscured the fact that the statute reflects two competing elements of the
instrumental approach to ownership. Nascent urgings by a growing group
of "scientific foresters," which the Forest Service embraced, competed with
the priorities of the preservationists, which it has not.3 Although both
groups argued for government ownership and the recognition of the social
value of the land, their priorities were quite different. The assumptions

347. See id. at 11, citing K.B. Kelly, FederalIndian Land Policy and Economic Development in
the United States, in ECONoMIC DEVELOPMNT IN AmEICAN INDIAN RESERVATIONS
DEvELOPmEr" SERIES 30 (1979).

348. See DANA & FAIRFAX, supra note 11, at 56. Confusion between national parks and
national forests continued, at least in some quarters, until the Depression era. The 1891 act is
preceded by three 1890 reservations which eventually became parts of Sequoia, General
Grant, and Yosemite National Parks. They were debated and passed Congress as a "forest
reservation." The bill required the Secretary of the Interior to make rules which are now
familiar as park-like rules: to "provide for the preservation from injury of all timber, mineral
deposits, natural curiosities or wonders within said park, and their retention in their natural
condition." Act of Sept. 25,1890, ch. 926,26 Stat. 478. See also Dana & FAIRFAX, supra note 11,
at 56. The reservations ought to suggest that current day assumptions, that "X" action or
statute was for a National Park and "Y" was for a National Forest, are utterly without
foundation. Miller is particularly emphatic that these confusions are more than merely
semantic. See Miller, supranote 41, at 290-92.
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underlying the statute were amply reflected in the fact that President
Harrison first utilized the new authority to expand Yellowstone National
Park. This was a cause he had long championed while he was in the
Senate. 9 The rift between scientific foresters and park preservationists
ultimately widened into one of the major drivers of public domain policy
fragmentation.' Because of the Secretary of the Interior's initial
preservationist interpretation of the 1891 authority, forest reservations
were, in law if not in fact, entirely closed to use-no grazing, no timber
harvest, no homesteading, no mineral entry.-s' Throughout the decade of
the 1890s, diverse interests labored to fashion a compromise that would
meet their aspirations. The growing scientific forestry community and their
allies in the irrigation-watershed protection movement were not always
compatible with the priorities of homesteaders and ranchers, and the
increasingly vocal wildlife" and wilderness protection advocates.

349. See DANA & FAWRAX, suWra note 11, at 58. Within four years, President Cleveland set
aside about 14.5 million acres in reservations, which were more like parks, as we presently

understand them, than forests. See id. at 60.
350. For more detail on Park Service/Forest Service hostilities, see Connick &Fairfax, supra
note 277, at ch. 4,4-9.
351. These restrictions were much harder on those who needed federal recognition--such
as homesteaders, and miners seeking to patent claims-as opposed to those who simply
trespassed, such as livestock operators, and therefore benefited from federal inability to
enforce its policies.
352. See IS, supr note 11, at 45-48. The growing wildlife interests experienced their first
major legislative victory in 1894 with the passage of amendments to the Yellowstone
reservation, which provided extensively for the protections of wildlife in the park. See id.
353. See ANDREW DENNY RODGERS III, BERNHARD EDUARD FERNOW: A STORY OF NORTH
AMERICAN FORESTRY 157-58 (1951) (citing Bernhard Femow, Report of the Division of Forestry
for 1891, 224-29). Much of John Muir's familiar lamentations about sheep date from this
period, wherein he is seeking to protect the forest reservations from being reopened to
grazing. Historians frequently lament that Congress failed to make arrangements in the 1891
act for forest management on the reserves. It seems likely that no such management was
intended; the forest reserve authority was initially applied to parks. Bernhard Fernow, then
director of the Division of Forestry in the Department of Agriculture, made precisely the same
interpretation of the statute. His Report of the Division of Forestry for 1891 argues that the
reserves have two purposes, first, an economic one, assuring -a continuous forest cover of soil
on mountain slopes and crests for the purpose of preserving or equalizing water flow in the
streams." The second, objects "are those of an aesthetic nature, namely to preserve natural
scenery, remarkable objects of interest, and to secure places of retreat for those in quest of
health, recreation, and pleasure." See also ANDREW DENNY ROGERS, BERNHARD EDWARD
FERNOW: A STORY OF NORTH AmERIAN FOREMRY 157 (1951). Naturally Fernow thought that
the second, while legitimate, was subservient to the first. The Secretary of the Interior, who
was charged with interpreting and implementing the statute, did not agree. In his 1891 report,
the Secretary of the Interior "urgently recommended that Congress take proper action to have
the reservations that are proclaimed by the President established as national public parks
granted to the states to be preserved unimpaired..." In addition to the agricultural and
economic purposes achieved through 'the preservation of the forests upon the public
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8. The Carey Act: Federally Regulated Dispositionto Statesfor Irrigation
Even as debate about forest and park reservations intensified,
irrigators were successful in advocating for the last major disposition
program to the states to support reclamation. The Carey Act provided for
granting up to one million acres in each state containing desert lands to
support reclamation, The statute was a compromise in response to long
standing advocacy that the federal government ought simply to donate the
desert lands to the states, as it had done under the swamp lands grants of
mid-century." Irrigation advocates gradually built the case that individuals and small firms could not carry the burden of irrigation. Moreover, the
period in which the national government simply yielded either land or
authority to the states to undertake such projects had passed. The statute
that was finally enacted resembled the Desert Lands Act.' However,
Congress carefully constrained it to require that the states would "file maps
showing their plans for irrigation and the sources of water" and sell or
otherwise dispose of the land only to actual settlers in tracts carefully
regulated in size.'

domain," the Secretary added that, in making the reservations "it is to be considered also that
these parks will preserve the fauna, fish and flora of our country, and become resorts for the
people seeking instruction and recreation..." See SECRETARY INwRIOR ANN. REP. 14-15 (1891).
In March, immediately after the reserve bill passed, and again in September, President
Harrison made reservations totaling 12 million acres. Significantly, Harrison proclaimed the
Pacific Forest Reserve in February 1892, it having been recommended by the General Land
Office assessment of the area as appropriate "for national park purposes." Cyrus A. Mosier,
Report Relative to the Proposed Reservation of Public Lands, Mount RainierRegion (1892) cited in
LAWRENCE RAKESTRAW, A HISTORY OF FOREST CONSERVATION IN THE PACIFIC NORTHWEST,

1891-1913,44 (1979). By 1893, Presidents Harrison and Cleveland had set aside approximately
19.2 million acres of forest reserves. Thereafter, the forest reservation process halted, awaiting
some resolution from Congress regarding the status of the lands. Congress continued,
however, to deal with a number of park reservations and proposed park reservations
throughout the decade. In 1896, Congress reserved Casa Grande Ruin, the first archaeological
site to receive federal protection. See A. BuLL CLEMENsEN, CASA GRANDE RUINS NATIONAL
RIC RESERVE 1892-1992
MONUMENT, ARIZONA: A CENTENNIAL HISTORY Op THE FIRST PREH
(1992).
354. The Carey Act, ch. 301, § 4,28 Star. 422 (1894) (codified as amended at 43 U.S.C. § 641
(1994)).

355.
356.

See GATES, supra note 1, at 321-24 (discussing the fraud ridden Swamp Lands Acts).
Desert Lands Act, 43 U.S.C. §§ 321-38 (1994).

357. GATES, supra note 1, at 648-51; Miller, supra note 41, at 442-45. The provisions and
their effects suggest that the carefully sculpted requirements may have limited activity under
the statute--noting that at the rate lands were taken up it would have required more than 150

years for states to utilize their million acres. See GATES, supranote 1, at 630. More reasonable
perhaps is Miller's suggestion that federal reclamation programs were in the offing. See Miller,
supranote 41, at 444-45.
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9. The 1897 "Organic Act": ScientificManagement or Actual Settlers?
The Forest Service embraced the 1897 legislation as its "Organic
Act," and has long argued that the statute authorized scientific management of the forest reserves. This was based on a provision that authorizes
the Secretary to make rules and regulations that will achieve the goals of
the reservation, specifically "to preserve the forests thereon from destruction."M The Forest Service tale is a post hoc misrepresentation of the
context and content of the statute that passed. As a series of courts
subsequently concluded, the 1897 act did not authorize scientific
management as envisioned by the scientific foresters of the day and as long
practiced by the Forest Service. The language in the section of the act
authorizing timber sales was carefully limited to what might be called
vicious tree control. The act authorized the Secretary to remove only dead
or mature trees that hinder growth of new trees in order to protect
watersheds. More generally, the provisions illustrated an amalgam of the
continuing support for actual settlers and the increasing acceptance of
government regulation of socially important resources. However, the
means of support to settlers altered perceptibly. Government regulation of
public resources, rather than disposition of them, was central to the act.
The bill that passed in 1897 authorized more than the regulated
sale of timber. Other provisions, rarely referenced adequately, demonstrated the continuing strength of the intrinsic view of property. Indeed, the
embrace of the settlers cast real clouds on the future of the reservations.'

358. The literature on this is large. Start with ISE, supranote 11, for a standard line, then
DANA & FAIRFAX, supra,note 11, for a brief summary and move to Miller, supra, note 41, for
the details.
359.

DANA & FAMRFAX, supra note 11, at 63. The 1897 act passed as a rider on an

appropriations bill. See id,
360.

16 U.S.C. § 476, repealedby Act of Oct. 22,1976, Pub. L. No. 94-588, § 13,90 Stat. 2958.

This followed the decision in West Va. Div. of Izaak Walton League of America v. Butz, 522 F.2d
945 (4th Cir. 1975) (requiring the Forest Service to mark each individual tree authorized for
cutting under timber contracts). See DANA & FAntFAX, supranote 11, at 327-41.
361. The president's authority under the 1891 act to make reservations was heavily
challenged and barely survived. Furthermore, the bill evinces hostility to the reserves which
was not evident until literally the last weeks of the negotiation process. As Congress worked
on the 1897 bill, President Cleveland precipitously proclaimed 13 new reserves, a total area
of 21.3 million acres, as recommended by a National Academy of Sciences (NAS) committee
impaneled to study the issue. See BNG, supra note 2, at 107-109. Unlike the previous reserves,
Whole
these were poorly studied, and the experts had not even visited five of them. See id.
towns, villages, farms, mines, mills, and thousands of inhabitants were included. See Miller,
supra note 41, at 327. Congress and the public were deeply outraged by the abusive exercise
of authority and they "rudely stopped the process of legislative compromise." Id. at 310. Even

Pinchot believed that the NAS recommendations were an error. See BNG, supra note 2, at 11922. General public support for the reserves is evinced in the fact that the president's authority
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Proposals authorizing protection of the forests by army troops were
removed.' The act opened reserves to mineral exploration and to sheep
and cattle grazing. It granted to settlers within the reserves free access and
the right to build roads and other improvements on the reserved land to
achieve it.e Finally, Congress declared its intention that no land valuable
for agriculture or mining was to be included in a forest reserve.
As the scientific managers in government gained stature and
confidence, the 1897 statute was manipulated to accomplish many of their
goals. Far from being an embrace of scientific forest management, however,
the 1897 Act opened the 1891 reservations to diverse entry. It clearly
expressed the continuing priority on disposition to actual settlers. Thus, in

making forest reservations Congress did not abandon the disposition
policy, but facilitated it.3"
10. Narrow Government Authority to HoldLand--Camfield v. United States.3
In the same year that Congress enacted the wonderfully complex
1897 statute, the Supreme Court considered a crucial challenge to federal
authority to hold land. In the famous Camfield case, the Court confronted
crafty entrymen who had arranged fences on privately held parcels in a
checkerboard section to enclose the publicly owned parcels as well.' The
to set them aside was not revoked at that point. See Miller, supra note 41, at 303. It did,
however, as a condition of retaining the reserves, restore the Cleveland reserves to entry for
nine months (during which period settlers could and did stake claims) and authorize the
president to modify any reservation made under the 1891 statute. See id. Efforts to rescind the
president's reservation authority continued, with a major peak again in 1897, until they
succeeded in 1907. See id.
362. See A Plan to Save the Forests: ForestPreservationby Military Control, LXIX CENTURY
ILLUSTRATFD MONTHLY MAG., Feb. 1895, at 626.
363. Seeslsupranote 11, at 139-40.
364. See THE FIGHT, supra note 13, at 12. Gifford Pinchot is emphatic "The single object of
the public land system of the United States, as President Roosevelt repeatedly declared, is the
making and maintenance of prosperous homes." Id. at 11. The disposition system, Pinchot
argued, was debauched, allowing "[great areas of the public domain" to pass "into the
hands, not of the home-maker, but of large individual or corporate owners whose object is
always the making of profit and seldom the making of homes....Few passions of the human
mind are stronger than land hunger, and the large holder clings to his land....Unless the
American homestead system of small free-holders is to be so replaced by a foreign system of
tenantry, there are few things of more importance to the West than to see to it that the public
lands pass directly into the hands of the actual settler instead of into the hands of the man
who, if he can, will force the settler to pay him the unearned profit of the land speculator, or
will hold him in economic and political dependence as a tenant. If we are to have homes on
the public lands, they must be conserved for the men who make homes." Id. at 12-15.
365. Camfield v. United States, 167 U.S. 518 (1897).
366. The checkerboard lands arise from the structure of land grants to railroads: in order
to prevent monopolization of access to the tracks by the railroads, and to assure that the
government would recover some of the value added by the road, Congress retained every
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defendants argued that because the fences were on private land, forcing
their removal under the 1885 anti-enclosure statute was unconstitutional.
Not so, concluded the Supreme Court. The Court reasoned that the fences
were a nuisance. Like any proprietor, the federal government had the right
to be free of nuisance. Although the Court decision treats the federal
government as any other proprietor, the Court also noted that the general
government had authority "analogous to the police power of the several
states" to protect itself from nuisance on its own land. Moreover, the Court
simply presumed that the federal government may hold onto the land and
take steps to protect it. "A different rule," the Court stated, "would place
the public domain of the United States completely at the mercy of state
legislation." 7 The Camfield case was not an interpretation of Congress'
authority under the property clause in Article IV of the Constitution. It is
best understood, along with the Gettysburg and Fort Leavenworth cases, as
part of the growing acceptance of the federal government as the superior
sovereign. This notion gradually ripened into federal authority to acquire,
hold, and share authority over land within states. Hence, Camfield is a fairly
confined, but significant, recognition that the federal government would
continue to hold property in the western states.
11.

Summary

The Camfield case and the 1897 act provide a nice fin de siecle
indication of the shape of emerging resource policy. Major events of the
period reflected changing notions of government and property in a
diversifying public land policy. They also demonstrated the difficulty in
changing the emphasis on the Lockean intrinsic view of ownership on the
public domain. By the end of the nineteenth century, interpretations of the
Constitution clearly permitted continuing federal land ownership. We
emphasize this point because end-of-the-twentieth century commentators
frequently presume that the authority always existed, and that federal land
ownership was always contemplated, always legitimate.' That is simply
not the case. As the national level of government grew in stature and scope,
its land holding authority grew with it. However, the gradual expansion
in the federal government's inclination and ability to hold land was not
accompanied by a clear "shift-to-retention" policy. Reservations for
preservation of natural wonders and protection of watersheds joined
acquisitions for national battlefields in the public domain policy quiver.
However, the major goal in all of Congress' enactments, the reservations as
well as the disposals, was continuing disposition of land to actual settlers.

other section in the swaths of grants.
367. Camfield, 167 U.S. at 526.
368. See COGGINS RT AL, sMpra note 7.
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No longer unalloyed, the Lockean vision of individuals taking title to
property by claiming them with labor out of a state of nature continued,
nevertheless, to dominate public domain policy.
One way to categorize these alterations in the range and emphasis
of public domain policy is to observe the differences emerging in congressional response to different kinds of resources. One end of the spectrum is
dear-mineral development continues to this day to be tied to intrinsic
assumptions about property--discovery, investment of effort, and
ownership. Mineralized lands are on a separate, identifiable, and coherent
trajectory. Similarly, Congress dearly intended arable land to be open to
settlement even when inadvertently included in forest reservations. Beyond
continued disposition, however, three separate reservation policies began
to emerge. The preeminent one at the dose of the century was a congressional effort to halt disposition of selected resources pending creation of an
improved disposition scheme. Congress abandoned extensive reservations,
for example, to civilize the Indians and to facilitate reclamation under
pressure from railroads and settlers. The 1891 forest reservations occupied
a middle ground. Once made, they were subsequently opened to entry for
mining or for diverse homesteading alienation and use. At the other end
of the spectrum, scenic curiosities were reserved more permanently for
tourist development.' Parks joined battlefields as sources of national
inspiration as well as tourist commerce, reflecting the growing strength of
instrumental views of property. Finally, a crucial form of resource
fragmentation is worth notice. In meeting the needs of miners, Congress
separated the land from the water. Control over water remained largely,
but not exclusively, with the states for most of the twentieth century."
Irrigation interests occupied a particularly instructive place as
powerful and explicit advocates of fragmentation. They urged the federal

369. See Connick &Fairfax, supra note 277, at ch. 2,35. Alfred Runte, not to be trifled with
on these matters, argues emphatically, and largely convincingly, that there was no thought
at or near the time of the Yellowstone reservation of preserving natural systems or nature. See
id. The focus was on the curiosities and peculiarities of nature. He alleges that the emergence
of natural systems conservation can be traced in the evolution of New York State's efforts to
protect Niagara Falls, a process in which the federal government, notably, took no part. See

id.
370. However, it is interesting to note that the second park reservation did not last out the
century. Many commentators note that, having made the Yellowstone reservation, Congress

did not set aside another park-like reservation for almost twenty years. That is not true. It is
correct that no Yellowstone-like reservations made it into the system of National Parks.

However, Congress set aside Mackinac Island in 1876, using for the first time the term
"national park." However, it remained a reservation for only 20 years before it was turned
over to the state for use as a state park. See generallyWidder, supra note 332.
371. See A. Dan Tarlock, The Endangered Species Act and Western Water Rights, 20 LAND &
WATER L Rrv.1,13-17 (1985).
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government to retain the watershed land under government protection in
forest reservations but to dispose of the irrigable acres. In the debates on
the 1897 Act, they defended the forest reserves from the predations of

homesteaders, loggers, and others who might disturb the forest cover and
stream flow.' Just as frequently, however, they are portrayed as the
hobgoblins of park reservations, advocating dams in scenic mountain

valleys as they sought a mix of federal programs to meet their exacting
needs. Accordingly, they embody the beginning of a fragmented public
domain policy that is dearly visible at the end of the nineteenth century:

public domain policy, at the peak of what is typically styled as the
reservation era, actually headed off in a number of incompatible directions,
all folded around the fundamental theme of support for continuing
disposition to actual settlers.
B. Roosevelt and Pinchot: The Progressives in Office-The Flowering
of Fragmentation
Louise Peffer observed that no change came about "automatically"
in public domain policy just because the nineteenth century ended and the
twentieth began.P However, Theodore Roosevelt's administration gave the
turn of the century a significance that was more than chronological.
Conservation became, as is well known, a national crusade, a touchstone
of the Roosevelt administration. Under this focus, ideas and proposals that
had incubated for decades were implemented. This did not mean that
concern for the actual settler abated. To the contrary, establishment of
homes for the "little guy" was the rhetorical centerpiece of the Progressive's faith. However, it was also true that in Roosevelt's shadow a key
element of the "shift-to-retention" thesis arguably emerges. For a few brief
moments, the Secretaries of Agriculture and Interior pulled in the same
direction, giving a chimera of credibility to the integrated approach to
resources promised by the Progressives.' That partnership soon faded,
contributing to serious institutional fragmentation in public domain policy,
and the major alterations of the Roosevelt-Pinchot era revealed a fragmentation of title to resources underwritten by the changing notion of property
discussed in Part m. Progressive Era retention policies were frequently
more apparent than real, a division of the "bundle of sticks" of ownership

372. See Donald J.Pisar, ForestsandRecamation, 1891-1911, in ORIGINS OF THE NATIONAL
FOREsTS: A CENTENNIAL SYMPosIuM 237-58 (Harold K. Steen ed., 1992) (detailing the
relationship between the foresters and the irrigators and how it fell apart when transformed
into a relationship between the Forest Service and the Reclamation Service).
373. See PEFFER, supra note 10, at 8.
374. See supra note 2.
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among rival claimants. Frequently, the result was that the federal govemment was left with lines on a map that suggest retention, while control and
economic benefit from the resource passed, in law or in fact, to states or
private parties.
1. Reclamation: Institutional Fragmentation and Subsidizing Continuing
Disposition
Roosevelt turned first to reclamation. His embrace of reclamation
arose from the fact that it would "expand the opportunities for homemaking."" The 1902 Newlands Acte7 demonstrated a growing federal power
and the importance of science. Yet both the power and the science were
marshaled in support of continued disposition. Passage of the act was
driven by rhetoric embracing homesteading, the "sweet obbligato [that]
accompanied almost any discussion of public land matters. "377 The statute
promised irrigation water to achieve the agricultural settlement potential
of the arid West. The irrigation program initially provided a system for
self-financing the projects." However, a series of congressional enactments
over the twentieth century gradually forgave most repayment obligations
and allowed farmers access to water at enormously subsidized prices. The
subsidized yeoman, not precisely a personification of the Lockean/
Jeffersonianvision, nevertheless represented the continuing hold of the
actual settler mystique despite major changes in expectations about
government programs and property.
The Newlands Act depended for its implementation on scientifically credible government agencies. The U.S. Geological Survey (USGS)

375. PmP, supra note 10, at 32-33.
376. 43 U.S.C. § 371 (1994). The Newlands Act authorized the Secretary of the Interior to
"plan, build, operate, and maintain irrigation works" in 16 arid western states. Id. The Act
provided for withdrawal of sites for irrigation works, federal construction and operation of
reclamation facilities, including dams and water distribution systems. Again the literature is
enormous. For good starting points for those who wish to approach the topic in the context
of public domain policy, see generally GATES, supra note 1, at ch. 22; HAYS, supra note 2;
DONALD WORsrER, RVERS OF EMPIRE: WATER, ARIDrrY AND THE GROWTH OF THE AMERICAN

WEsr (1985); MARx RESNR CADILLAC DESERT THE AMERICAN WESr AND ITS DISAPPEARING
WATER (1986).
377. PEPPER, supra note 10, at 40.
378. The basic idea was that the receipts from public land sales in the sixteen states and
water use fees would be used to pay for the construction and maintenance, and that the
projects would be self-supporting. Peffer notes that the act "in one respect...presented a new
idea ...
with the exception of moneys earmarked for land grant colleges," land sale receipts
would be allocated to construction of irrigation works. PEPER, supra note 10, at 33. Her
discussion of the pros and cons of having funds allocated without congressional
appropriations Is still relevant. See id. at 40. The notion that debits would be forgiven in the
acquisition of public lands had a long history, dating from the cash sales programs of the
early 1800s. See GATES, supranote 1, at 7-10.
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received initial responsibility for implementing the act. However, the
Secretary established the Reclamation Service separate from USGS as an
agency within the Department of the Interior in 1907.' The national forests
were justified largely in terms of their contribution to water for settlement.
However, the water and the land producing the water were managed by
two different sets of experts in two different agencies, and in two frequently warring departments. Thus, the fragmenting practice of responding to each emergent political interest by establishing a new federal agency
had begun.
Moreover, in order to achieve the goal of continuing disposition,
the western states agreed to an expansion of federal power including the
federalization of what was viewed as state's responsibility for reclamation
policy.' This was, as historian Donald Worster has noted, difficult for
many westerners to accept.381 However, the statute also promised that
reclamation projects would not interfere with established state water
allocation law or title to water established under it.' Thus, the western
states were able to accept this federalization in part because it was merely
a "brief acknowledgment of the principle of reservation.' The lands were
destined for settlement and the agricultural interests were able to avoid
most of the federal control while benefiting from the subsidies.

379. See BARBARA T. ANDREWS & MARIE SANSONE, WHO RUNS THE RIVERS? DAMS AND
DEcISIONs IN THE NEW WESt ch. 3 (1983). By 1907 the Forest Service had existed for two years.
380. See generally ANDREWS &SANSONE, supWra note 379. The statute makes rules about the
distribution of water to actual settlers on small parcels of land. The commitment to state
control of allocation was subsequently much litigated and challenged. However, it provided
the vehicle by which large agricultural interests, particularly in southern California, evaded
the act's at least nominal embrace of small agriculturists.
381. See WORSTER, supra note 376, at 159-62. See also DONALD WOTER, AN UNSETLE
COUNTRY: CHANGING LANDSCAPES OF THE AMERICAN WEST 31-54 (1994).
382. See WORSrER, supra note 376, at 161 (reminding us the Jeffersonian vision was for
"white, American family men" since the statute provided that "no Mongolian labor" could

be used on construction crews).
383. PEPPER, supra note 10, at 39-40. More appropriately for the present discussion,
perhaps, Peffer styles this federalization in terms of a balance between two principlesreservation and settlement-which are combined in the statute. The west was "bitterly
antagonistic to any form of federal overlordship,...[yet] in its eagerness to gain a desired end
by irrigation it was willing to make a brief acknowledgment of the principle of reservation
when, as under the terms of the Reclamation Act, the land was merely to be set aside in
preparation for future settlement." Id. But Petter's argument is ultimately flawed-the west
was not opposed to any form of overlordship or to reservations per se. Westerners supported
reservations that met their needs and opposed those that did not. See HAYS, supra note 2, at
13. Moreover, the act as passed is a compromise-areas in irrigation projects were withdrawn
from all entry except homestead entry.
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2. Sedimentary Deposits and Reservationsin Limbo
Minerals policy was another area in which Congress was feeling
its way toward enhanced federal control without making effective
reservations. Hardrock deposits continued on the simple path of complete
disposition without any return to the government. Sedimentary deposits
or energy minerals soon were split off and evinced the same pattern as the
reclamation reservations. Presidents Roosevelt and Taft halted alienation
of federal coal and oil deposits until Congress designed an improved way
to continue disposition. Between July and November of 1906, Roosevelt
withdrew 66 million acres of land likely to contain coal.' President Taft
continued mineral withdrawals, dosing 4.5 million acres of oil lands,
primarily in Wyoming and California, to all forms of entry.' The result
was another stalemate-reserved resources, like the early forest reservations and the national parks, and no process identified for management or
access. There was no question that these minerals would be developed, but
the question of how was not resolved until 1920.f
3. The Irony of the ForestTransfer Act of 1905--ScientificManagementand the
End of the Forest Reservation Authority
The General Land Office in the Department of the Interior had not
met with much success in managing the forest reservations set aside under
the 1891 Act and subject to regulated use under the 1897 statute.3 7 Pinchot
and Roosevelt early on decided to move the reserves to the Department of
Agriculture. Pinchot, from his position as the Director of the Division of

384. See PER7, supra note 10, at 69-71, (citing S. Doc. No. 59-141 (1906-07)). In December
of that same year, Roosevelt addressed Congress and proposed a leasing system for coal, oil,
and gas.
385. See Pcmi, supra note 10, at 110-15,125. Challenges to executive authority to make
such reservations without specific congressional direction resulted in passage in 1910 of the
Pickett Act. Intended to assure the president's authority, the statute was so witlessly drawn
as to subject it to more trenchant attack.
386. See PEFRR, supra note 10, at 115-18. The issue was finally resolved in favor of
presidential withdrawal authority that predated and transcended the Pickett Act's ill advised
provisions in United States v. Midwest Oil Co., 236 US. 459 (1915).
387. Part of the problem was that Pinchot, in an effort to build support for transferring the
reserves to the Department of Agriculture, where he was Director of the Division of Forestry,
devoted considerable energy to undercutting the efforts of the General Land Office (GLO).
The GLO's effort to manage the lands is an under-told story. The requirement of turning an
agency of bookkeepers and patent investigators into a field force of land managers was not
easily met. See James Muhn, Early Administrationof the ForestReserve Act: InteriorDepartment
and Genenl Land Office Policies, 1891-1897, in ORIGINS OF THE NATIONAL FORESTS A
CENTENNiAL
nyosM
259-75 (Harold K. Steen ed., 1992). See also IsE, supra note 11, at ch.
3 & 4,155.
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Forestry in the Department of Agriculture, could then institute the practice
of scientific forestry "on the ground."'
In the transfer we see three major fragmenting elements. First, the
"institutional fragmentation underlying the transfer was significant. The
founding of the Forest Service spread public domain management between
two departments. It heralded the growing practice of establishing a new
agency to meet the specific needs of those whose expertise or economic
needs were related to specific resources. Second, the lead-up to the transfer
enabled stock operators to control national forest grazing policy. Livestock
operators, who largely had been barred from the reservations by the
Department of the Interior's park-oriented interpretation of the 1891 Act,
bargained hard for greater access in return for their support of the transfer.
The General Land Office manual warned that "stockmen used the forests
only as a privilege and not as a right, and that the Secretary could exclude
them entirely at his discretion."" Pinchot, blurring forever that fundamental distinction between a right and a privilege, "led the fight in Washington
for greater recognition for the stockmen."' Finally, in the transfer we
perceived growing hostility between Congress and the Executive Branch
over public domain policy. Congress established the Forest Service with
generous salaries for forest managers and staff. It also developed a fund
containing all receipts for timber and grazing permits that could be used
to support further administrations of the reserves, designated thereafter as
National Forests.' However, the generosity did not endure growing
western resentment of Pinchot's rather high-handed management style. In
the 1907 appropriations bill, Congress stripped the agency of its selfsupporting status, making management funds subject to annual appropria388. "On the ground" distinguishes Pinchot from his predecessor, Bernhard Fernow,
whom Pinchot believed was ineffectual in that he did not emphasize the silviculture that
Pinchot had learned in Europe. But see RLW. Behan, Forestryand the End of Innocence, AM.
FORESTS, May 1975, at 16,19; Richard Behan, Address to the N.W. School of Law, Political

Popularityand Conceptual Nonsense: The StrangeCase of Sustained Yield Forestry (1978).
389. HAYS, supra note 2, at 55-57 (citing the General Land Office Manual).
390. HAYS, supranote 2, at 57. In 1901, Pinchot attracted Albert F. Potter, an official in the
Arizona Wool Growers' Association, to the Bureau of Forestry to establish a Division of
Grazing. Potter became the chief architect of Forest Service grazing policy. Stockmen were
also successful in requiring "the selection of forest supervisors and rangers, when practicable,
from the citizens of the states or territories in which the reserves were located." Ise calls this
a "little political concession." ISE, supranote 11, at 157. Note, however, that the same little
concession was among the early amendments to the Taylor Grazing Act, absent the "when
practicable" dodge.
391. See ISE, supra note 11, at 162-63. A separate statute, also passed in 1905, gave officers
of the United States authority to arrest without process any person found violating a law or
regulation governing forest or park reservations. See id. at 162; Act of Feb. 6,1905, Pub. L. No.
46, ch. 456,33 Stat. 700. This general law enforcement authority has never been granted to the
BLM except in narrow geographic areas.
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tions. It granted the states an increasingly generous share of agency
receipts. Congress also rescinded the reservation authority in just those
states where the forest cover might have justified further forest reservations, namely Washington, Oregon, Idaho, Montana, Wyoming, and
Colorado.' Although the reserves survived intense congressional
criticism, the president's 1891 forest reservation authority was gone, and
Congress and the Executive Branch were on significantly different
wavelengths concerning public land management.'
4. "RedistributionPolicy" on National Forest Grazing Lands-ohen in the
Service of Locke

The standard narrative suggests that once the U.S. Forest Service
was established, the forest reservations were permanent. This superficial
analysis fails to note not only the clear preference for settlers in the 1897
act, but also the growing disjunction between formal title to land and
control over resources. Sparring with livestock interests dominated the
early years of Forest Service existence, not timber management.' Early
Forest Service grazing priorities were similar to those of the Reclamation
Act. Both demonstrated explicit preference for subsistence farmers and
newcomers over large, established producers.
Under the "redistribution" policy of the Forest Service, first-comers
to the national forest rangelands received a yearly permit to graze similar
to the original General Land Office permits. Moreover, access was
temporary. The Forest Service clearly established that as new arrivals came
into an area, available forage would be redistributed to accommodate the
newcomers. Small producers were to be allowed to increase their permitted
number of stock, and newcomers were to be granted grazing access. They
both had a right to expand their operations and to expect redistribution of

392. See generally DANA & FAIRFAX, supra note 11, at 91-92. Forced by other factors to sign
the offending appropriations bill, Roosevelt cooked up with Pinchot a number of additions
to the forests in those states immediately prior to approving the act. Roosevelt added 16
million acres to the reservations that clinched congressional hostility to Pinchot and the

Forests for a protracted period. See also PEPPER supra note 10, at ch. 5; Sally K. Fairfax,
InterstateBargainingover Revenue Sharing and Payments in Lieu of Taxes: Federalismas if States

Mattered, in FEDERAL LANDS POLIcY 77 (Phillip 0. Foss ed., 1987).
393. Challenges to the mineral withdrawals led to legislation and litigation that ultimately
established that the president has independent authority to reserve lands from the public

domain. See supratext accompanying notes 385-88.
394.

This hostility was reflected 60 years later in the report by the PuBuC LAND LAW

REVIEW COMMISSION, ONE THIRD OF THE NATION'S LANm A REPORT TO THE PREsIDENr AND
CONGRESS (1970).
395. The relative importance of livestock and timber is expressed in the fact that despite

extremely low grazing fees, they exceeded or equaled timber receipts from 1906 to 1917 and
vastly outpaced them until 1921. See DANA & FAIRAX, supranote 11, at 87.
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permits to graze on national forests from the larger operators until the
newcomers reached a specified level just below which the larger operators
could not be reduced. Accordingly, the redistribution policy was an
excellent illustration of the admixture of incompatible property notions in
Progressive Era policy: the existing access rights of established ranchers
were treated in an instrumental way, as alterable to achieve an important
social goal of continuing disposition to actual settlers. The instrumental
approach to original claimants ironically created the opportunity for
continued assignment of intrinsic rights to newly arriving ranchers still
acting out the Lockean-Jeffersonian model.
Forest Service grazing policy evolved rapidly from reserved land
management into a major example of nominal retention. Established
ranchers tolerated the redistribution policy only until confronted with a
rash of new homestead entries, which was not long in coming.' Our
national preoccupation with hearty yeomen was exacerbated by a burst of
early twentieth century enthusiasm for "dry farming," a short hand for
scientific dogma of the day that rain follows the plow.' It led to the
Kinkaid Act in 1904 where Congress experimented with 640-acre homesteads in northwest Nebraska.' The popularity of the bill's scientific
theory was so widespread that bills for extending its provisions soon proliferated in Congress." A series of "enlarged" homestead acts passed Congress in the first decade of the new century.1 Established livestock operators became increasingly insistent on derailing the redistribution policy and
increasing recognition of their "rights" to graze national forest lands.
5. Homesteading on NationalForests-MoreRescinded Reseruations
While the Forest Service, following Pinchot's lead, made more and
more policy accommodations to the livestock operators, Congress persisted
in its enthusiasm for disposition of reserved forestland to homesteaders. In
1906 Congress reiterated its direction, first articulated in the 1897 act, that
the forests were not intended to include land suitable for agriculture by
opening the National Forests to homesteading. They gave the Secretary
discretion to classify lands appropriate for entry. The Secretary's pace in
making those designations was predictably desultory. Congress in 1912
directed the Secretary to make such classifications. Again, the agency

396. See PEFFME,
supra note 10, at 134-39. Homestead entries peaked in 1910 and continued
strong after World War 1.Forty percent more land was homesteaded between 1897 and 1922
than between 1862 and 1897. See id.
397. See GATES, supra note 1, at 503.
398. Fans of MARMSANDOZ'S O JULES (1935) are not always aware of the role of public
land law in that saga. It is Kinkaid Act land that Jules worked.
399. See PEFFER, supranote 10, at 140-41.
400. See GATES, supra note 1,at ch. 17,463-94.
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hemmed and hawed, nevertheless opening about 2.5 million acres to
entry.' While not a huge amount of land, it was broken into about 18,000
separate tracks, which had a considerable impact on both the forests and
the cattle operators.
6. The Antiquities Act of 1906-Strong Retention of Land and Disposal of Key
Resources
Given these successful challenges to the forest reservation policy,
the Antiquities Act of 1906 appeared as a far more complex and important
statute than typical treatment of it would suggest. The statute broadened
and solidified the government's interest in the growing category of
property that could not be privately owned. In the same year that Congress
insisted that national forests be opened to homestead entry, and within
months of rescinding the president's forest reservation authority, it passed
the Antiquities Act. This act granted general reservation authority to
protect "historic landmarks, historic and prehistoric structures, and other
objects of historic or scientific interest that were situated upon the lands
owned or controlled" by the United States, an authority far broader than
that granted in 1891 concerning forest reservations.' The president was
also authorized to accept donations of relevant tracts of land on behalf of
the United States.4 1

401. See DANA & FAIPAX, supra note 11, at 102-03.
402. See GATES, supra note 1, at 512. The act was popular in part for its contribution to
getting land onto tax rolls. See id.
403. Although the reservations were supposed to be specifically limited to the "smallest
area compatible with the proper care and management of the objects to be protected," the use
of the authority has frequently been expansive. Antiquities Act of 1906, § 2,16 U.S.C. § 431
(1994). Hal Rothman, the act's Boswell, complains that the act "has been undervalued,
ignored, and discounted by both contemporary observers and historians." HAL ROmTMAN,
AMERICA's NATIONAL MONUMm3: THE PoLmCS OF PREsVATIoN xi (1989). This seems a fair
statement. However, in Rothman, as elsewhere, the Antiquities Act is treated in the context
of accreting National Park policy, as one little increment on the road to retention and
enlightenment. Thus, it seems a rather natural development The act is more interesting. When
considered in the context of the anti-reservation tendencies in Congress at the time it passed,
its existence is astounding. Moreover, Rothman plays down the parts of the statute that are
extraction oriented, and thus misses the interesting split in thinking about ownership. For a
more recent consideration of owning heritage resources and sensitive properties, see Joseph
L. Sax, HeritagePreservation as a Public Duty: The Abbe Gregoire and the Origins of an Idea, 88
MiCH. L Rsv. 1142 (1990); Joseph L.Sax, Is Anyone Minding Stonehenge: The Origins of Cultural
Property Protection in England, 78 CAL L REv. 1543 (1990). See also Freyfogle, supra note 210.
404. 16 US.C. § 431. This donation authority is not trivial. At the time, this was the only
authority to accept donations of land for conservation purposes. See Connick & Fairfax, supra
note 277, at Introduction 6, 18. The Antiquities Act authority was used to initiate Acadia
National Park and Muir Woods. The former is the beginning of national parks in the east. See
id. at ch. 3, 87.
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Despite its power to retain land, however, the Antiquities Act was
also an extraction statute, not unlike the General Mining Act.' The act
severed the land from the portable antiquities and, relics thereon, and
authorized the respective secretaries to grant permits for exploring ruins
and gathering objects. It required that the objects be sent to museums and
other scientific or educational sites. We therefore interpret the statute as
creating a new kind of property-for some items that can only be owned
and managed by museums. Unfortunately, the field of archaeology was not
up to the privileges granted at the time. The process that ensued is
arguably best analogized to the permit system of mineral extraction until
well after World War II." Thus, the Antiquities Act was a mixed bag.
Unquestionably it was, and remains, the strongest commitment to land
reservation for conservation in the code. Notwithstanding, it provided
scanty scientific cover for systematic removal of Indian relics from reserved
lands and almost no protection at all from looters either on or outside of the
lands reserved.
7. Federal Reserved Water Rights-Crowing FederalAuthority Reunites the
Water with Some of the Reserved Land
Congress and the Executive Branch were not the only participants
zigzagging on disposition and retention. During the first decade of the
century the Supreme Court precipitated a small, but quite significant
retreat on the disposition of water to the states. In 1908, the Court
considered a case in which enterprising white farmers had diverted
streams surrounding an Indian reservation to the extent that they
effectively de-watered the Indian land. In a case challenging the legitimacy
of these diversions, the Court crafted, with unclear Constitutional
authority, a doctrine of implied water reservation. When the federal
government set aside and reserved land from the public domain, it
automatically, without even mentioning water, reserved sufficient water
to accomplish the purpose of the reservation.' Any doubts about the reach
of the federal authority to retain land and other resources that lingered in
the wake of Camfield, the Court resolved in Winters.
The expansion of federal authority in connection with reserved
lands was so great that it was not necessary for the federal government to
comply with state water law to establish title to water. This was a danger-

405. We are grateful to our colleague Bryan Lym, who first voiced this interpretation of
the statute during a seminar on cultural resources many years ago.
406.

See PAUL FAGETTE, DIGGING FOR DOLLARS: AMERICAN ARCHAEOLOGY AND THE NEW

DEAL xvii-xxvii, ch. 1, at 1-18 (1996).
407. See Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564, 577 (1908) (holding that the federal
government reserved enough water rights by implication upon reservation of land for Indian
tribes to effectuate the purposes of that reservation).
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ous doctrine indeed. The reservation was open ended rather than for a
specific amount. Moreover, it was not subject to the "use it or lose it"
element of state water allocation systems. Finally, the date of priority
attached to the reservation was usually very senior in most watersheds."
Although the case's doctrinal basis is still not altogether dear, it was
impossible not to read the Court's decision as an important increment in
the development of federal authority over the public domain land. The
reserved water right was an opposite number to the Irrigation Survey and,
ironically, the Indian land reservations. In the latter two cases, the federal
government reserved land and then unreserved it. Under the Winters
doctrine, the Courts recovered control over resources that Congress had
granted to the states. Thus, the Courts had come a long way from the rather
niggling arguments of Camfield in a rather short time.
8. The Weeks Act-ReacquiringForest Lands in the Eastern United States
The Antiquities Act's authority to accept donations evinced a
willingness of Congress to acquire private land for some federal purposes.
This authority was extended grandly in 1911 to include actual purchase of
forested lands. The Weeks Act authorized establishment of a commission
which sought out, in a rather complex process, land high in watersheds for
acquisition. Congress, not the courts as in the case of the Winters doctrine,
deemed some resources and public purposes sufficient to justify the
reacquisition of land disposed of previously. However, before 1911 it was
not clear that Congress had the authority to do so. The Weeks Act was
debated primarily in the context of whether the federal government had
authority to acquire lands for conservation purposes.' The initial answer
to that question was a resounding "no." Ultimately, Congress was willing
to be convinced that the bill was not a forest protection act, for which
allegedly there was no authority, but rather a Commerce Clause based
effort to protect watersheds. Hence, the commerce-based bill passed

408.

But, because the Court left the basis for this novel doctrine murky, it was possible for

denizens of the state water bar to assert that the authority was tied to either the War Power
or the Treaty Power, or to the government's special fiduciary relationship with the Indian
reservations. Thus the argument went for many years; the same implied right did not attach

to the federal government's reservations of land for forest, park, or similar purposes. Not until
1976, it is interesting to note, did the government pursue litigation to extend this doctrine to
include those lands. See Cappaert v. United States, 426 US. 128,13841,146 (1976) (holding
the federal government reserved enough water rights by implication to effect the purposes
of its reservation to protect a unique species of fish).
409. See Connick & Fairfax, supra note 277, at Introduction 17. Although the vision of how
the federal government could hold, manage, and acquire land was expanding; it did not yet
extend to acquisitions for conservation. See also Meidinger, supra note 286, at 19-23. It is
important to note that Congress did not authorize land acquisition for park purposes until the
late 1950s. See Connick & Fairfax, supra note 277, at Introduction 20.
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easily."' Acquiring land was not, of course, the same as reserving it. 1'
Passage of the Weeks Act nevertheless manifested an acceptance of federal
ownership, management, and the advantages of federal participation in
local economies. It also indicated the importance of sellers in the politics of
federal land acquisition. Owners of marginal, over-cut timber land and
beat-out farms throughout the eastern United States were happy to sell
their property to the federal government rather than simply abandon it.412
9. Homesteading Continues Nonetheless-A Belated Attempt to Recognize the
Realities of Row Cropping in the Arid West by Severing the Surface from the
Subsurface Estate
Although government ownership, and even acquisition of land,
had clearly gained a secure place in the array of public domain laws and
policies, the increasingly mythic notion of homesteading continued to
dominate debate. The last of the major homesteading statutes, passed in
1916, recognized the aridity of the intermountain west. The Stock Raising
Homestead Act permitted 640-acre homesteads in designated areas under
very favorable conditions.4u The statute depended on an important
fragmentation in the concept of property. While granting the surface to the
homesteader, the underlying coal and other valuable minerals were
reserved to the federal government. This provision gave rise to enormous
areas in which title to the surface was "severed" from title to the
subsurface.
In spite of its name, the bill was most emphatically not a victory for
ranchers. Again the notion of intrinsic property and the accompanying
image of actual settlers would not be denied in spite of the strenuous
objections of the stock operators." 4 The only concession to ranchers'
interests was the authorization for withdrawal of public lands for stock
driveways.41 Under the act, the stockmen saw the "march of the homesteader[s]" continue across the range areas which the stockmen were trying
to control. 16 Ironically, ranchers were forced by continuing disposition to
homesteaders to become explicit and consistent advocates of land retention

410. See Connick & Fairfax, supra note 277, at Introduction 17.
411. See Connick & Fairfax, spra note 277, at Introduction 5-7. We find it interesting that
land acquisition for forests in the East was much earlier and more easily established than
reservation authority in the West. Note, however, that acquisition authority for parks, as
opposed to forests, has never been dearly acceptable. See id.
412. See id, at Introduction 19 (discussing one of the motives behind the act).
413. See Stock Raising Homestead Act of 1916,43 US.C. § 294 repealed by Pub. L No. 94579, § 702, 90 Stat. 2787, 2789 (1976).
414. See PEFFB supra note 10, at 162-63. See also GATES, supra note 1, at 501.
415. See GATES, supra note 1, at 517.
416. See PEPPER, supranote 10, at 161.
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in order to prevent further breakup of "their" ranches. Increasingly, the
livestock operators saw that they could get what they wanted by manipulating the managing agencies, separating title from control.
10.

The National Park Service Established-InstitutionalFragmentation

Like 187247 and 1906,18 public domain policy students find 1916
sweetly ironic. The intensification of disposition under the Stock Raising
Homestead Act was juxtaposed with the passage of a bill establishing the
National Park Service (NPS). 19 Some of the irony disappears, however,
with further information about the NPS act. It was more ballyhooed than
the 1905 statute that authorized the formation of the U.S. Forest Service.420
The Park Service "organic act" was far less of an embrace of government
management and dearly was not a congressional imprimatur for federal
preservation efforts.' The Act opened the national parks, monuments and
reservations to both timber harvest and grazing of livestock.' Moreover,
the first responsibility assigned to the "service thus established" was to
"promote and regulate the use of the federal areas known as national parks,
monuments, and reservations." 3 (Emphasis added.) To achieve that goal,
Congress authorized the Secretary to "grant privileges, leases and permits
for the use of land for the accommodation of visitors." 424 These "privileges" ripened into proprietary interests for concession holders.'

417. Both the General Mining Act of 1872 and the Yellowstone reservation passed. General
Mining Act of 1872, ch. 152,17 Stat. 91 (1872) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 30
U.S.C.); Act of Mar. 1,1872, ch. 28,17 Stat. 32 (1872) (codified at 16 US.C. § 21).
418. Both the Antiquities Act and the Forest Homesteading Bill passed. Antiquities Act
of 1906, ch. 3060, § 2,34 Stat. 225 (1906) (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 431); Act of June 11, 1906, ch.
3074, Pub. L. No. 220,34 Stat. 233, repealed by Pub. L. No. 94-579, § 702,90 Stat. 2787,2789
(1976).
419. National Park Service Organic Act of 1916,16 U.S.C. §§ 1-4 (1994).
420. See Forest Transfer Act, ch. 288, 33 Stat. 628 (codified in scattered sections of 16
U.S.C.) (1905). As noted above, the Forest Service song and story embraces the far more
ambivalent 1897 act.
421. The National Park Service act is frequently and accurately portrayed as a defeat for
the Forest Service. See Connick & Fairfax, supra note 277, at Introduction 19.
422. The Secretary of the Interior has rarely pursued such options.
423. 16 U.S.C. § 1. See LARRY M. DRSAVER,AMERICA'S NATIONAL PARK SYSTEM: THE
CRITICAL DOCUMENTS 46-47 (1994); SELARS, supra note 326, at ch.1, 7-27, ch. 2, at 28-46.
424. National Park Service Concessions Policy Act of 1965,16 U.S.C. § 20a (1994) repealed
by National Park Service Concessions Management Improvement Act of 1998, Pub. L No. 105391, § 401,112 Stat. 3515 (1998).
425. See George Cameron Coggins & Robert L.Glicksman, ConcessionsLaw and Policy in
the NationalPark System, 74 DENY. U. L. REv. 729, 740-59 (1997). But notice as well that a new
system to award concessions in parks was created by the National Parks Omnibus
Management Act of 1998,16 U.S.C. §§ 5951-57 (West Supp. 1999).
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For obvious reasons, most of the present day discussion of the act
centers on a putative paradox in one sentence in the statute. Modem
advocates of the Park Service as an instrument of nature preservation find
it confusing that the NPS is required "to conserve the scenery and the
natural and historic objects and the wild life therein" and to "provide for
public enjoyment," while ensuring that the parks are left "unimpaired for
the enjoyment of future generations." Steven Mather, first director of the
Park Service, was less wracked by that arguable conundrum than
subsequent advocates of park purism. He was a tireless promoter of roads,
hotels, cars, and tourism in the national parks.'
The founding of the National Park Service would be, given some
late twentieth century notions of what the statute said, an unambiguous
mark in the reservation/preservation column. However, a simple reading
of its actual words and early implementation tells a different story. It
opened lands previously closed to grazing and timber harvest. More
importantly, the act began a "cooperative effort between government and
private business-notably railroad, automobile and other tourism
interests-to.. .preserve places of great natural beauty and scientific
interest, while also.. .creating and perpetuating an economic base through
tourism. " 'm

11.

Mineral Land Leasing Act of 1920-Nominal Retention and Institutional

Fragmentation
After more than a decade of debate and litigation, passage of the
Mineral Land Leasing Act of 1920 (MLA) answered the question of how to
develop reserved sedimentary and energy mineral deposits. The 1920
statute could be understood as the retention poster child. This seems a
reasonable conclusion at first blush, but several caveats are worth mention.
First, from the outset, leases for coal were issued without any apparent
effort to protect the federal interest in the resources. Regarding on-shore oil
and gas, for the most part, the government proceeded as if applicants had
a right to a lease. Indeed, it continues to do so in many cases.429 Although
the government retained considerable potential control over development

426. 16 U.S.C. § 1.See Robert B. Keiter, NationalPark Protection:Putting the OrganicAct to
Work, in OUR COMMON LANDS: DEFENDING THE NATONAL PARKS 75,75-78 (David J. Simon ed.,

1988) (interpreting the statute as a management mandate, biased in the politically correct
direction of preservation).
427. See SELtARS, supranote 326, at ch. 3, 47-90.
428. Id. at 89.
429. See FAIRFAX & YALE, supranote 42, at ch. 5, 68-71. The most notable exception is the
1997 decision not to allow leasing on the Lewis and Clarke National Forest in Montana on the

grounds that such leasing would disrupt regional citizens' "sense of place."
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of many of those deposits, it did not exercise 0it. " Second, western states
cut an impressive financial deal in the receipt sharing provisions of the
minerals leasing program"3e While only nominally giving up control over
development of valuable resources within their boundaries, the states
gained 90 percent of the revenues from mineral development, which under
the MLA are distributed to the states. Fifty percent of the revenues are
distributed to the state in which the development takes place, and another
40 percent are earmarked for deposit in the "reclamation fund," an account
established to provide start-up money for reclamation projects.' The
remaining ten percent is deposited in the general fund of the U.S. treasury.
Thus, the MLA presents an interesting challenge to our discussion
of retained resources. Nominally, the control it gave federal managers over
the location, timing, intensity, and reclamation of minerals development
suggested that the resources were clearly retained.'~ In practice, the
government rarely exercised that control. All of the economic returns from
the resources were split off and granted to the states.' Accordingly, when
one considers the "bundle of sticks" that has become the dominant
metaphor for understanding property, it is clear that under the MLA, the
federal government disposed to the states key elements of the bundle.'
Therefore, it seems reasonable to conclude that what the government
retained is the potential to control.
12. "Redistribution" Redux-Title and Control Part Company on National
ForestRanges
A slightly different partitioning of the bundle of rights arises in the
continuing saga of the Forest Service's redistribution policy regarding
grazing access. By the mid-1920s, one segment of the livestock industry
had achieved effective control over the grazing program on national
forests. Ranchers with base properties succeeded both in excluding
transient sheep operations from forest ranges and in redefining permit
terms sufficiently to be secure against redistribution to newcomers. Indeed,
430.
431.

See ROBERTH. NELSON, THE MAKING OF FEDERAL COAL POLICY ch. 2, at 23-29 (1983).
See FAIRFAX & YALE, supra note 42, at ch. 5, 74-78,91,98.

432. See FAIRFAX & YALE, supranote 42, at 151-53. The reclamation fund is, like many of
the retention programs discussed herein, more apparent than real. In fact, there is no
reclamation fund at all; it is a bookkeeping fiction.
433. The leasing system also fragmented the management of access to mineralized
lands,-minerals within national forests were and continue to be managed by agencies in the
Department of the Interior.
434. This is not nearly so clear a fragmentation of title as the surface/subsurface split
effected by the 1916 Stock Raising Homestead Act.

435. See Sally K. Fairfax, et. al.,
The FederalForests Are Not What They Seem: Formal and
Informal Claims to FederalLands, 25 ECOLOGY LQ. 630 (1999) [hereinafter Formal & Informal
Claims (updating control over mineral development, and the devolution thereof to states).
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the permit morphed from an annual permit to "turn out" a designated
number of animals into an exclusive right to graze virtually in perpetuity
on a specific place.
The new permits gave ranchers access to a specific area and the
right to fence it in, and effectively eliminated community allotments for
subsistence grazing.' The stockmen successfully sought a rancherdominated board to review any allotment changes made by the agency.'
They also sought a separation between the upward limit on newcomer
growth potential and the low point to which the agency could reduce
existing permittees' allotments in order to make room for newcomers.
Under the new policy, no newcomer could ever achieve holdings equal to
the size of existing operations. This created a permanent two-level system
that effectively discouraged newcomers and thereby significantly reduced
any pressure for redistribution. Finally, the Forest Service changed permits
from year-to-year allocations into leases with 10-year terms. Even the tenyear limit was largely a formality-the permits effectively became
permanent allotments in the vast majority of cases.
Although ranchers were unsuccessful in having their entire agenda
enacted into law, they forever altered the contours of the permit program
on Forest Service lands. It had been a very short walk from Forest Service
control over grazing on national forests to permittees gaining control over
the Forest Service grazing lands. For almost all purposes, the permittees
succeeded in gaining most of the benefits of ownership while avoiding
most of its burdens (e.g., paying property tax on privately owned land).
Over time, the largess ripened into an entitlement, which has been
increasingly difficult to alter." Thus, what looked like a reservation and an
assertion of federal control over access to federal property was rapidly
transformed by political manipulation into a Forest Service statement of
preference for one among several rival claimants of federal largess.

436. See PATRICK C. WEST, UNIV. OF MICH. MONOGRAPH #2, NATURAL RESOURCE
BUREAUCRACY AND RURAL POVERTY: A STUDY IN THE POLmCAL SOCIOLOGY OF NATURAL

RESOURCES 60-62 (1982).
437. The stockmen did not ignore the courts as an avenue for achieving favorable policies.
They challenged both the Constitutionality of the congressional delegation of rule making
authority to the Secretary of Agriculture, and the statutory basis of the Secretary's decision
to charge a nominal fee for grazing access. In both instances, their challenge failed. See, e.g.,
Light v. United States, 220 U.S. 523 (1911); United States v. Grimaud, 220 U.S. 506 (1911).
438. See Raymond, supra note 41, at 432. Raymond is clear that as a legal matter, a
property right does not exist See id. However, the effect of established expectations solidified
in a web of other rights and policies, such as the facts of permit transfer and the tax
implications noted above, has created an effective right. See id. at 436-38.
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13. The Taylor Grazing Act-More Nominal Retention and Federal
Acquiescence
Forest Service acquiescence in livestock operator's priorities began
with Pinchot's need for their support in procuring a transfer of the forest
reserves from the Department of Interior to the Department of Agriculture.
It continued because the Forest Service and the Department of the Interior
engaged in a protracted struggle for authority over the remaining
unreserved, un-entered public domain. Most especially under Secretary
Harold Ickes (1930-1947), the Department of the Interior refused to
relinquish control over the remaining grazing lands in the public domain.
Passage of the Taylor Grazing Act followed a process of two federal
agencies competing with each other to gain the support of stock operators.
Not surprisingly, implementation of the Taylor Grazing Act evinced a
pattern similar to grazing programs on national forests. It looked on the
surface like a reservation, but should be understood as a successful effort
by one set of claimants to achieve exclusive access to specific areas. That
access has evolved into a right or entitlement becoming extremely difficult
to alter.
The Taylor Grazing Act (TGA) passed in 1934 following the
successful wooing of the livestock industry by Interior Secretary Harold
Ickes with promises of less restrictive management in the Interior
Department. Under the statute, and the amendments and executive actions
which rapidly followed, the remaining public domain lands in the
continental United States were withdrawn from entry and established as
grazing districts. This withdrawal from entry gives the TGA the appearance of a retention statute.4"
After 1934, the federal government nominally controlled entry and
use of all public lands in the contiguous forty-eight states.' However, it is
difficult to characterize either the intent or the end result as retention. From

439. The Taylor Grazing Act, ch. 865,48 Stat. 1269 (1934) (codified as 43 U.S.C. § 315); See
PEPPER, supra note 10, at 222-25. Certainly this is Peffer's position when she characterizes its
passage as the closing of "the public domain." Id. at 224. Peffer is the classic source on the
Taylor Grazing Act. See also Sally K. Fairfax, Coming of Age in the Bureau of Land Management:
Range Management in Search of a Gospel, in DEVELOPING STRATEGIES FOR RANGELAND
MANAGEMENT: A REPORT PREPARED BY THE COMMITTEE ON DEVELOPING STRATEGIES FOR

RANGELAND MANAGEMENT 1715,1722-27 (National Research Council, National Academy of
Sciences 1984) thereinafter Coming of Age).
440. See Coming ofAge, supranote 439, at 1722-27. For consistency's sake, it is worth noting
that the act specifically provides that these steps were ostensibly taken "pending final
disposition." Hence, we have a final act in our series of withdrawals or reservations pending
development of an improved disposition program. The principal impact of this language was
to cloud title to the lands and to justify minimal federal oversight for another four decades.
See id. at 1728-29.
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the outset, the grazing district lands were viewed as encumbered by
previously existing rights, and the allocation of access under the TGA
proceeded merely to stabilize patterns of previous use."1 There was no
intimation in the allocation of TGA permits--as there had been in the
Reclamation Act and the Forest Service's redistribution program-that the
government was doing anything other than sorting out existing access by
formalizing some claims and eliminating others. To be sure, the ranchers
manipulated the allocation process.' Indeed, the commitment of the first
director of the program was to achieve "democracy on the range." "Ferry"
Carpenter wrote proudly that in Idaho he was not welcome in his capacity
as Director of the Grazing Service at meetings called to allow local ranchers
to describe their historic use. Therefore, Carpenter simply skipped the
meeting and waited until locals later changed their minds and invited him
back. This was not a land reservation, but a formalization of local users'
control over the resource. Perhaps recognizing this, Congress did not act
to establish an agency to manage the grazing districts until 42 years after
the TGA passed."
13.

Summary

Ironically, we see under Roosevelt and Pinchot, not a broadening
of the reservation policy or a flowering of the government ownership and
management programs which they so ardently sought, but a complex
fragmentation of policy. The least subtle element of this policy disarray,
and the one least compatible with the "shift-to-retention" thesis, is the
specific and increasingly emphatic commitment to continuing disposition.
The 1872 General Mining Act was not the "last" of the disposition statutes,
as it is frequently portrayed. Disposition programs continued through

441.

See FARRINGTON R. "FERRY" CARPENTER, CONFESSIONS OF A MAVERICK AN

AUTroIOGRAPHY 164-65 (1984). Carpenter's goal was to set up grazing advisory boards of
existing grazers and let them do it. See id.
442.

See DANA & FAIRFAX, supra note 11, at 162-63. Ranchers used the presence of fences,

which had been declared an illegal nuisance in Camfield, as evidence of historic range use for
purposes of establishing a right to a permit. Statutory criteria included historic use and access
to a base property. By defining historic use as "between 1929 and 1934," the more prosperous
ranchers were able to eliminate those who had cut their herds during the worst of the
Depression. See id. at 163. Thus, by giving those with a base property first access, as opposed
to the sheep herders with historic use but no base property, the cattlemen were absolutely
advantaged. See id.
443. See CAPENTER, supra note 441, at 164.
444. See Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976,43 U.S.C. § 1731 (1994). Under
the Federal Land Policy and Management Act, Congress officially organized the Bureau of
Land Management. Previous versions, the Bureau of Grazing, the Grazing Service, and the
early BLM were the result of internal reorganizations within the Department of the Interior.
See id.
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heavily subsidized homesteading activities made possible by the Reclamation Act. This policy culminated in the Stock Raising Homestead Act of
1916, and peaked again, in terms of acreage involved, with the stock
operators' kidnapping of the Forest Service redistribution program, and the
passage of the Taylor Grazing Act in 1934.
Similarly disappointing to the "shift-to-retention" theorists is the
unmistakable fact that many established reservations were rescinded.
Notably, some Indian Reservations and the Irrigation Survey succumbed
to disposal along with the pivotal forest reservation authority granted to
the president in 1891. In the early years of this century, Congress opened
existing forest reservations to homesteading, grazing, and minerals entry.
Even while establishing the National Park Service, Congress simultaneously opened park and monument reservations to timber harvest and
grazing of livestock.
The nominal reservations are slightly more difficult to discern.
Forest Service actions effectively returned control of national forest grazing
lands to the livestock operators. Congress intended the Forest Service to
assure the continuing availability of forage resources on national forests to
the stream of actual settlers. The Stock Raising Homestead Act made little
sense if Congress anticipated that settlers arriving to take advantage of that
act would be shut out of grazing on public forests. Nevertheless, the
agency rapidly turned its back on its initial programs and gradually
relinquished effective control to the stock operators. We conclude that the
putative reservation evolved into a statement of preference for one set of
rival claimants to the public lands.
Similarly, the Taylor Grazing Act separates title from control, and
the grazing districts it created are appropriately viewed as only nominally
retained. The act as well as its implementation looked and felt as if
Congress decided to avert its eyes while the dominant groups divided up
the carcass of the public domain to "stabilize the range livestock industry."
The Department of the Interior simply turned over the public range in an
exercise of "democracy."' More interesting still were the partial retentions.
The Stock Raising Homestead Act divided the earth into two separate
estates. The Mineral Leasing Act fragmented the resource three ways,
separating control from title, and both from the right to benefit economically from the development. The revenue shares extracted by the states in
the process of ceding control suggest that the resource was only partially

445. Typically one encounters the phrase "home rule on the range." It is possible that in
future years the BLM will utilize the "bare title" that they do have, to impose effective
management on these resources. However, at present writing, the momentum continues in
the opposite direction and it is difficult to consider the grazing lands of the West in any
meaningful sense "retained."
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retained in federal ownership. Moreover, the mining industry was every
bit as effective in preventing federal management of mineral deposits as
were the livestock operators. Therefore, the retention of control must be
considered not only partial, but also nominal.
This section provided both chronological background and a
revisionist look at public domain policies between the Civil War and the
Taylor Grazing Act. We found no clear line of policy development away
from land disposition toward a coherent federal policy of retention. We
conclude that there is sufficient reason to discard the "shift-to-retention"
model and to justify further investigation of the "fragmentation" alternative.
V. CONCLUSIONS
Our goal has been to reconsider the "shift-to-retention" account of
public domain history. It is dear that between 1879 and 1934 permanent
government land ownership, and subsequently land management, became
a more important element of public domain policy than it had been during
the previous century. However, the notion of a shift-to-retention does not
bear weight as the organizing theme for understanding public resource law
and policy at the turn of the last century, or at the close of the present one.
Given the fragmenting ideas about government and property that we
described in Parts II and III, the assertion that policy issues at the intersection of land and government would take off on a single coherent path
should immediately arouse suspicions. Nevertheless, the story has had
staying power or "legs" because it suits the needs of those advocates who
find that the idea of public management facilitates their control over public
resources without burdening them with ownership responsibilities.'
A. The Fragmentation Narrative
Instead of a single shift, we described three extensive forms of
policy fragmentation. First, and most seriously, goals and means of policy

fragmented. Retention certainly became an important policy option,
especially in the late nineteenth century. For certain types of land, such as
those containing scenic wonders, antiquities, and stands of timber,
retention became a robust and fully-developed policy alternative under
Pinchot's and Roosevelt's guidance. But for many lands normally described
as "retained," the story is more complex. In some cases, the idea of
"retention" obscures the crucial fact that many federal holdings were

446. Oddly, beneficiaries include two groups not traditionally seen as bedfellows:
environmental advocates and commodity users, particularly ranchers.
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actually re-acquired by the government from private owners, through
voluntary sale and condemnation, rather than simply being withdrawn
from disposal. Federal authorities quickly reconsidered other reservations
of land. In every "reserve and rescind" example, the pressure to undo the
reservation came in favor of continued disposal for use by actual settlers.
In fact, during the ostensible "shift-to-retention" era, disposition to actual
settlers remained a primary policy goal on huge percentages of land in
federal ownership. Thus, this juxtaposition of retention and continuing
disposition is quite destructive of the "shift-to-retention" model as an
analytical tool.
Another path of policy fragmentation lay somewhere between the
retention and disposition options we have described so far. Extensive
resources-most particularly grazing lands as well as energy and
sedimentary minerals-appear to have been retained, but upon closer
inspection have not been effectively held for government ownership and
management. We refer to such lands as having been either partially or
nominally retained. These resources reflect many of the elements of the
fragmenting notion of property and ownership discussed in Part III. These
partially and nominally-retained lands are particularly important in part
because they are so extensive-they have created a myth all their own." 7
The Report of the Public Land Law Review Commission" has indelibly
imprinted the notion that the federal government owns and manages onethird of the nation's land."9 State and native claims have reduced federal
holdings in Alaska, however, where the major concentration of federal
lands continues to be located. More important to our narrative, we calculate
that if you remove even just the "nominally-retained" grazing lands from
the government owned column, the extent of federal land ownership is
reduced considerably, to about ten percent of the nation's land. This single,
simple observation could become an important element of an improved
dialogue regarding federal land ownership.

447. We are grateful to our colleague Scott Sellwood, who elaborated this line of thought
in, of all places, his master's oral exam!
448. Actually, it was the fourth in a series of public land law review commissions, dated
in 1880,1905,1929, and the final one, thus far, in the late 1960s. See PUBIC LAND LAW REVIEW
COMMISSION, ONE THIRD OF THE NATION'S LAND A REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND TO
CONGRESS (1970).

449. This observation has given rise to much comment about the anomaly of such
extensive government holdings in the epicenter of capitalism, and some less rational discourse
about socialism, communism, and, more recently, jack and/or black-booted storm troopers
in helicopters. Ironically, the latter refrains appear most prevalent in those regions of the
country where citizens ought to be aware that the alleged federal control is frequently more
apparent than real,
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The second fragmentation occurred among resource management
institutions. Far from producing the integrated approach to planning and
management of resources that Pinchot envisioned in Rock Creek Park, the
Progressive Era ushered in an extensive diversification of agencies and laid
the foundation for competition between various branches of government.
The proliferation of agencies, each to serve a different constituency, had
begun, and never again would all of the public domain be the responsibility of a single agency or department. Similarly, the bureaucratization of
resource management led to extensive competition, not just among
agencies, but between Congress and the Executive Branch. Whatever else
federal policy was to become, it would not provide a comprehensive,
integrated approach to government-owned resources.
Third, the resources themselves were fragmented. The process
began in our discussion with the 1866 Mining Act, with the severance of
the land from the water, for purposes of determining jurisdiction. It
continued as different professions and agencies carved first one piece then
another out of the public domain. Forests, water, minerals, scenic wonders,
and forage were each assigned to separate agencies or bureaucracies as the
landscape was fragmented. As new notions of ownership permeated law
and society, Congress parceled out the "bundle of sticks" differently for
different resources. Congress retained nominal control but granted
economic benefits to the states or private actors, and so on. There was no
longer a single, dominant conception of lots on the public domain as
indivisible subjects of ownership, just as there was no longer a single
dominant policy for the land's continued protection and use.
B.

Implications for Theory and Practice

It is the lot of academics to believe that an improved analytical
framework and vocabulary are important to both theory and practice. Our
discussion suggests that a more complex approach to understanding public
domain policy is needed. We make three suggestions about what a new
and improved theory should look like. We follow those comments with
some concluding thoughts on how these new theoretical ideas help in the
practical world of public land policymaking today.
1. Implicationsfor Theory
First, we believe that a scheme based on periods dominated by a
progression of particular policies is unworkable. Since we have simultaneously engaged in disposition, expanded retention, and reacquisition of
lands for the better part of a century, any notion of eras is bound to be
badly misleading. More specifically, a tale that positions a particular era
and approach to policy in the golden light of omniscience is even more
prone to error.
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Second, an effective narrative regarding twentieth century public
land policy must make room to display durable tensions underlying our
choices. The "shift-to-retention" narrative encompasses many basic tradeoffs in our political life: public ownership as against private stewardship;
bureaucratic/political control or entrepreneurial/economic decision
making; economic development versus preservation for aesthetics or
environmental services; science as a basis for legitimacy in public decision
making as distinct from popular preference on the one hand and from
practical experience on the other; centralized, ostensibly comprehensive
decision making at the federal level as opposed to state, local, regional or
other mixed approaches.
Unfortunately, the "shift-to-retention" narrative privileges one
element of each choice and frequently inscribes the other as evil. Corporations are bad; science is good; locals and their knowledge are not to be
trusted, but somehow actual settlers are our heroes. It is important to have
a narrative that recognizes the legitimacy of more than one element within
these basic notions of government and that focuses on where and when a
specific approach is more likely to achieve stated goals.
We believe that an emphasis on property and entitlements, formal
title as well as informal rights, access and expectations, is a useful place to
start. By entitlements we mean formal title as well as informal rights and
expectations of access, use, and other property-like claims. 1 Our discussion of property in Part III established that there are two significantly
different perspectives on ownership within our political discourse-the
intrinsic and the instrumentalist views. Both Lockean ideas and Progressive
Era notions associated with the less-familiar Cohen have had, and continue
to have, an important influence on policy, and neither seems likely to usurp
the other anytime soon. Both embody assumptions regarding the proper
role of government--crudely limited versus activist--both of which
similarly wax and wane without ever triumphing or disappearing. Part IV
revealed this conflicting set of ideas about property and government in
public land policy. In fact, that experience is far broader than the "retain in
federal ownership" vs. "dispose of to states or privatize" dyad that has
congealed around the last several reenactments of the Sagebrush Rebellion

450. See Joseph L Sax, Liberatingthe PublicTrust Doctrinefrom Its HistoricShackles, 14 U.C.
DAvis L. REv. 185,187-88 (1980) (defining "established expectations" as a property element
protected by the public trust doctrine).
451. See generally Formal & Informal Claims, supra note 435.
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Saga.' We must appreciate the full spectrum of title arrangements, both
historic and currently emerging, on the public domain.4
But Part III confirmed that there is something important missing
the
familiar juxtaposition of Locke and his Progressive Era critics. The
from
Hegelian account of government and ownership gives us a useful handle
on the incompatible ideas and policies that we have observed in public
domain law and policy, but which is missing from the Locke/Intrinsic to
Cohen/Instrumental continuum. Indeed, it is Hegel who best describes the
property ideas in operation on the majority of the public land. Not Locke,
because under nominal retention, the full intrinsic rights of ownership are
not recognized-they remain checked by social demands. Not Cohen,
because the same social demands are nevertheless unable to displace the
individual rights of those with tenure on public lands. It is Hegel who
strives to find some balance between competing demands of property-the
social and the individual-without unduly disregarding either or
homogenizing the combination and provides an ingredient missing from
the traditional spectrum of discussion.
Consider again the grazing example. Much of the advocacy
surrounding the conflict over control of federal grazing lands implicitly
partakes of a simplified account of ownership. Those in favor of stronger
federal management see the ongoing assertions of control by local users as
a sham. Only an instrumental approach to property, disregarding Lockean
claims of ownership and entitlement by local users, can support this
position. Similarly, those favoring private rights in public lands buttress
their arguments with an intrinsic account of property, in which the
government is obliged to recognize existing rights of tenure rather than
creating or changing them.' Given the fundamentally opposite visions of
property that underwrite their positions, it is no wonder that advocates on
both sides of the volatile issue are generally unable to move towards
satisfactory conclusions.
The stories of the advocates, however, only tell half a tale. In
reality, government policy with respect to public lands embraced both an
intrinsic and an instrumental approach to property at the same time,
without attempting to untangle all the contradictions thereby created. The
Taylor Grazing Act, for example, reserved some powers of ownership to

452. See, e.g., John D. Leshy, Sharing Federal Multiple-Use Lands: Historic Lessons and
Speculationsfor the Future, in RETHINKING THE FEDERAL LANDS 235 (Sterling Brubaker ed.,
1984).
* 453.

454.

See generallyFormal & Informal Claims, supranote 435.
See, e.g., WAYNE RAGE, STORM OVER RANGELANDS: PRIVATE RIGHTS INFEDERAL LANDS

(1989) (a classic example of this argument). Hage is currently suing the federal government
over reductions in his permit to graze Forest Service lands in Nevada. See Hage v. United
States, 35 Fed. Cl. 147 (1996); Hage v. United States, 42 Fed. Cl. 249 (1998).
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the federal government even as it was recognizing pre-existing rights.
Thus, the intrinsic view of property was modified by instrumentalist ideas
of control regarding federal public lands. Neither view of property was
dominant. Instead, federal policy attempted to embrace both visions of
ownership, because a complete adherence to either was unacceptable.
There dearly remain some deeply held beliefs that pre-existing claims on
these lands (or "entitlements" in today's vernacular) are to be respected.
And yet, there also dearly remain contrary beliefs that these lands are
federally owned for the betterment of the nation as a whole. These
mutually exclusive views are a significant part of policy fragmentation, and
a key means of creating the wide swaths of "nominally retained" land.
Such irreconcilable differences suggest the utility of Hegel's dialectical
analysis to ownership as a third approach to underwriting policy.
Having proffered an entitlements approach emphasizing Hegel's
notion of property as an appropriate gloss on our fragmentation narrative,
we reject three others that could be made to fit with the same story line.
The first is to describe fragmentation as conceptual mush. One might argue
that Progressive Era policy makers and subsequent public land managers
have been bumbling along incrementally for a century, seeking the path of
least resistance or acting in a conceptual void. We reject that interpretation
flatly, having demonstrated to the contrary that policy has long been
driven by a firmament of powerful, but incompatible ideas about government and property.
We also reject a slightly more directed version of the "conceptual
mush" gloss, a pragmatism theme. One might explain the fragmentation
resulted from experimentation and a willingness to try whatever worked
in diverse political and edaphic circumstances. Although less troubling
than the mush hypothesis, a canny pragmatist story simply will not
wash.' Finally, we reject the flip side of the pragmatist theme, the notion
that policy was and continues to be driven by mere, messy, undesirable,
and ultimately evil power politics. The role of politics must be understood,
not reviled, in any narrative that successfully describes past fragmentation
and the present-day array of entitlements.' Political advocates use ideas
and stories to make their claims precisely because they have power.

455. See HEAVEN ON EARTH, supra note 70, passim (arguing there has been almost nothing
ingenious about the public land law and policy in the last 125 years-almost everything we

tried failed).
456. All three of these glosses fail on the point of durability. People believe and/or
manipulate the Progressive Era "shift-to-retention" mystique. If we were simply up against

witless mush, mindless pragmatism, or power politics, the dominant story of the public
domain and conservation history would be easier to change and transcend than it has proven
to be. Thus, the Progressive Era "shift-to-retention" myth is a barrier to clear thinking. See
HEAVEN ON EARTH, supranote 70, at 328-29.
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2. Implicationsfor Practice
Several narratives emerge from a refined frame of reference based
on a Hegelian approach to entitlements. One consequence of adopting a
richer frame of reference or vocabulary concerning entitlements is that it
makes us realize that we have tried a far greater range of instruments for
arranging title and control than the simplistic "shift-to-retention" narrative
permits us to discuss. We have, under different circumstances and for
different resources, tried everything from "the government retains all
rights" to "the government gives away all rights." In between we have
tried "the government retains bare title and grants away all control and
economic benefit," "the government retains control and title but grants all
economic benefit," "the government gives away the surface but retains the
subsurface," and vice versa.
One of the unhappy insights from recognizing that fact is to
become aware that no single arrangement seems to satisfy completely.
Perhaps they only seem to fail because we are not wholly aware of what we
have done. We have not adequately analyzed or understood the nuances,
pros, and cons of each arrangement of title or the circumstances in which
it might be effective. Clarification of the diverse ways in which we have
fragmented both policy and title allows a fuller understanding of the
alternatives that we have tried. We should lay to rest the imprecations of
good and evil that accompany the "shift-to-retention" model because it
taints wholly legitimate private rights and expectations. Nevertheless, the
fact remains, we have tried many different approaches to apportioning title
and control. Thus, we should treat with suspicion any suggestions that
some new arrangement of rights will resolve our differences.
A second outcome of an improved frame of reference relocates our
expectation on the intrinsic-instrumentalist continuum. We realize that
many of the decisions to retain that we thought we had made a century ago
are the real heart of the debate that is going on now. No wonder we are so
irritable with each other. No wonder the dialogue seems unrelated to the
actual issues that managers, local communities, investors, environmentalists, and recreationists encounter. One branch of the attentive public
believes its predecessors' press releases by simply assuming that lands
inscribed on the maps as federal are "public."' Another branch recognizes
that government title is partial, fraught with caveats and compromises, and
riven with legitimate private rights. Yet another branch, particularly Native
Americans and claimants of access under ancient Spanish land grants and

457. See generally Formal & Informal Claims, supranote 435 (dissenting on this and related

points).
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entitlements, argues that any level of federal title or private claims based
on federal policies are simply bogus, based on theft.'
Recognizing the legitimacy of those diverse perspectives enables
us to understand that growing exercise of federal authority over western
lands'" is in fact an effort to turn the potential federal control over partially
and nominally retained resources into actual control. Indeed, the issue of
government ownership and control is alive and the focus of debate right
now. We have been deluded by the founding myths of the conservation
movement and several key agencies into believing that the issue of
retention was resolved a century ago. Thus, many participants in the
debate are ill equipped to understand the wide variety of assumptions and
expectations that others bring to the discussion.
Another way to use this model is to observe that most of the
assumptions that underwrote the possibility of federal ownership and
scientific management are unwinding. We are not in an era of burgeoning
nationalism, continental aspirations, and faith in science.'" Similarly,
458. See id. at 637-39. A virtue of the entitlements approach is that it provides entree into
expectations that do not normally make it onto the agenda, reconfiguring the national forests,
for example, in the wake of the growing realization about the extent to which they were
simply stolen from prior claimants. For Hispanic claims see Donald Dale Jackson, Around Los
Ojos, Sheep and Land Are Fighting Words, SMITHSONIAN, Apr. 1991, at 36; CLYDE EASTMAN &
JAMES R.GRAY, COMMUNrTY GRAZING: PRACnICE AND POTENTIAL IN NEW MEXICO 23-30,51-82
(1987); Pladdo Gomez, The Historyand Adjudition of the Common Lands of Spanishand Mexion
Land Grants, 25 NAT. RESOURCES J.1039 (1985). For a brief look at problems in National Parks,
see Formal & Informal Claims, supranote 435, at 637-39 (discussing Native American peoples
and their rights in the formation of early parks).
459. The dominant trend has been to greater and greater federal control under statutes
such as the National Forest Management Act of 1976 (NFMA), 16 US.C. §§ 1600-14 (1994); the
Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976 (FLPMA), 43 U.S.C. §§ 1701-82 (1994); the
Endangered Species Act of 1973 (ESA), 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-43 (1994); the Surface Mining
Control and Reclamation Act of 1977 (SMCRA), 30 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1308 (1994); and the
National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA), 42 U.SC. § 4321-70 (1994). Nevertheless,
it would be as much of an error to describe a "shift" at the end of the twentieth century as it
is at the end of the nineteenth century. Offsetting the growing federal control narrative are a
number of counter trends, including growing recognition of traditional and aboriginal claims
in the Southwest and in and around former and never-were-but-should-have-been Indian
reservations, huge dispositions of land to states and natives under the Alaska Native Claims
Settlement Act (ANSCA) 43 US.C. § 1601-29 (1994), giveaways "beyond avarice" of federal
coal under SMCRA (the descriptive phrase was frequently used by then-BLM Director Frank
Gregg) and the growing range of entitlements for "receipt sharing" payments to counties from
non-existent harvests (a process now known as "de-coupling" the receipt share from the
harvest). See, e.g., Formal & Informal Claims,supra note 435, at 642-44.
460. See HEAVE ON EARTH,supra note 70, at xix-xxi (noting, for example, that the market
has an increasing cache as a distributor of goods, and the sense of community in American
life has been dissipating since the end of the Second World War). See also Donald Snow,
Introductionto JOHN BADEN et al., THE NEXT WEST: Pusuc LANDS, COMMuNrry AND ECONOMY
INTHE AMuIcAN WEST 1-9 (1997). Interestingly, much of this resurrection of community and
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science is no longer accepted in most circles as an authoritative arbiter of
public priorities. Instead, each of us has faith in scientific findings that
support our prejudices and preferences." 1 Some observers attempt to
translate these changes in the national mood about government into the
underpinnings for a new gospel. Traditional environmentalists reassert the
Progressive Era values of science and centralized management under the
authority of the Endangered Species Act.' Others argue that the local or
community level-face-to-face democracy-provides some special
alchemy." In part, the quest for a new, simplifying principle is rooted in
the notion that we used to have one.' Our argument, to the contrary, is
that we never had a single gospel. To the extent that we think one existed,
we are deluding ourselves. Americans have been, for the better part of 125
years, in the maw of a debate over disparate principles and constantly
changing frames of reference regarding both property and government.
Accordingly, multiple and incompatible views of public land issues are
important and relevant. A policy story that fails to recognize that fact
confuses the present by misrepresenting the past.

rejection of government programs is tied to an embrace of Aldo Leopold's aura. See id. at 6-8.

Leopold is quite incorrectly proffered as a hero of and advocate for government ownership
and management. See id.
461. See Sally Fairfax, LMSSONS FOR THE FORUNT SERVIcE FROM STATE TRUST LAND
MANAGEMENff EXPERIENCE 9 (Resources for the Future Discussion Paper No. 99-16, 1999).

Ecologists are expressing greater hesitation about their own abilities to predict ecosystem
response to different management alternatives or attributing outcomes to particular
management strategies, events, or disturbances. See id. at 10.
462. Robert Nelson asserts that the market is enjoying increased cache as a distributor of
goods. See HEAVEN ON EARTH, supm 70, at xxi-xxvL Nelson seems high centered on economics
and decentralization/community control. See HEAVEN ON EARTH, supra 70, at 460.
463. See KEMMIS, supranote 87, at ch. 8,10941. It is at any rate enjoying a renaissance in
public esteem and aspirations. But see RANDAL O'TOOLE, REIORMING THE FOREST SERVICE

(1988) (focuses less on privatization and markets than on proper incentives to federal
bureaucrats, which does, of course, tend in the same market driven direction, but only after
partaking of the Progressive's embrace of scientific, government management).
464. See, e.g., Coming ofAge, supra note 439.

